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Preface
Computer vision is an ever growing discipline whose ambitious goal is to equip machines with the in-
telligent visual skills humans and animals are provided by Nature, allowing them to interact effortlessly
with complex, dynamic environments. Designing automated visual recognition and sensing systems
typically involves tackling a number of challenging tasks, and requires an impressive variety of sophis-
ticated mathematical tools. In most cases, the knowledge a machine has of its surroundings is at best
incomplete – missing data is a common problem, and visual cues are affected by imprecision. The need
for a coherent mathematical ‘language’ for the description of uncertain models and measurements then
naturally arises from the solution of computer vision problems.
The theory of evidence (sometimes referred to as ‘evidential reasoning’, ‘belief theory’ or ‘Dempster-
Shafer theory’) is, perhaps, one of the most successful approaches to uncertainty modelling, and arguably
the most straightforward and intuitive approach to a generalized probability theory. Emerging in the
late Sixties as a profound criticism of the more classical Bayesian theory of inference and modelling
of uncertainty, evidential reasoning stimulated in the following decades an extensive discussion of the
epistemic nature of both subjective ‘degrees of beliefs’ and frequentist ‘chances’, or relative frequencies.
More recently a renewed interest in belief functions, the mathematical generalization of probabilities
which are the object of study of the theory of evidence, has seen a blossoming of applications to a
variety of fields of human knowledge.
In this Book we are going to show how, indeed, the fruitful interaction of computer vision and belief
calculus is capable of stimulating significant advances in both fields.
From a methodological point of view, novel theoretical results concerning the geometric and algebraic
properties of belief functions as mathematical objects are illustrated and discussed in Part II, with a
focus on both a perspective ‘geometric approach’ to uncertainty and an algebraic solution to the issue of
conflicting evidence.
In Part III we show how these theoretical developments arise from important computer vision problems
(such as articulated object tracking, data association and object pose estimation) to which, in turn, the
evidential formalism is able to provide interesting new solutions.
Finally, some initial steps towards a generalization of the notion of total probability to belief functions
are taken, in the perspective of endowing the theory of evidence with a complete battery of estimation
and inference tools to the benefit of all scientists and practitioners.
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‘’La vera logica di questo mondo il calcolo delle probabilita` ... Questa branca della matematica, che
di solito viene ritenuta favorire il gioco d’azzardo, quello dei dadi e delle scommesse, e quindi estrema-
mente immorale, e` la sola ‘matematica per uomini pratici’, quali noi dovremmo essere. Ebbene, come
la conoscenza umana deriva dai sensi in modo tale che l’esistenza delle cose esterne e` inferita solo
dall’armoniosa (ma non uguale) testimonianza dei diversi sensi, la comprensione, che agisce per mezzo
delle leggi del corretto ragionamento, assegnera` a diverse verita` (o fatti, o testimonianze, o comunque li
si voglia chiamare) diversi gradi di probabilita`.”
James Clerk Maxwell
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
In the wide river of scientific research, seemingly separate streams often intertwine, generating novel,
unexpected results. The fruitful interaction between mathematics and physics, for example, marked in
the Seventeenth Century the birth of modern science in correspondence with the publication of Newton’s
Philosophia Naturalis Principia Mathematica1. The accelerated accumulation of human knowledge
which characterized the last century has, on the one hand, much increased the possibility of such fecund
encounters taking place - on the other hand, this very growth has caused as a side effect a seemingly
unstoppable trend towards extreme specialization.
The aim of this Book is to provide a significant example of how crossing the traditional boundaries
between disciplines can lead to novel results and insights that would have never been possible otherwise.
As mentioned in the Preface, computer vision is an interesting case of a booming discipline involving
a panoply of difficult problems, most of which involve the handling of various sources of uncertainty
for decision making, classification or estimation. Indeed the latter are crucial problems in most applied
sciences [1], as both people and machines need to make inferences about the state of the external world,
and take appropriate actions. Traditionally, the (uncertain) state of the world is assumed to be described
by a probability distribution over a set of alternative, disjoint hypotheses. Making appropriate decisions
or assessing quantities of interest requires therefore estimating such a distribution from the available
data.
Uncertainty [2, 3, 4, 5, 6] is normally handled in the literature within the Bayesian framework [7, 8],
a fairly intuitive and easy to use setting capable of providing a number of ‘off the shelf’ tools to make
inferences or compute estimates from time series. Sometimes, however, as in the case of extremely
rare events (e.g., a volcanic eruption or a catastrophic nuclear power plant meltdown), few statistics
are available to drive the estimation. Part of the data can be missing. Furthermore, under the law of
large numbers, probability distributions are the outcome of an infinite process of evidence accumulation,
drawn from an infinite series of samples, while in all practical cases the available evidence can only
provide some sort of constraint on the unknown probabilities governing the process. All these issues
have led to the recognition of the need for a coherent mathematical theory of uncertainty under partial
data [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16].
Different kinds of constraints are associated with different generalizations of probabilities [17, 18],
formulated to model uncertainty at the level of distributions [19, 20]. The simplest approach consists in
setting upper u(x) and lower l(x) bounds to the probability values of each element x of the sample space,
yielding what is usually called a ‘probability interval’. A more general approach allows the (unknown)
distribution to belong to an entire convex set of probability distributions – a ‘credal set’. Convexity (as
a mathematical requirement) is a natural consequence, in these theories, of rationality axioms such as
coherence. A battery of different uncertainty theories has indeed been developed in the last century or
so [21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27], starting from De Finetti’s pioneering work [28, 29]. Among the most
powerful and successful frameworks it is worth mentioning possibility-fuzzy set theory [30], the theory
of random sets [31, 32], and that of imprecise probabilities [33], without forgetting other significant
1Isaac Newton, 1687
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contributions such as monotone capacities [34, 35], Choquet integrals [36], rough sets, hints, and more
recent approaches based on game theory [37, 38].
G. Shafer’s theory of belief functions [39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44], in particular, allows us to express partial
belief by providing lower and upper bounds to probability values on all events [45, 46, 47, 48, 49].
According to A. Dempsters seminal work [50], a belief function is a lower probability measure induced
by the application of a multi-valued mapping to a classical probability distribution. The term ‘belief
function’ was coined when Shafer proposed to adopt these mathematical objects to represent evidence
in the framework of subjective probability, and gave an axiomatic definition for them as non-additive
probability measures. In a rather controversial interpretation, belief functions can be also seen as a
special case of credal set, for each of them determines a convex set of probabilities ‘dominating’ its
belief values.
Belief functions carried by different bodies of evidence can be combined using the so-called Demp-
ster’s rule, a direct generalization of classical Bayes’ rule. This combination rule is an attractive tool
which has made the fortune of the theory of evidence, for it allows us to merge different sources of
information prior to making decisions or estimating a quantity of interest. Many other combination rules
have been proposed since, to address paradoxes generated by the indiscriminate application of Demp-
ster’s rule to all situations or to better suit cases in which the sources of evidence to combine are not
independent or entirely reliable (as requested by the original combination rule).
Why a theory of evidence? Despite its success the theory of evidence, along with other non-
‘mainstream’ uncertainty theories, is often the object of a recurring criticism: why investing effort and
intellectual energy on learning a new and (arguably) rather more complex formalism only to satisfy some
admittedly commendable philosophical curiosity? The implication being that classical probability theory
is powerful enough to tackle any real-world application. Indeed people are often willing to acknowledge
the greater naturalness of evidential solutions to a variety of problems, but tend also to point out belief
calculus’ issue with computational complexity while failing to see its practical edge over more standard
solutions.
Indeed, as we will see in this Book, the theory of belief functions does address a number of com-
plications associated with the mathematical description of the uncertainty arising from the presence of
partial or missing evidence (also called ‘ignorance’). It makes use of all and only the available (partial)
evidence. It represents ignorance in a natural way, by assigning ‘mass’ to entire sets of outcomes (in
our jargon ‘focal elements’). It explicitly deals with the representation of evidence and uncertainty on
domains that, while all being related to the same problem, remain distinct. It copes with missing data
in the most natural of ways. As a matter of fact it has been shown that, when part of the data used to
estimate a desired probability distribution is missing, the resulting constraint is a credal set of the type
associated with a belief function [51]. Furthermore, evidential reasoning is a straightforward generaliza-
tion of probability theory, one which does not require abandoning the notion of event (as is the case for
Walley’s imprecise probability theory). It contains as special cases both fuzzy set and possibility theory.
In this Book we will also demonstrate that belief calculus has the potential to suggest novel and ar-
guably more ‘natural’ solutions to real-world problems, in particular within the field computer vision,
while significantly pushing the boundaries of its mathematical foundations.
A word of caution. We will neglect here almost completely the evidential interpretation of belief func-
tions (i.e., the way Shafer’s ‘weights of the evidence’ induce degrees of belief), while mostly focussing
on their mathematical nature of generalized probabilities. We will not attempt to participate in the de-
bate concerning the existence of a correct approach to uncertainty theory. Our belief, supported by many
scientists in this field (e.g. by Didier Dubois), is that uncertainty theories form a battery of useful com-
plementary tools among which the most suitable must be chosen depending on the specific problem at
hand.
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Scope of the Book. The theory of evidence is still a relatively young field. For instance, a major lim-
itation (in its original formulation) is its being tied to finite decision spaces, or ‘frames of discernment’,
although a number of efforts have been brought forward to generalize belief calculus to continuous
domains (see Chapter 3). With this Book we wish to contribute to the completion of belief theory’s
mathematical framework, whose greater complexity (when compared to standard probability theory) is
responsible, in addition, for the existence of a number of problems which do not have any correspon-
dence in Bayesian theory.
We will introduce and discuss theoretical advances concerning the geometrical and algebraic proper-
ties of belief functions and the domains they are defined on, and formalize in the context of the theory of
evidence a well-known notion of probability theory – that of total function. In the longer term, our effort
is directed towards equipping belief calculus with notions analogous to those of filtering and random
process in probability theory. Such tools are widely employed in all fields of applied science, and their
development is, in our view, crucial to making belief calculus a valid alternative to the more classical
Bayesian formalism.
We will show how these theoretical advances arise from the formulation of evidential solutions to
classical computer vision problems. We believe this may introduce a novel perspective into a discipline
that, in the last twenty years, has had the tendency to reduce to the application of kernel-based support
vector machine classification to images and videos.
Outline of the Book. Accordingly, this Book is divided into three Parts.
In Part I we recall the core definitions and the rationale of the theory of evidence (Chapter 2), along
with the notions necessary to the comprehension of what follows. As mentioned above, many theo-
ries have been formulated with the goal of integrating or replacing classical probability theory, their
rationales ranging from the more philosophical to the strictly application-orientated. Several of these
methodologies for the mathematical treatment of uncertainty are briefly reviewed in Chapter 3. We will
not, however, try to provide a comprehensive view of the matter, which is still evolving as we write.
Part II is the core of this work. Starting from Shafer’s axiomatic formulation of the theory of belief
functions, and motivated by the computer vision applications later discussed in Part III, we propose
novel analyses of the geometrical and algebraic properties of belief functions as set functions, and of the
domains they are defined on.
In particular, in Chapter 4 the geometry of belief functions is investigated by analyzing the convex shape
of the set of all the belief functions defined over the same frame of discernement (which we call ‘belief
space’). The belief space admits two different geometric representations, either as a simplex (a higher-
dimensional triangle) or as a (recursive) fiber bundle. It is there possible to give both a description
of the effect of conditioning on belief functions and a geometric interpretation of Dempster’s rule of
combination itself. In perspective, this geometric approach has the potential to allow us to solve problems
such as the canonical decomposition of a belief function in term of its simple support components (see
Chapter 2). The problem of finding a probability transformation of belief functions that is respectful of
the principles of the theory of evidence, and may be used to make decisions based on classical utility
theory, also finds a natural formulation in this geometric setting.
Stimulated by the so-called ‘conflict’ problem, i.e., the fact that each and every collection of belief
functions (representing, for example, a set of image features in the pose estimation problem of Chapter
8) is not combinable, in Chapter 5 we analyze the algebraic structure of families of compatible frames
of discernment, proving that they form a special class of lattices. In Chapter 6 we build on this lattice
structure to study Shafer’s notion of ‘independence of frames’, seen as elements of a semimodular lattice.
We relate independence of frames to classical matroidal independence, and outline a future solution to
the conflict problem based on a pseudo-Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization algorithm.
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In Part III we illustrate in quite some detail two computer vision applications whose solution originally
stimulated the mathematical developments of Part II.
In Chapter 7 we propose an evidential solution to the model-based data association problem, in which
correspondences between feature points in adjacent frames of a video associated with the positions of
markers on a moving articulated object are sought at each time instant. Correspondences must be found
in the presence of occlusions and missing data, which induce uncertainty in the resulting estimates.
Belief functions can be used to integrate the logical information available whenever a topological model
of the body is known, with the predictions generated by a battery of classical Kalman filters. In this
context the need to combine conditional belief functions arises, leading to the evidential analogue of
the classical total probability theorem. This is the first step, in our view, towards a theory of filtering
in the framework of generalized probabilities. Unfortunately, only a partial solution to this total belief
problem is given in this Book, together with sensible predictions on the likely future directions of this
investigation.
Chapter 8 introduces an evidential solution to the problem of estimating the configuration or ‘pose’
of an articulated object from images and videos, while solely relying on a training set of examples. A
sensible approach consists in learning maps from image features to poses, using the information provided
by the training set. We present therefore a ‘Belief Modeling Regression’ (BMR) framework in which,
given a test image, its feature measurements translate into a collection of belief functions on the set of
training poses. These are then combined to yield a belief estimation, equivalent to an entire family of
probability distributions. From the latter, either a single central pose estimate (together with a measure
of its reliability) or a set of extremal estimates can be computed. We illustrate BMR’s performance
in an application to human pose recovery, showing how it outperforms our implementation of both
Relevant Vector Machine and Gaussian Process Regression. We discuss motivation and advantages of
the proposed approach with respect to its competitors, and outline an extension of this technique to
fully-fledged tracking.
Finally, some reflections are proposed in the Conclusions of Part IV on the future of belief calculus,
its relationships with other fields of pure and applied mathematics and statistics, and a number of future
developments of the lines of research proposed in this Book.
Part 1
Belief calculus

CHAPTER 2
Shafer’s mathematical theory of evidence
The theory of evidence [52] was introduced in the Seventies by Glenn Shafer as a way of representing
epistemic knowledge, starting from a sequence of seminal works ([53], [54], [55]) by Arthur Dempster,
Shafer’s advisor [56]. In this formalism the best representation of chance is a belief function (b.f.) rather
than a classical probability distribution. Belief functions assign probability values to sets of outcomes,
rather than single events: their appeal rests on their ability to naturally encode evidence in favor of
propositions.
The theory embraces the familiar idea of assigning numbers between 0 and 1 to measure degrees of
support but, rather than focusing on how these numbers are determined, it concerns itself with the mech-
anisms driving the combination of degrees of belief.
The formalism provides indeed a simple method for merging the evidence carried by a number of dis-
tinct sources (called Dempster’s rule [57]), with no need for any prior distributions [58]. In this sense,
according to Shafer, it can be seen as a theory of probable reasoning. The existence of different levels of
granularity in knowledge representation is formalized via the concept of family of compatible frames.
The most popular theory of probable reasoning is perhaps the Bayesian framework [59, 60], due to
the English clergyman Thomas Bayes (1702-1761). There, all degrees of beliefs must obey the rule of
chances (i.e., the proportion of time in which one of the possible outcomes of a random experiment tends
to occur). Furthermore, its fourth rule dictates the way a Bayesian function must be updated whenever
we learn that a certain proposition A is true:
(1) P (B|A) = P (B ∩ A)
P (A)
.
This so-called Bayes’ rule is inextrably related to the notion of ‘conditional’ probability P (B|A) [61].
As we recall in this Chapter, the Bayesian framework is actually contained in the theory of evidence
as a special case, since:
(1) Bayesian functions form a special class of belief functions, and
(2) Bayes’ rule is a special case of Dempster’s rule of combination.
In the following we will neglect most of the emphasis Shafer put on the notion of ‘weight of evidence’,
which in our view is not strictly necessary to the comprehension of what follows.
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1. Belief functions
Let us first review the classical definition of probability measure, due to Kolmogorov [62].
1.1. Belief functions as superadditive measures.
DEFINITION 1. A probability measure over a σ-field or σ-algebra1 F ⊂ 2Ω associated with a sample
space Ω is a function p : F→ [0, 1] such that
• p(∅) = 0;
• p(Ω) = 1;
• if A ∩B = ∅, A,B ∈ F then p(A ∪B) = p(A) + p(B) (additivity).
If we relax the third constraint to allow the function p to meet additivity only as a lower bound, and
restrict ourselves to finite sets, we obtain what Shafer [52] called a belief function.
DEFINITION 2. Suppose Θ is a finite set, and let 2Θ = {A ⊆ Θ} denote the set of all subsets of Θ. A
belief function (b.f.) on Θ is a function b : 2Θ → [0, 1] from the power set 2Θ to the real interval [0, 1]
such that:
• b(∅) = 0;
• b(Θ) = 1;
• for every positive integer n and for every collection A1, ..., An ∈ 2Θ we have that:
(2) b(A1 ∪ ... ∪ An) ≥
∑
i
b(Ai)−
∑
i<j
b(Ai ∩ Aj) + ...+ (−1)n+1b(A1 ∩ ... ∩ An).
Condition (2), called superadditivity, obviously generalizes Kolmogorov’s additivity (Definition 1).
Belief functions can then be seen as generalizations of the familiar notion of (discrete) probability mea-
sure. The domain Θ on which a belief function is defined is usually interpreted as the set of possible
answers to a given problem, exactly one of which is the correct one. For each subset (‘event’) A ⊂ Θ
the quantity b(A) takes on the meaning of degree of belief that the truth lies in A.
Example: the Ming vase. A simple example (from [52]) can clarify the notion of degree of belief. We
are looking at a vase that is represented as a product of the Ming dynasty, and we are wondering whether
the vase is genuine. If we call θ1 the possibility that the vase is original, and θ2 the possibility that it is
indeed counterfeited, then
Θ = {θ1, θ2}
is the set of possible outcomes, and {∅,Θ, {θ1}, {θ2}}
is the (power) set of all its subsets. A belief function b over Θ will represent the degree of belief that
the vase is genuine as b({θ1}), and the degree of belief the vase is a fake as b({θ2}) (note we refer
to the subsets {θ1} and {θ2}). Axiom 3 of Definition 2 poses a simple constraint over these degrees
of belief, namely: b({θ1}) + b({θ2}) ≤ 1. The belief value of the whole outcome space Θ, therefore,
represents evidence that cannot be committed to any of the two precise answers θ1 and θ2 and is therefore
an indication of the level of uncertainty about the problem.
1 Let X be some set, and let 2X represent its power set. Then a subset Σ ⊂ 2X is called a σ-algebra if it satisfies the
following three properties [63]:
• Σ is non-empty: there is at least one A ⊂ X in Σ;
• Σ is closed under complementation: if A is in Σ, then so is its complement, X \A;
• Σ is closed under countable unions: if A1, A2, A3, ... are in Σ, then so is A = A1 ∪A2 ∪A3 ∪ · · · .
From these properties, it follows that the σ-algebra is also closed under countable intersections (by De Morgan’s laws).
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1.2. Belief functions as set functions. Following Shafer [52] we call the finite set of possibili-
ties/outcomes frame2 of discernment (FOD).
1.2.1. Basic probability assignment.
DEFINITION 3. A basic probability assignment (b.p.a.) [65] over a FOD Θ is a set function [66, 67, 66]
m : 2Θ → [0, 1] defined on the collection 2Θ of all subsets of Θ such that:
m(∅) = 0,
∑
A⊂Θ
m(A) = 1.
The quantity m(A) is called the basic probability number or ‘mass’ [68, 69] assigned to A, and
measures the belief committed exactly to A ∈ 2Θ. The elements of the power set 2Θ associated with
non-zero values of m are called the focal elements of m and their union is called its core:
(3) Cm .=
⋃
A⊆Θ:m(A)6=0
A.
Now suppose that empirical evidence is available so that a basic probability assignment can be introduced
over a specific FOD Θ.
DEFINITION 4. The belief function associated with a basic probability assignment m : 2Θ → [0, 1] is
the set function b : 2Θ → [0, 1] defined as:
(4) b(A) =
∑
B⊆A
m(B).
It can be proven that [52]:
PROPOSITION 1. Definitions 2 and 4 are equivalent formulations of the notion of belief function.
The intuition behind the notion of belief function is now clearer: b(A) represents the total belief
committed to a set of possible outcomes A by the available evidence m. As the Ming vase example
illustrates, belief functions readily lend themselves to the representation of ignorance, in the form of the
mass assigned to the whole set of outcomes (FOD). Indeed, the simplest belief function assigns all the
basic probability to the whole frame Θ and is called vacuous belief function.
Bayesian theory, in comparison, has trouble with the whole idea of encoding ignorance, for it cannot
distinguish between ‘lack of belief’ in a certain event A (1 − b(A) in our notation) and ‘disbelief’ (the
belief in the negated event A¯ = Θ \ A). This is due to the additivity constraint: P (A) + P (A¯) = 1.
The Bayesian way of representing the complete absence of evidence is to assign an equal degree of belief
to every outcome in Θ. As we will see in this Chapter, Section 7.2, this generates incompatible results
when considering different descriptions of the same problem at different levels of granularity.
1.2.2. Moebius inversion formula. Given a belief function b there exists a unique basic probability
assignment which induces it. The latter can be recovered by means of the Moebius inversion formula3:
(5) m(A) =
∑
B⊂A
(−1)|A\B|b(B).
Expression (5) establishes a 1-1 correspondence between the two set functions m and b [71].
2For a note about the intuitionistic origin of this denomination see Rosenthal, Quantales and their applications [64].
3See [70] for an explanation in term of the theory of monotone functions over partially ordered sets.
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1.3. Plausibility functions or upper probabilities. Other expressions of the evidence generating a
given belief function b are what can be called the degree of doubt d(A) .= b(A¯) on an event A and, more
importantly, the upper probability of A:
(6) pl(A) .= 1− d(A) = 1− b(A¯),
as opposed to the lower probability of A, i.e., its belief value b(A). The quantity pl(A) expresses the
‘plausibility’ of a proposition A or, in other words, the amount of evidence not against A [72]. Once
again the plausibility function pl : 2Θ → [0, 1] conveys the same information as b, and can be expressed
as
pl(A) =
∑
B∩A 6=∅
m(B) ≥ b(A).
1.3.1. Example. As an example, suppose a belief function on a frame Θ = {θ1, θ2, θ3} of cardinality
three has two focal elements B1 = {θ1, θ2} and B2 = {θ1} as in Figure 1, with b.p.a. m(B1) = 1/3,
m(B2) = 2/3.
Then, for instance, the belief value of A = {θ1, θ3} is:
(7) b(A) =
∑
B⊆{θ1,θ3}
m(B) = m({θ1}) = 2/3,
while b({θ2}) = m({θ2}) = 0 and b({θ1, θ2}) = m({θ1}) + m({θ1, θ2}) = 2/3 + 1/3 = 1 (so that the
‘core’ of the considered belief function is C = {θ1, θ2}).
FIGURE 1. An example of (consonant, see Section 8) belief function on a frame of
discernment Θ = {θ1, θ2, θ3} of cardinality 3, with focal elements B2 = {θ1} ⊂ B1 =
{θ1, θ2}.
To appreciate the difference between belief (lower probability) and plausibility (upper probability)
values, let us focus in particular on the event A′ = {θ1, θ3}. Its belief value (7) represents the amount of
evidence which surely supports {θ1, θ3}, and is guaranteed to involve only elements of A′.
On the other side, its plausibility value:
pl({θ1, θ3}) = 1− b({θ1, θ3}c) =
∑
B∩{θ1,θ3}6=∅
m(B) = m({θ1}) +m({θ1, θ2}) = 1
accounts for the mass that might be assigned to some element of A′, and measures the evidence not
surely against it.
1.4. Bayesian theory as a limit case. Confirming what said when discussing the superadditivity
axiom (2), in the theory of evidence a (finite) probability function is simply a belief function satisfying
the additivity rule for disjoint sets.
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DEFINITION 5. A Bayesian belief function b : 2Θ → [0, 1] meets the additivity condition:
b(A) + b(A¯) = 1
whenever A ⊆ Θ.
Obviously, as it meets the axioms of Definition 2, a Bayesian belief function is indeed a belief function.
It can be proved that [52]:
PROPOSITION 2. A belief function b : 2Θ → [0, 1] is Bayesian if and only if ∃ p : Θ→ [0, 1] such that∑
θ∈Θ p(θ) = 1 and:
b(A) =
∑
θ∈A
p(θ) ∀A ⊆ Θ.
2. Dempster’s rule of combination
Belief functions representing distinct bodies of evidence can be combined by means of Dempster’s
rule of combination [73], also called orthogonal sum.
2.1. Definition.
DEFINITION 6. The orthogonal sum b1 ⊕ b2 : 2Θ → [0, 1] of two belief functions b1 : 2Θ → [0, 1],
b2 : 2
Θ → [0, 1] defined on the same FOD Θ is the unique belief function on Θ whose focal elements are
all the possible intersections of focal elements of b1 and b2, and whose basic probability assignment is
given by:
(8) mb1⊕b2(A) =
∑
i,j:Ai∩Bj=A
m1(Ai)m2(Bj)
1−
∑
i,j:Ai∩Bj=∅
m1(Ai)m2(Bj)
,
where mi denotes the b.p.a. of the input belief function bi.
Figure 2 pictorially expresses Dempster’s algorithm for computing the basic probability assignment of
the combination b1 ⊕ b2 of two belief functions. Let a unit square represent the total, unitary probability
mass one can assign to subsets of Θ, and associate horizontal and vertical strips with the focal elements
A1, ..., Ak and B1, ..., Bl of b1 and b2, respectively. If their width is equal to their mass value, then their
area is also equal to their own mass m(Ai), m(Bj). The area of the intersection of the strips related
to any two focal elements Ai and Bj is then equal to the product m(Ai) · m(Bj), and is committed to
the intersection event Ai ∩ Bj . As more than one such rectangle can end up being assigned to the same
subset A (as different pairs of focal elements can have the same intersection) we need to sum up all these
contributions, obtaining:
mb1⊕b2(A) ∝
∑
i,j:Ai∩Bj=A
m1(Ai)m2(Bj).
Finally, as some of these intersections may be empty, we need to discard the quantity∑
i,j:Ai∩Bj=∅
m1(Ai)m2(Bj)
by normalizing the resulting basic probability assignment, obtaining (8).
Note that, by Definition 6 not all pairs of belief functions admit an orthogonal sum – two belief
functions are combinable if and only if their cores (3) are not disjoint: C1 ∩ C2 6= ∅ or, equivalently, iff
there exist a f.e. of b1 and a f.e. of b2 whose intersection is non-empty. A1 A2 A3 A4 B1 B2 B3
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FIGURE 2. Graphical representation of Dempster’s rule of combination: the sides of the
square are divided into strips associated with the focal elements Ai and Bj of the belief
functions b1, b2 to combine.
PROPOSITION 3. [52] If b1, b2 : 2Θ → [0, 1] are two belief functions defined on the same frame Θ,
then the following conditions are equivalent:
• their Dempster’s combination b1 ⊕ b2 does not exist;
• their cores (3) are disjoint, Cb1 ∩ Cb2 = ∅;
• ∃A ⊂ Θ s.t. b1(A) = b2(A¯) = 1.
FIGURE 3. Example of Dempster’s sum. The belief functions b1 with focal elements
A1, A2 and b2 with f.e.s B1, B2 (left) are combinable via Dempster’s rule. This yields a
new belief function b1 ⊕ b2 (right) with focal elements X1 and X2.
2.1.1. Example of Dempster’s combination. Consider a frame of discernment Θ = {θ1, θ2, θ3, θ4, θ5}.
We can define there a belief function b1 with basic probability assignment:
m1({θ2}) = 0.7, m1({θ2, θ4}) = 0.3.
Such a b.f. has then two focal elements A1 = {θ2} and A2 = {θ2, θ4}. As an example, its belief values
on the events {θ4}, {θ2, θ5}, {θ2, θ3, θ4} are respectively b1({θ4}) = m1({θ4}) = 0, b1({θ2, θ5}) =
m1({θ2}) + m1({θ5}) + m1({θ2, θ5}) = 0.7 + 0 + 0 = 0.7 and b1({θ2, θ3, θ4}) = m1({θ2}) +
m1({θ2, θ4}) = 0.7 + 0.3 = 1 (so that the core of b1 is {θ2, θ4}).
Now, let us introduce another belief function b2 on the same FOD, with b.p.a.:
m2(B1) = m2({θ2, θ3}) = 0.6, m2(B2) = m2({θ4, θ5}) = 0.4.
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The pair of belief functions are combinable, as their cores C1 = {θ2, θ4} and C∈ = {θ2, θ3, θ4, θ5} are
clearly not disjoint.
Dempster’s combination (8) yields a new belief function on the same FOD, with focal elements (Figure
3-right) X1 = {θ2} = A1 ∩B1 = A2 ∩B1 and X2 = {θ4} = A2 ∩B2 and b.p.a.:
m(X1) =
m1({θ2}) ·m2({θ2, θ3}) +m1({θ2, θ4}) ·m2({θ2, θ3})
1−m1({θ2}) ·m2({θ4, θ5}) =
0.7 · 0.6 + 0.3 · 0.6
1− 0.7 · 0.4 = 5/6,
m(X2) =
m1({θ2, θ4}) ·m2({θ4, θ5})
1−m1({θ2}) ·m2({θ4, θ5}) =
0.3 · 0.4
1− 0.7 · 0.4 = 1/6.
Note that the resulting b.f. b1 ⊕ b2 is Bayesian.
2.2. Weight of conflict. The normalization constant in (8) measures the level of conflict between
the two input belief functions, for it represents the amount of evidence they attribute to contradictory
(i.e., disjoint) subsets.
DEFINITION 7. We call weight of conflict K(b1, b2) between two belief functions b1 and b2 the loga-
rithm of the normalisation constant in their Dempster’s combination:
K = log 1
1−∑i,j:Ai∩Bj=∅m1(Ai)m2(Bj) .
Dempster’s rule can be trivially generalised to the combination of n belief functions. It is interesting
to note that, in that case, weights of conflict combine additively.
PROPOSITION 4. Suppose b1, ..., bn+1 are belief functions defined on the same frame Θ, and assume
that b1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ bn+1 exist. Then:
K(b1, ..., bn+1) = K(b1, ..., bn) +K(b1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ bn, bn+1).
2.3. Conditioning belief functions. Dempster’s rule describes the way the assimilation of new ev-
idence b′ changes our beliefs previously encoded by a belief function b, determining new belief values
given by b⊕ b′(A) for all events A. In this formalism, a new body of evidence is not constrained to be in
the form of a single proposition A known with certainty, as it happens in Bayesian theory.
Yet, the incorporation of new certainties is permitted as a special case. In fact, this special kind of
evidence is represented by belief functions of the form:
b′(A) =
 1 ifB ⊂ A0 ifB 6⊂ A ,
where B is the proposition known with certainty. Such a belief function is combinable with the original
b.f. b as long as b(B¯) < 1, and the result has the form:
b(A|B) .= b⊕ b′ = b(A ∪ B¯)− b(B¯)
1− b(B¯)
or, expressing the result in terms of upper probabilities/plausibilities (6):
(9) pl(A|B) = pl(A ∩B)
pl(B)
.
Expression (9) strongly reminds us of Bayes’s rule of conditioning (1) – Shafer calls it Dempster’s rule
of conditioning.
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2.4. Combination vs conditioning. Dempster’s rule (8) is clearly symmetric in the role assigned
to the two pieces of evidence b and b′ (due to the commutativity of set-theoretical intersection). In
Bayesian theory, instead, we are constrained to represent new evidence as a true proposition, and con-
dition a Bayesian prior probability on that proposition. There is no obvious symmetry, but even more
importantly we are forced to assume that the consequence of any new piece of evidence is to support a
single proposition with certainty!
3. Simple and separable support functions
In the theory of evidence a body of evidence (a belief function) usually supports more than one propo-
sition (subset) of a frame of discernment. The simplest situation, however, is that in which the evidence
points to a single non-empty subset A ⊂ Θ.
Assume 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1 is the degree of support for A. Then, the degree of support for a generic subset
B ⊂ Θ of the frame is given by:
(10) b(B) =

0 if B 6⊃ A
σ if B ⊃ A, B 6= Θ
1 if B = Θ.
DEFINITION 8. The belief function b : 2Θ → [0, 1] defined by Equation (10) is called a simple support
function focused on A. Its basic probability assignment is: m(A) = σ, m(Θ) = 1 − σ and m(B) = 0
for every other B.
3.1. Heterogeneous and conflicting evidence. We often need to combine evidence pointing to-
wards different subsets, A and B, of our frame of discernment. When A∩B 6= ∅ these two propositions
are compatible, and we say that the associated belief functions represent heterogeneous evidence.
In this case, if σ1 and σ2 are the masses committed respectively to A and B by two simple support
functions b1 and b2, we have that their Dempster’s combination has b.p.a.:
m(A ∩B) = σ1σ2, m(A) = σ1(1− σ2), m(B) = σ2(1− σ1), m(Θ) = (1− σ1)(1− σ2).
Therefore, the belief values of b = b1 ⊕ b2 are as follows:
b(X) = b1 ⊕ b2(X) =

0 X 6⊃ A ∩B
σ1σ2 X ⊃ A ∩B, X 6⊃ A,B
σ1 X ⊃ A, X 6⊃ B
σ2 X ⊃ B, X 6⊃ A
1− (1− σ1)(1− σ2) X ⊃ A,B, X 6= Θ
1 X = Θ.
As our intuition would suggest, the combined evidence supports A ∩B with degree σ1σ2.
When the two propositions have empty intersection A ∩ B = ∅, instead, we say that the evidence is
conflicting. In this situation the two bodies of evidence contrast the effect of each other.
The following example is also taken from [52].
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3.1.1. Example: the alibi. A criminal defendant has an alibi: a close friend swears that the defendant
was visiting his house at the time of the crime. This friend has a good reputation: suppose this commits
a degree of support of 1/10 to the innocence of the defendant (I). On the other side, there is a strong,
actual body of evidence providing a degree of support of 9/10 for his guilt (G).
To formalize this case we can build a frame of discernment Θ = {G, I}, so that the defendant’s
friend provides a simple support function focused on {I} with bI({I}) = 1/10, while the hard piece of
evidence corresponds to another simple support function bG focused on {G} with bG({G}) = 9/10.
Their orthogonal sum b = bI ⊕ bG yields then:
b({I}) = 1/91, b({G}) = 81/91.
The effect of the testimony has mildly eroded the force of the circumstantial evidence.
3.2. Separable support functions and decomposition. In general, belief functions can support
more than one proposition at a time.
The next simplest class of b.f.s is that of ‘separable support functions’.
DEFINITION 9. A separable support function b is a belief function that is either simple or equal to the
orthogonal sum of two or more simple support functions, namely:
b = b1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ bn,
where n ≥ 1 and bi is simple ∀ i = 1, ..., n.
A separable support function b can be decomposed into simple support functions in different ways. More
precisely, given one such decomposition b = b1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ bn with foci A1, ..., An and denoting by C the
core of b, each of the following
• b = b1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ bn ⊕ bn+1 whenever bn+1 is the vacuous belief function on the same frame;
• b = (b1 ⊕ b2)⊕ · · · ⊕ bn whenever A1 = A2;
• b = b′1⊕ · · · ⊕ b′n, whenever b′i is the simple support function focused on A′i .= Ai ∩ C such that
b′i(A
′
i) = bi(Ai), if Ai ∩ C 6= ∅ for all i;
is a valid decomposition of b in terms of simple belief functions. On the other hand,
PROPOSITION 5. If b is a non-vacuous, separable support function with core Cb then there exists a
unique collection b1, ..., bn of non-vacuous simple support functions which satisfy the following condi-
tions:
(1) n ≥ 1;
(2) b = b1 if n = 1, and b = b1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ bn if n ≥ 1;
(3) Cbi ⊂ Cb;
(4) Cbi 6= Cbj if i 6= j.
This unique decomposition is called the canonical decomposition of b – we will reconsider it later in
the Book.
An intuitive idea of what a separable support function represents is provided by the following result.
PROPOSITION 6. If b is a separable belief function, and A and B are two of its focal elements with
A ∩B 6= ∅, then A ∩B is a focal element of b.
The set of f.e.s of a separable support function is closed under set-theoretical intersection. Such a
n.f. b is coherent in the sense that if it supports two propositions, then it must support the proposition
‘naturally’ implied by them, i.e., their intersection. Proposition 6 gives us a simple method to check
whether a given belief function is indeed a separable support function.
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3.3. Internal conflict. Since a separable support function can support pairs of disjoint subsets, it
flags the existence of what we can call ‘internal’ conflict.
DEFINITION 10. The weight of internal conflictWb for a separable support function b is defined as:
• 0 if b is a simple support function;
• inf K(b1, ..., bn) for the various possible decompositions of b into simple support functions b =
b1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ bn if b is not simple.
It is easy to see (see [52] again) thatWb = K(b1, ..., bn) where b1⊕· · ·⊕bn is the canonical decomposition
of b.
4. Families of compatible frames of discernment
4.1. Refinings. One appealing idea in the theory of evidence is the simple, sensible claim that our
knowledge of any given problem is inherently imperfect and imprecise. As a consequence, new ev-
idence may allow us to make decisions on more detailed decision spaces (represented by frames of
discernments). All these frames need to be ‘compatible’ with each other, in a sense that we will precise
in the following.
One frame can certainly be assumed compatible with another if it can be obtained by introducing new
distinctions, i.e., by analyzing or splitting some of its possible outcomes into finer ones. This idea is
embodied by the notion of refining.
DEFINITION 11. Given two frames of discernment Θ and Ω, a map ρ : 2Θ → 2Ω is said to be a
refining if it satisfies the following conditions:
(1) ρ({θ}) 6= ∅ ∀θ ∈ Θ;
(2) ρ({θ}) ∩ ρ({θ′}) = ∅ if θ 6= θ′;
(3) ∪θ∈Θρ({θ}) = Ω.
In other words, a refining maps the coarser frame Θ to a disjoint partition of the finer one Ω (see Figure
4).
FIGURE 4. A refining between two frames of discernment.
The finer frame is called a refinement of the first one, and we call Θ a coarsening of Ω. Both frames
represent sets of admissible answers to a given decision problem (see Chapter 3 as well) – the finer one is
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nevertheless a more detailed description, obtained by splitting each possible answer θ ∈ Θ in the original
frame. The image ρ(A) of a subset A of Θ consists of all the outcomes in Ω that are obtained by splitting
an element of A.
Proposition 7 lists some of the properties of refinings [52].
PROPOSITION 7. Suppose ρ : 2Θ → 2Ω is a refining. Then
• ρ is a one-to-one mapping;
• ρ(∅) = ∅;
• ρ(Θ) = Ω;
• ρ(A ∪B) = ρ(A) ∪ ρ(B);
• ρ(A¯) = ρ(A);
• ρ(A ∩B) = ρ(A) ∩ ρ(B);
• if A,B ⊂ Θ then ρ(A) ⊂ ρ(B) iff A ⊂ B;
• if A,B ⊂ Θ then ρ(A) ∩ ρ(B) = ∅ iff A ∩B = ∅.
A refining ρ : 2Θ → 2Ω is not, in general, onto; in other words, there are subsets B ⊂ Ω that are not
images of subsets A of Θ. Nevertheless, we can define two different ways of associating each subset of
the more refined frame Ω with a subset of the coarser one Θ.
DEFINITION 12. The inner reduction associated with a refining ρ : 2Θ → 2Ω is the map ρ : 2Ω → 2Θ
defined as:
(11) ρ(A) =
{
θ ∈ Θ
∣∣∣ρ({θ}) ⊆ A}.
The outer reduction associated with ρ is the map ρ¯ : 2Ω → 2Θ given by:
(12) ρ¯(A) =
{
θ ∈ Θ
∣∣∣ρ({θ}) ∩ A 6= ∅}.
Roughly speaking, ρ(A) is the largest subset of Θ that implies A ⊂ Ω, while ρ¯(A) is the smallest
subset of Θ that is implied by A. As a matter of fact:
PROPOSITION 8. Suppose ρ : 2Θ → 2Ω is a refining, A ⊂ Ω and B ⊂ Θ. Let ρ¯ and ρ the related
outer and inner reductions. Then ρ(B) ⊂ A iff B ⊂ ρ(A), and A ⊂ ρ(B) iff ρ¯(A) ⊂ B.
4.2. Families of frames. The existence of distinct admissible descriptions at different levels of gran-
ularity of a same phenomenon is encoded in the theory of evidence by the concept of family of compatible
frames (see [52], pages 121-125), whose building block is the notion of refining (Definition 11).
DEFINITION 13. A non-empty collection of finite non-empty sets F is a family of compatible frames
of discernment with refiningsR, whereR is a non-empty collection of refinings between pairs of frames
in F , if F andR satisfy the following requirements:
(1) composition of refinings: if ρ1 : 2Θ1 → 2Θ2 and ρ2 : 2Θ2 → 2Θ3 are inR, then ρ2 ◦ ρ1 : 2Θ1 →
2Θ3 is inR;
(2) identity of coarsenings: if ρ1 : 2Θ1 → 2Ω, ρ2 : 2Θ2 → 2Ω are inR and ∀θ1 ∈ Θ1 ∃θ2 ∈ Θ2 such
that ρ1({θ1}) = ρ2({θ2}), then Θ1 = Θ2 and ρ1 = ρ2;
(3) identity of refinings: if ρ1 : 2Θ → 2Ω and ρ2 : 2Θ → 2Ω are inR, then ρ1 = ρ2;
(4) existence of coarsenings: if Ω ∈ F and A1, ..., An is a disjoint partition of Ω then there is a
coarsening in F corresponding to this partition;
(5) existence of refinings: if θ ∈ Θ ∈ F and n ∈ N then there exists a refining ρ : 2Θ → 2Ω in R
and Ω ∈ F such that ρ({θ}) has n elements;
(6) existence of common refinements: every pair of elements in F has a common refinement in F .
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Roughly speaking, two frames are compatible if and only if they concern propositions which can be
both expressed in terms of propositions of a common, finer frame.
By property (6) each collection of compatible frames has many common refinements. One of these is
particularly simple.
THEOREM 1. If Θ1, ...,Θn are elements of a family of compatible frames F , then there exists a unique
frame Θ ∈ F such that:
(1) ∃ a refining ρi : 2Θi → 2Ω for all i = 1, ..., n;
(2) ∀θ ∈ Θ ∃ θi ∈ Θi for i = 1, ..., n such that
{θ} = ρ1({θ1}) ∩ ... ∩ ρn({θn}).
This unique frame is called the minimal refinement Θ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Θn of the collection Θ1, ...,Θn, and
is the simplest space in which we can compare propositions pertaining to different compatible frames.
Furthermore:
PROPOSITION 9. If Ω is a common refinement of Θ1, ...,Θn, then Θ1⊗ · · ·⊗Θn is a coarsening of Ω.
Furthermore, Θ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Θn is the only common refinement of Θ1, ...,Θn that is a coarsening of every
other common refinement.
4.2.1. Example: number systems. Figure 5 illustrates a simple example of compatible frames. A
real number r between 0 and 1 can be expressed, for instance, using either binary or base-5 digits.
Furthermore, even within a number system of choice (for example the binary one), the real number can
be represented with different degrees of approximation, using for instance one or two digits. Each of
these quantized versions of r is associated with an interval of [0, 1] (red rectangles) and can be expressed
in a common frame (their common refinement, Definition 13, property (6)), for example by selecting a
2-digit decimal approximation.
Refining maps between coarser and finer frames are easily interpreted, and are depicted in Figure 5.
FIGURE 5. The different digital representations of the same real number r ∈ [0, 1]
constitute a simple example of family of compatible frames.
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4.3. Consistent belief functions. If Θ1 and Θ2 are two compatible frames, then two belief functions
b1 : 2
Θ1 → [0, 1], b2 : 2Θ2 → [0, 1] can potentially be expression of the same body of evidence. This
is the case only if b1 and b2 agree on those propositions that are discerned by both Θ1 and Θ2, i.e., they
represent the same subset of their minimal refinement.
DEFINITION 14. Two belief functions b1 and b2 defined over two compatible frames Θ1 and Θ2 are
said to be consistent if
b1(A1) = b2(A2)
whenever
A1 ⊂ Θ1, A2 ⊂ Θ2 and ρ1(A1) = ρ2(A2), ρi : 2Θi → 2Θ1⊗Θ2 ,
where ρi is the refining between Θi and the minimal refinement Θ1 ⊗Θ2 of Θ1 and Θ2.
A special case is that in which the two belief functions are defined on frames connected by a refining
ρ : 2Θ1 → 2Θ2 (i.e., Θ2 is a refinement of Θ1). In this case b1 and b2 are consistent iff:
b1(A) = b2(ρ(A)), ∀A ⊆ Θ1.
The b.f. b1 is called the restriction of b2 to Θ1, and their mass values are in the following relation:
(13) m1(A) =
∑
A=ρ¯(B)
m2(B),
where A ⊂ Θ1, B ⊂ Θ2 and ρ¯(B) ⊂ Θ1 is the inner reduction (11) of B.
4.4. Independent frames. Two compatible frames of discernment are independent if no proposition
discerned by one of them trivially implies a proposition discerned by the other. Obviously we need to
refer to a common frame: by Proposition 9 what common refinement we choose is immaterial.
DEFINITION 15. Let Θ1, ...,Θn be compatible frames, and ρi : 2Θi → 2Θ1⊗···⊗Θn the corresponding
refinings to their minimal refinement. The frames Θ1, ...,Θn are said to be independent if
(14) ρ1(A1) ∩ · · · ∩ ρn(An) 6= ∅
whenever ∅ 6= Ai ⊂ Θi for i = 1, ..., n.
Equivalently, condition (14) can be expressed as follows:
• if Ai ⊂ Θi for i = 1, ..., n and ρ1(A1) ∩ · · · ∩ ρn−1(An−1) ⊂ ρn(An) then An = Θn or one of
the first n− 1 subsets Ai is empty.
The notion of independence of frames is illustrated in Figure 6.
In particular, it is easy to see that if ∃j ∈ [1, .., n] s.t. Θj is a coarsening of some other frame Θi,
|Θj| > 1, then {Θ1, ...,Θn} are not independent. Mathematically, families of compatible frames are
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FIGURE 6. Independence of frames.
collections of Boolean subalgebras of their common refinement [74], as Equation (14) is nothing but the
independence condition for the associated Boolean sub-algebras 4.
5. Support functions
Since Dempster’s rule of combination is applicable only to set functions satisfying the axioms of belief
functions (Definition 2), we are tempted to think that the class of separable belief functions is sufficiently
4The following material comes from [74].
DEFINITION 16. A Boolean algebra is a non-empty set U provided with three internal operations
∩ : U × U −→ U
A,B 7→ A ∩B
∪ : U × U −→ U
A,B 7→ A ∪B
¬ : U −→ U
A 7→ ¬A
called respectively meet, join and complement, characterized by the following properties:
A ∪B = B ∪A, A ∩B = B ∩A
A ∪ (B ∪ C) = (A ∪B) ∪ C, A ∩ (B ∩ C) = (A ∩B) ∩ C
(A ∩B) ∪B = B, (A ∪B) ∩B = B
A ∩ (B ∪ C) = (A ∩B) ∪ (A ∩ C), A ∪ (B ∩ C) = (A ∪B) ∩ (A ∪ C)
(A ∩ ¬A) ∪B = B, (A ∪ ¬A) ∩B = B
As a special case, the collection (2S ,⊂) of all the subsets of a given set S is a Boolean algebra.
DEFINITION 17. U ′ is a subalgebra of a Boolean algebra U iff whenever A,B ∈ U ′ it follows that A ∪ B,A ∩ B and
¬A are all in U ′.
The ‘zero’ of a Boolean algebra U is defined as: 0 = ∩A∈UA.
DEFINITION 18. A collection {Ut}t∈T of subalgebras of a Boolean algebra U is said to be independent if
(15) A1 ∩ · · · ∩An 6= 0
whenever 0 6= Aj ∈ Utj , tj 6= tk for j 6= k.
Compare expressions (15) and (14).
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large to describe the impact of a body of evidence on any frame of a family of compatible frames. This
is, however, not the case as not all belief functions are separable ones.
Let us consider a body of evidence inducing a separable b.f. b over a certain frame Θ of a family F :
the ‘impact’ of this evidence onto a coarsening Ω of Θ is naturally described by the restriction b|2Ω of b
(Equation 13) to Ω.
DEFINITION 19. A belief function b : 2Θ → [0, 1] is a support function if there exists a refinement Ω
of Θ and a separable support function b′ : 2Ω → [0, 1] such that b = b′|2Θ.
In other words, a support function [75] is the restriction of some separable support function.
As it can be expected, not all support functions are separable support functions. The following Proposi-
tion gives us a simple equivalent condition.
PROPOSITION 10. Suppose b is a belief function, and C its core. The following conditions are equiv-
alent:
• b is a support function;
• C has a positive basic probability number, m(C) > 0.
Since there exist belief functions whose core has mass zero, Proposition 10 tells us that not all the
belief functions are support ones (see Section 7).
5.1. Vacuous extension. There are occasions in which the impact of a body of evidence on a frame
Θ is fully discerned by one of its coarsening Ω, i.e., no proposition discerned by Θ receives greater
support than what is implied by propositions discerned by Ω.
DEFINITION 20. A belief function b : 2Θ → [0, 1] on Θ is the vacuous extension of a second belief
function b0 : 2Ω → [0, 1], where Ω is a coarsening of Θ, whenever:
b(A) = max
B⊂Ω, ρ(B)⊆A
b0(B) ∀A ⊆ Θ.
We say that b is ‘carried’ by the coarsening Ω. We will make use of this all important notion in our
treatment of two computer vision problems in Part III, Chapter 7 and Chapter 8.
6. Impact of the evidence
6.1. Families of compatible support functions. In its 1976 essay [52] Glenn Shafer distinguishes
between a ‘subjective’ and an ‘evidential’ vocabulary, keeping distinct objects with the same mathemat-
ical description but different philosophical interpretations.
Each body of evidence E supporting a belief function b (see [52]) simultaneously affects the whole
familyF of compatible frames of discernment the domain of b belongs to, determining a support function
over every element of F . We say that E determines a family of compatible support functions {sΘE }Θ∈F .
The complexity of this family depends on the following property.
DEFINITION 21. The evidence E affects F sharply if there exists a frame Ω ∈ F that carries sΘE for
every Θ ∈ F that is a refinement of Ω. Such a frame Ω is said to exhaust the impact of E on F .
Whenever Ω exhausts the impact of E onF , sΩE determines the whole family {sΘE }Θ∈F , for any support
function over any given frame Θ ∈ F is the restriction to Θ of sΩE ’s vacuous extension (Definition 20) to
Θ⊗ Ω.
A typical example in which the evidence affects the family sharply is statistical evidence, in which case
both frames and evidence are highly idealized [52].
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6.2. Discerning the interaction of evidence. It is almost a commonplace to affirm that, by select-
ing particular inferences from a body of evidence and combining them with particular inferences from
another body of evidence, one can derive almost arbitrary conclusions. In the evidential framework,
in particular, it has been noted that Dempster’s rule may produce inaccurate results when applied to
‘inadequate’ frames of discernment.
Namely, let us consider a frame Θ, its coarsening Ω, and a pair of support functions s1, s2 on Θ deter-
mined by two distinct bodies of evidence. Applying Dempster’s rule directly on Θ yields the following
support function on its coarsening Ω:
(s1 ⊕ s2)|2Ω,
while its application on the coarser frame Θ after computing the restrictions of s1 and s2 to it yields:
(s1|2Ω)⊕ (s2|2Ω).
In general, the outcomes of these two combination strategies will be different. Nevertheless, a condition
on the refining linking Ω to Θ can be imposed which guarantees their equivalence.
PROPOSITION 11. Assume that s1 and s2 are support functions over a frame Θ, their Dempster’s
combination s1 ⊕ s2 exists, ρ¯ : 2Θ → 2Ω is an outer reduction, and
(16) ρ¯(A ∩B) = ρ¯(A) ∩ ρ¯(B)
holds wherever A is a focal element of s1 and B is a focal element of s2. Then
(s1 ⊕ s2)|2Ω = (s1|2Ω)⊕ (s2|2Ω).
In this case Ω is said to discern the relevant interaction of s1 and s2. Of course if s1 and s2 are carried
by a coarsening of Θ then this latter frame discerns their relevant interaction.
The above definition generalizes to entire bodies of evidence.
DEFINITION 22. Suppose F is a family of compatible frames, {sΘE1}Θ∈F is the family of support func-
tions determined by a body of evidence E1, and {sΘE2}Θ∈F is the family of support functions determined
by a second body of evidence E2.
Then, a particular frame Ω ∈ F is said to discern the relevant interaction of E1 and E2 if:
ρ¯(A ∩B) = ρ¯(A) ∩ ρ¯(B)
whenever Θ is a refinement of Ω, where ρ¯ : 2Θ → 2Ω is the associated outer reduction, A is a focal
element of sΘE1 and B is a focal element of s
Θ
E2 .
7. Quasi support functions
Not every belief function is a support function. The question remains of how to characterise in a
precise way the class of belief functions which are not support functions.
Let us consider a finite power set 2Θ. A sequence f1, f2, ... of set functions on 2Θ is said to tend to a limit
function f if
(17) lim
i→∞
fi(A) = f(A) ∀A ⊂ Θ.
It can be proved that [52]:
PROPOSITION 12. If a sequence of belief functions has a limit, then the limit is itself a belief function.
In other words, the class of belief functions is closed with respect to the limit operator (17). The latter
provides us with an insight into the nature of non-support functions.
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PROPOSITION 13. If a belief function b : 2Θ → [0, 1] is not a support function, then there exists a
refinement Ω of Θ and a sequence s1, s2, ... of separable support functions over Ω such that:
b =
(
lim
i→∞
si
)∣∣∣2Θ.
DEFINITION 23. We call belief functions of this class quasi-support functions.
It should be noted that (
lim
i→∞
si
)∣∣∣2Θ = lim
i→∞
(si|2Θ),
so that we can also say that s is a limit of a sequence of support functions.
The following proposition investigates some of the properties of quasi-support functions.
PROPOSITION 14. Suppose b : 2Θ → [0, 1] is a belief function over Θ, and A ⊂ Θ a subset of Θ. If
b(A) > 0 and b(A¯) > 0, with b(A) + b(A¯) = 1, then b is a quasi-support function.
It easily follows that Bayesian b.f.s are quasi-support functions, unless they commit all their probabil-
ity mass to a single element of the frame.
PROPOSITION 15. A Bayesian belief function b is a support function iff there exists θ ∈ Θ such that
b({θ}) = 1.
Furthermore, it is easy to see that vacuous extensions of Bayesian belief functions are also quasi-
support functions.
As Shafer remarks, people used to think of beliefs as chances can be disappointed to see them rele-
gated to a peripheral role, as beliefs that cannot arise from actual, finite evidence. On the other hand,
statistical inference already teaches us that chances can be evaluated only after infinitely many repetitions
of independent random experiments.5
7.1. Bayes’ theorem. Indeed, as it commits an infinite amount of evidence in favor of each possible
element of a frame of discernment, a Bayesian belief function tends to obscure much of the evidence
additional belief functions may carry with them.
DEFINITION 24. A function l : Θ → [0,∞) is said to express the relative plausibilities of singletons
under a support function s : 2Θ → [0, 1] if
l(θ) = c · pls({θ})
for all θ ∈ Θ, where pls is the plausibility function for s and the constant c does not depend on θ.
PROPOSITION 16. (Bayes’ theorem) Suppose b0 and s are a Bayesian belief function and a support
function on the same frame Θ, respectively. Suppose l : Θ→ [0,∞) expresses the relative plausibilities
of singletons under s. Suppose also that their Dempster’s sum b′ = s ⊕ b0 exists. Then b′ is Bayesian,
and
b′({θ}) = K · b0({θ})l(θ) ∀θ ∈ Θ,
where
K =
(∑
θ∈Θ
b0({θ})l(θ)
)−1
.
This implies that the combination of a Bayesian b.f. with a support function requires nothing more
than the latter’s relative plausibilities of singletons.
It is interesting to note that the latter functions behave multiplicatively under combination,
5Using the notion of weight of evidence Shafer gives a formal explanation of this intuitive observation by showing that a
Bayesian b.f. indicates an infinite amount of evidence in favor of each possibility in its core [52].
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PROPOSITION 17. If s1, ..., sn are combinable support functions, and li represents the relative plau-
sibilities of singletons under si for i = 1, ..., n, then l1 · l2 · · · · · ln expresses the relative plausibilities of
singletons under s1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ sn.
providing a simple algorithm to combine any number of support functions with a Bayesian b.f.
7.2. Incompatible priors. Having an established convention on how to set a Bayesian prior would
be useful, as it would prevent us from making arbitrary and possibly unsupported choices that could
eventually affect the final result of our inference process. Unfortunately, the only natural such convention
(a uniform prior) is strongly dependent on the frame of discernment at hand, and is sensitive to both
refining and coarsening operators.
More precisely, on a frame Θ with n elements it is natural to represent our ignorance by adopting an
uninformative uniform prior assigning a mass 1/n to every outcome θ ∈ Θ. However, the same conven-
tion applied to a different compatible frame Ω of the same family may yield a prior that is incompatible
with the first one. As a result, the combination of a given body of evidence with one arbitrary such prior
can yield almost any possible result [52].
7.2.1. Example: Sirius’ planets. A team of scientists wonder whether there is life around Sirius.
Since they do not have any evidence concerning this question, they adopt a vacuous belief function to
represent their ignorance on the frame
Θ = {θ1, θ2},
where θ1, θ2 are the answers “there is life” and “there is no life”. They can also consider the question in
the context of a more refined set of possibilities. For example, our scientists may raise the question of
whether there even exist planets around Sirius. In this case the set of possibilities becomes
Ω = {ζ1, ζ2, ζ3},
where ζ1, ζ2, ζ3 are respectively the possibility that there is life around Sirius, that there are planets but
no life, and there are no planets at all. Obviously, in an evidential setup our ignorance still needs to
be represented by a vacuous belief function, which is exactly the vacuous extension of the vacuous b.f.
previously defined on Θ.
From a Bayesian point of view, instead, it is difficult to assign consistent degrees of belief over Ω and
Θ both symbolizing the lack of evidence. Indeed, on Θ a uniform prior yields p({θ1}) = p({θ1}) = 1/2,
while on Ω the same choice will yield p′({ζ1}) = p′({ζ2}) = p′({ζ3}) = 1/3. Ω and Θ are obviously
compatible (as the former is a refinement of the latter): the vacuous extension of p onto Ω produces a
Bayesian distribution
p({ζ1}) = 1/3, p({ζ1, ζ2}) = 2/3
which is inconsistent with p′!
8. Consonant belief functions
To conclude this brief review of evidence theory we wish to recall a class of belief functions which is,
in some sense, opposed to that quasi-support functions – that of consonant belief functions.
DEFINITION 25. A belief function is said to be consonant if its focal elements A1, ..., Am are nested:
A1 ⊂ A2 ⊂ · · · ⊂ Am.
The following Proposition illustrates some of their properties.
PROPOSITION 18. If b is a belief function with upper probability function pl, then the following con-
ditions are equivalent:
(1) b is consonant;
(2) b(A ∩B) = min(b(A), b(B)) for every A,B ⊂ Θ;
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(3) pl(A ∪B) = max(pl(A), pl(B)) for every A,B ⊂ Θ;
(4) pl(A) = maxθ∈A pl({θ}) for all non-empty A ⊂ Θ;
(5) there exists a positive integer n and a collection of simple support functions s1, ..., sn such that
b = s1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ sn and the focus of si is contained in the focus of sj whenever i < j.
Consonant b.f.s represent collections of pieces of evidence all pointing towards the same direction.
Moreover,
PROPOSITION 19. Suppose s1, ..., sn are non-vacuous simple support functions with foci Cs1 , ..., Csn
respectively, and b = s1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ sn is consonant. If Cb denotes the core of b, then all the sets Csi ∩ Cb,
i = 1, ..., n are nested.
By condition (2) of Proposition 18 we have that:
0 = b(∅) = b(A ∩ A¯) = min(b(A), b(A¯)),
i.e., either b(A) = 0 or b(A¯) = 0 for every A ⊂ Θ. Comparing this result to Proposition 14 explains in
part why consonant and quasi-support functions can be considered as representing diametrically opposed
subclasses of belief functions.

CHAPTER 3
State of the art
It the almost forty years since its formulation the theory of evidence has obviously evolved quite sub-
stantially, thanks to the work of several talented researchers [76], and now this denomination refers to
a number of slightly different interpretations of the idea of generalized probability. Some people have
proposed their own framework as the ‘correct version of the evidential reasoning, partly in response to
strong criticisms brought forward by important scientists (compare for instance Judea Pearl’s contribu-
tion in [77], later recalled in [78], and [79]). Several generalizations of the initial finite-space formulation
to continuous frames of discernment have been proposed [80], although none of them has been yet ac-
knowledged as ‘the’ ultimate answer to the limitations of Shafer’s original formulation.
In the same period of time, the number of applications of the theory of evidence to engineering [81,
82, 83] and applied sciences [84, 85, 86] has been steadily increasing: its diffusion, however, is still
relatively limited when compared to that of classical probability [87] or fuzzy methods [88]. A good
(albeit outdated) survey on the topic, from a rather original point of view, can be found in [10]. Another
comparative review about texts on evidence theory is presented in [89].
Scope of the Chapter. In this Chapter, we wish to give a more up-to-date survey of the current state
of the art of the theory of evidence, including the various associated frameworks proposed during the
years, the theoretical advances achieved since its inception, and the algorithmic schemes [90] (mainly
based on propagation networks [91]) proposed to cope with the inherent computational complexity which
comes with dealing with an exponential number of focal elements [92]. Many interesting new results
have been achieved of late1, showing that the discipline is evolving towards maturity. Here we would just
like to briefly mention some of those results concerning major open problems in belief calculus, in order
to put into context the work we ourselves are going to develop in Part II. The most accredited approaches
to decision making and inference with belief functions are also reviewed [94], and a brief overview of the
various proposals for a continuous generalization of Shafer’s belief functions is given. The relationships
1The work of Roesmer [93] deserves a special mention for its original connection between nonstandard analysis and
theory of evidence.
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between Dempster-Shafer theory and other related uncertainty theories are shortly outlined, and a very
limited sample of the various applications of belief calculus to the most disparate fields is discussed.
1. The alternative interpretations of belief functions
The axiomatic set up that Shafer gave originally to his work could seem quite arbitrary at a first glance
[95, 96]. For example, Dempster’s rule [97] is not really given a convincing justification in his seminal
book [52], leaving the reader wondering whether a different rule of combination could be chosen instead
[98, 99, 100, 101, 102]. This question has been posed by several authors (e.g. [103], [104], [105]
and [106] among the others), most of whom tried to provide an axiomatic support to the choice of this
mechanism for combining evidence.
1.1. Upper and lower probabilities, multi-valued mappings and compatibility relations. As a
matter of fact the notion of belief function [107, 108] originally derives from a series of Dempster’s
works on upper and lower probabilities induced by multi-valued mappings, introduced in [53], [54] and
[55]. Shafer later reformulated Dempster’s work by identifying his upper and lower probabilities with
epistemic probabilities or ‘degrees of belief’, i.e., the quantitative assessments of one’s belief in a given
fact or proposition. The following sketch of the nature of belief functions is abstracted from [109]:
another debate on the relation between b.f.s and upper and lower probabilities is developed in [110].
Let us consider a problem in which we have probabilities (coming from arbitrary sources, for instance
subjective judgement or objective measurements) for a question Q1 and we want to derive degrees of
belief for a related question Q2. For example, Q1 could be the judgement on the reliability of a witness,
and Q2 the decision about the truth of the reported fact. In general, each question will have a number of
possible answers, only one of them being correct.
Let us call Ω and Θ the sets of possible answers to Q1 and Q2 respectively. So, given a probability
measure P on Ω we want to derive a degree of belief b(A) that A ⊂ Θ contains the correct response to
Q2 (see Figure 1).
FIGURE 1. Compatibility relations and multi-valued mappings. A probability measure
P on Ω induces a belief function b on Θ whose values on the events A of Θ are given by
(18).
If we call Γ(ω) the subset of answers to Q2 compatible with ω ∈ Ω, each element ω tells us that the
answer to Q2 is somewhere in A whenever
Γ(ω) ⊂ A.
The degree of belief b(A) of an event A ⊂ Θ is then the total probability (in Ω) of all the answers ω to
Q1 that satisfy the above condition, namely:
(18) b(A) = P ({ω|Γ(ω) ⊂ A}).
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The map Γ : Ω→ 2Θ (where 2Θ denotes, as usual, the collection of subsets of Θ) is called a multi-valued
mapping from Ω to Θ. Each of those mappings Γ, together with a probability measure P on Ω, induce a
belief function on Θ:
b : 2Θ → [0, 1]
A ⊂ Θ 7→ b(A) .=
∑
ω∈Ω:Γ(ω)⊂A
P (ω).
Obviously a multi-valued mapping is equivalent to a relation, i.e., a subsetC of Ω×Θ. The compatibility
relation associated with Γ:
(19) C = {(ω, θ)|θ ∈ Γ(ω)}
describes indeeed the subset of answers θ in Θ compatible with a given ω ∈ Ω.
As Shafer himself admits in [109], compatibility relations are only a new name for multivalued map-
pings. Nevertheless, several authors (among whom Shafer [111], Shafer and Srivastava [112], Lowrance
[113] and Yager [114]) chose this approach to build the mathematics of belief functions.
1.2. Random sets. Having a multi-valued mapping Γ, a straightforward step is to consider the prob-
ability value P (ω) as attached to the subset Γ(ω) ⊂ Θ: what we obtain is a random set in Θ, i.e., a
probability measure on a collection of subsets (see [115, 116, 31] for the most complete introductions to
the matter). The degree of belief b(A) of an event A then becomes the total probability that the random
set is contained in A. This approach has been emphasized in particular by Nguyen ([21], [117, 118]) and
Hestir [119], and resumed in [120].
Consider a multi-valued mapping Γ : Ω→ 2Θ. The lower inverse of Γ is defined as:
(20) Γ∗ : 2
Θ → 2Ω
A 7→ Γ∗(A) .= {ω ∈ Ω : Γ(ω) ⊂ A,Γ(ω) 6= ∅},
while its upper inverse is
(21) Γ
∗ : 2Θ → 2Ω
A 7→ Γ∗(A) .= {ω ∈ Ω : Γ(ω) ∩ A 6= ∅}.
Given two σ-fields (see Chapter 2, Footnote 1) A,B on Ω,Θ respectively, Γ is said strongly measur-
able iff ∀B ∈ B, Γ∗(B) ∈ A. The lower probability measure on B is defined as P∗(B) .= P (Γ∗(B)) for
all B ∈ B. By Equation (18) the latter is nothing but a belief function.
Nguyen proved that, if Γ is strongly measurable, the probability distribution Pˆ of the random set [118]
coincides with the lower probability measure:
Pˆ [I(B)] = P∗(B) ∀B ∈ B,
where I(B) denotes the interval {C ∈ B, C ⊂ B}.
In the finite case the probability distribution of the random set Γ is precisely the basic probability assign-
ment (Definition 3) associated with the lower probability or belief function P∗.
An extensive analysis of the relations between Smets’ Transferable Belief Model and the theory of
random sets can be found in [121].
1.3. Inner measures. Belief functions can also be assimilated to inner measures.
DEFINITION 26. Given a probability measure P defined over a σ-field of subsets F of a finite set X ,
the inner probability of P is the function P∗ defined by:
(22) P∗(A) = max{P (B)|B ⊂ A, B ∈ F}, A ⊂ X
for each subset A of X , not necessarily in F .
36 3. STATE OF THE ART
The inner probability value P∗(A) represents the degree to which the available probability values of
P suggest us to believe in A.
Now, let us define as domain X of the inner probability function (26) the compatibility relation C (19)
associated with a multi-valued mapping Γ, and choose as σ-field F on C the collection:
(23) F = {C ∩ (E ×Θ),∀E ⊂ Ω}.
Each element of F is the collection of all pairs in C which relate a point of E ⊂ Ω to a subset of Θ.
It is then natural to define a probability measure Q over the σ-field (23) which depends on the original
measure P on Ω:
Q : F → [0, 1]
C ∩ (E ×Θ) 7→ P (E).
The inner probability measure associated with Q is then the function on 2C :
Q∗ : 2C → [0, 1]
A ⊂ C 7→ Q∗(A) = max{P (E)|E ⊂ Ω, C ∩ (E ×Θ)) ⊂ A}.
We can then compute the inner probability of the subset A = C ∩ (Ω×A) of C which corresponds to a
subset A of Θ as:
Q∗(C ∩ (Ω× A)) = max{P (E)|E ⊂ Ω, C ∩ (E ×Θ) ⊂ C ∩ (Ω× A)}
= max{P (E)|E ⊂ Ω, ω ∈ E ∧ (ω, θ) ∈ C ⇒ θ ∈ A}
= P ({ω|(ω, θ) ∈ C ⇒ θ ∈ A})
which, by definition of compatibility relation, becomes:
= P ({ω : Γ(ω) ⊂ A}) = b(A),
i.e., the classical definition (18) of the belief value of A induced by a multi-valued mapping Γ. This
connection between inner measures and belief functions appeared in the literature in the second half of
the Eighties ([122, 123], [124]).
1.4. Belief functions as credal sets. The interpretation of belief values as lower bounds to the true
unknown probability value of an event (Section 1.2) generates, in turn, an additional angle of the nature
of belief functions [125]. Belief functions admit the following order relation:
b ≤ b′ ≡ b(A) ≤ b′(A) ∀A ⊂ Θ,
called weak inclusion. A b.f. b is weakly included in b′ whenever its belief values are dominated by those
of b′ for all the events of Θ.
A probability distribution P in which a belief function b is weakly included (P (A) ≥ b(A) ∀A) is said
to be consistent with b [126]. Each belief function b then uniquely identifies a lower envelope of the set
of probabilities consistent with it:
(24) P [b] = {P ∈ P : P (A) ≥ b(A)},
i.e., the set of probability measures whose values dominate that of b on all events A. Accordingly, the
theory of evidence is seen by some authors as a special case of robust statistics [127]. This position has
been heavily critised along the years.
Convex sets of probabilities are often called credal sets [128, 129, 130, 131]. Of course not all credal
sets ‘are’ belief functions. The set (24) is a polytope in the simplex of all probabilities we can define
on Θ. Its vertices are all the distributions ppi induced by any permutation pi = {xpi(1), ..., xpi(|Θ|)} of the
singletons of Θ of the form [132, 133]:
(25) ppi[b](xpi(i)) =
∑
A3xpi(i); A 63xpi(j) ∀j<i
m(A),
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assigning to a singleton element put in position pi(i) by the permutation pi the mass of all focal elements
containing it, but not containing any elements preceeding it in the permutation order [134].
1.5. The debate on the foundations. A number of researchers have fueled a debate about the nature
and foundations of the notion of belief function [135, 122, 124, 136, 137, 138, 139] and its relation to
other theories [140, 123, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147], in particular standard probability theory
and the Bayesian approach to statistical inference [148, 149, 150]. We only mention a few here.
Halpern and Fagin [151], for instance, underlined two different views of belief functions - as general-
ized probabilities (corresponding to the inner measures of Section 1.3), and as mathematical representa-
tions of evidence (perspective which we completely neglected in our brief overview of Chapter 2). They
maintained that many issues with the practical use of belief functions can be explained as consequences
of confusing these two interpretations. As an example, they cite Pearl and other authors’ remarks that the
belief function approach leads to incorrect or counterintuitive answers in a number of situations [77, 79].
In [152] Smets gave an axiomatic justification of the use of belief functions to quantify partial beliefs.
In [153], instead, he tried to precise the notion of distinct pieces of evidence combined via Dempster’s
rule. He also responded in [154] to Pearl’s criticisms appeared in [77], by accurately distinguishing the
different epistemic interpretations of the theory of evidence (resounding Halpern et al. [151]), focusing
in particular on his Transferable Belief Model (see Section 2.1).
2. Frameworks and approaches
The theory of evidence has been elaborated upon by a number of researchers [155, 156, 157, 158, 159,
160, 161], who have proposed original angles on the formalism [162, 163, 164, 165] which later devel-
oped into proper frameworks [166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171]. We mention here a couple of significant
examples.
2.1. Smets’ Transferable Belief Model. In his 1990’s seminal work [172] P. Smets introduced his
Transferable Belief Model (TBM) as a framework for quantifying degrees of belief based on Shafer’s
belief functions. In [173] and [174] (but also [175] and [176]) an extensive analysis of the major traits
of the TBM can be found. To summarise them briefly, within the TBM positive basic probability values
can be assigned to the empty set, originating ‘unnormalized’ belief functions (see also [177, 178]) whose
nature is analyzed in [179]. In [180] Smets compared the Transferable Belief Model with other interpre-
tations of the theory of evidence. In [181] he axiomatically derived a ‘pignistic’ transform which can be
used to map a belief function to a probability function and make decisions in any uncertain context via
classical utility theory.
Smets applied the TBM to diagnostic [182] and reliability [183] problems, among others. Dubois et
al later used the TBM approach on an illustrative example: the assessment of the value of a candidate
[184]. The vulnerability of the TBM to Dutch books was investigated by Snow in [185].
2.2. Kramosil’s probabilistic interpretation of the Dempster-Shafer theory. We have seen that
the theory of evidence can be developed in an axiomatic way quite independent of probability theory.
Such axioms express the requirements any uncertainty calculus intuitively ought to meet. Nevertheless,
D-S theory can also be seen as a sophisticated application of probability theory in a random set (see
Section 1.2) context.
From a similar angle I. Kramosil [186] proposed to exploit measure theory to expand the theory of
belief functions beyond its original scope. The scope of his investigation ranges from Boolean and non-
standard valued belief functions [187, 188], with application to expert systems [167], to the extension of
belief functions to countable sets [189], to the introduction of a strong law of large numbers for random
sets [190].
38 3. STATE OF THE ART
Of particular interest is the notion of signed belief function [191], in which frames of discernment
are replaced by measurable spaces equipped by a signed measure. The latter is a σ-additive set function
which can take values also outside the unit interval, including the negative and infinite ones. An assertion
analogous to Jordan’s decomposition theorem for signed measures is stated and proven [192], according
to which each signed belief function restricted to its finite values can be defined by a linear combination
of two classical probabilistic belief functions, assuming that the domain is finite. A probabilistic analysis
of Dempster’s rule is also developed by Kramosil [193], and its version for signed belief functions is
formulated in [194].
A detailed review of Kramosil’s work on his measure-theoretic approach to belief functions can be
found in two technical reports of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic ([195], [196]).
3. Conditional belief functions
In the original model in which belief functions are induced by multi-valued mappings of probability
distributions, Dempster’s conditioning can be judged inappropriate from a Bayesian point of view.
3.1. Dempster’s conditioning. Recall that in Dempster’s approach, conditional belief functions
with respect to an arbitrary event A are obtained by simply combining the original b.f. with a ‘categori-
cal’ (in Smets’ terminology) belief function focussed onA, by means of Dempster’s rule of combination:
b(.|A) = b ⊕ bA. In an interesting work, Kyburg [197] indeed analyzed the links between Dempster’s
conditioning of belief functions and Bayesian conditioning of closed, convex sets of probabilities (of
which belief functions are a special case). He arrived at the conclusion that the probability intervals
[198] generated by Dempster updating were included in those generated by Bayesian updating.
As a consequence, several theories of and approaches to conditioning of belief functions [199] have
been proposed along the years [200, 99, 201, 202, 203, 204] to address this criticism.
3.2. Fagin’s conditional belief. In the framework of credal sets and lower probabilities, Fagin and
Halpern defined a new notion of conditional belief [99], different from Dempster’s definition, as the
lower envelope of a family of conditional probability functions, and provided a closed-form expression
for it. This definition is related to the idea of inner measure (see Section 1.3)
3.3. Spies’ conditional events. On his side, Spies [205] established a link between conditional
events and discrete random sets. Conditional events were defined as sets of equivalent events under
the conditioning relation. By applying to them a multivalued mapping he gave a new definition of
conditional belief function. Finally, an updating rule (that is equivalent to the law of total probability is
all beliefs are probabilities) was introduced.
Slobodova also conducted some early studies on the issue of conditioning, quite related to Spies’
work. In particular, she introduced a multi-valued extension of conditional b.f.s and examined its prop-
erties [206]. In [207], in particular, she described how conditional belief functions (defined as in Spies’
approach) fit in the framework of valuation-based systems.
3.4. Smets’ conditional approaches. One way of dealing with the Bayesian criticism of Demp-
ster’s rule is to abandon all notions of multivalued mapping to define belief directly in terms of basis
belief assignments, as in Smets’ Transferable Belief Model [208] (Section 2.1). The unnormalized con-
ditional belief function bU(.|B) with b.b.a. mU(.|B)1
mU(.|B) =

∑
X⊆Bc
m(A ∪X) if A ⊆ B
0 elsewhere
1Author’s notation.
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is the ‘minimal commitment’ [209] specialization of b such that plb(Bc|B) = 0 [210].
In [211, 212], Xu and Smets used conditional belief functions to represent relations between variables in
evidential networks, and presented a propagation algorithm for such networks. In [213], Smets pointed
out the distinction between revision [202, 214] and focussing in the conditional process, and how they
led to unnormalized and geometric [215] conditioning
(26) bG(A|B) = b(A ∩B)
b(B)
,
respectively. Note the strong resemblance between (26) and classical Bayes’ rule (1). In these two
scenarios he proposed generalizations of Jeffrey’s rule of conditioning [216, 217, 218]
P (A|P ′,B) =
∑
B∈B
P (A ∩B)
P (B)
P ′(B)
to the case of belief functions.
3.5. Other contributions. In an interesting work, Klopotek and Wierzchon [219] provided a frequency-
based interpretation for conditional belief functions. More recently, Tang and Zheng [220] discussed the
issue of conditioning in a multi-dimensional space. Quite related to the topic of Chapter 4, Lehrer [221]
proposed a geometric approach to determine the conditional expectation of non-additive probabilities.
Such conditional expectation was then applied to updating, whenever information became available, and
to introduce a notion of independence.
4. Statistical inference and estimation
The question of how to transform the available data (typically coming in the form of a series of
trials) into a belief function (the so-called inference problem) [222, 223] is crucial to allow practical
statistical inference with belief functions [224, 225, 226]. The data can be of different nature: statistical
[227, 228], logical [229], expressed in terms of mere preferences, subjective. The problem has been
studied by scholars of the caliber of Dempster [230], Shafer, Seidenfeld, Walley, Wasserman [231] and
others [232, 233, 234, 235], who delivered an array of approaches to the problem. Unfortunately, the
different approaches to the inference problem produce different belief functions from the same statistical
data. A very general exposition by Chateauneuf and Vergnaud providing some foundation for a belief
revision process, in which both the initial knowledge and the new evidence is a belief function, can be
found in [223]. We give here a very brief survey of the topic.
Given a parametric model of the data as a function of a number of parameters, we want to identify
(or compute the support for) the parameter values which better describe the available data. Shafer’s
initial proposal for inferring a belief functions from the data via a likelihood-based support function [52]
was supported by Seidenfeld [227], but led him to criticise Dempster’s rule as an appropriate way of
combining different pieces of statistical evidence. Wasserman [236] showed that the likelihood-based
belief function can indeed be used to handle partial prior information, and related it to robust Bayesian
inference.
Later [237] Shafer illustrated three different ways of doing statistical inference in the belief frame-
work, according to the nature of the available evidence. He stressed how the strength of belief calculus
is really about allowing inference under partial knowledge or ignorance, when simple parametric models
are not available.
Many others have also contributed to the debate on the inference issue [238].
In the late Eighties Walley [239] characterized the classes of belief and commonality functions for which
statistical independent observations can be combined by Dempster’s rule, and those for which Demp-
ster’s rule is consistent with Bayes’ rule. Van den Acker [240] designed a method to represent statistical
inference as belief functions, designed for application in an audit context [241]. An original paper by
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Hummel and Landy [242] proposed a new interpretation of Dempster’s rule of combination in terms of
statistics of opinions of experts. Liu et al. [243] described an algorithm for inducting implication net-
works from empirical data samples. The values in the implication networks were predicted by applying
the belief updating scheme and then compared to Pearl’s stochastic simulation method, demonstrating
that evidential-based inference has a much lower computational cost.
As far as non-quantitative data are concerned, Bryson et al. [226, 225] presented an approach to the
generation of quantitative belief functions that included linguistic quantifiers to avoid the premature use
of numeric measures. Similarly, Wong and Lingras [244] proposed to generate belief functions from
symbolic information such as qualitative preferences [245] of users in decision systems.
5. Decision making
Decision making is, together with estimation, the natural final link of any inference chain [246]. In-
deed, decision making in the presence of partial evidence and subjective assessment [247] is the original
rationale for the development of the theory of evidence. Consequently, decision making with belief
functions has been studied throughout the last three decades [248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253], originating
a number of different approaches to the problem [254]. As an example, a work by Beynon et al. [255]
explored the potential of the theory of evidence as an alternative approach to multi-criteria decision mod-
eling.
The situation quite resembles that surrounding the argument around inference. There is no lack of pro-
posal solutions, but rather too many of them have been proposed, and a clear notion of what option is the
most sensible in what context is needed. A recent discussion on the meaning of belief functions in the
context of decision making can be found in [256].
Perhaps the first one who noted the lack in Shafer’s theory of belief functions of a formal procedure
for making decision was Strat [257]. He proposed a simple assumption that disambiguates decision
problems in the context of belief calculus, by enforcing a separation between the evidence carrying
information [258] about the decision problem and the assumptions that need to be made in order to
disambiguate the decision outcomes. He also showed how to generalize the methodology for decision
analysis employed in probabilistic reasoning to the use of belief functions, allowing their use within the
framework of decision trees. Schubert [259, 260] subsequently studied the influence of the ρ parameter
in Strat’s decision apparatus. Elouedi, Smets et al. [261, 262] adapted this decision tree technique to the
presence of uncertainty about the class value, represented by a belief function.
A decision system based on the Transferable Belief Model was developed [263, 264, 265] and applied
to a waste disposal problem by Xu et al. The framework makes use of classical expected utility theory
[266].
There, given a utility function u(x) on the possible outcomes x ∈ Θ, a decision maker can pick one
among a number of ‘lotteries’ (probability distributions) pi(x), in order to maximize the expected return
or utility
E(pi) =
∑
x
u(x)pi(x)
of the lottery. In [267], the author proved the necessity of the linearity axiom (and therefore of the
pignistic transform) by maximizing the following expected utility (our notation), where p = BetP is the
pignistic approximation (28) of a belief function b:
E[u] =
∑
x∈Θ
u(a, x)p(x).
The set of possible actions (decisions) a ∈ A and the set Θ of the possible outcomes x of the problem
are distinct, and the utility function u(a, x) is defined on A×Θ.
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A significant contribution to the application of linear utility theory to belief functions is due to Jaffray
[268, 269, 270].
A number of decision rules not based on the application of utility theory to the result of a probability
transform have also been proposed, for instance by Troffaes [271]. Most of those proposals are based
on order relations between uncertainty measures [272], in particular the ‘least commitment principle’
[273, 274, 275], the analogous of maximum entropy in belief function theory [276]. Xu and Yang [277]
proposed instead a decision calculus in the framework of valuation based systems [278], and showed that
decision problems can be solved using local computations. Wakker [146] argued on the central role that
the so-called ‘principle of complete ignorance’ plays in the evidential approach to decision problems.
6. Efficient implementation of belief calculus
The complexity of Dempster’s rule of computation is inherently exponential, due to having to con-
sider all possible subsets of a frame of discernment. Indeed, Orponen [279] proved that the problem of
computing the orthogonal sum of a finite set of belief functions is NP-complete. This has encouraged
much research on the efficient implementation [280] of the theory of evidence [281, 282, 283, 284, 285,
286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292], and Dempster’s rule in particular [293, 294, 295].
6.1. Graphical models. In their 1987’s work [120] Shafer, Shenoy and Mellouli posed the problem
in the lattice of partitions of a fixed frame of discernment. Different questions were represented as differ-
ent partitions of this frame, and their relations were represented as qualitative conditional independence
or dependence relations between partitions.
They showed that an efficient implementation of Dempster’s rule is possible if the questions are arranged
in a qualitative Markov tree [296, 297], as in such a case belief functions can be propagated through the
tree [298, 299]. Multivariate belief functions on graphical models [300] were explored by Kong in her
PhD thesis [301], but also by Mellouli [302, 303]. The fusion and propagation of graphical belief models
was studied by Almond [304]. The close relation of Shafer-Shenoy’s architecture with the contents of
Chapter 5, where we will discuss the algebraic structure of families of frames, is worth noticing. Indeed,
in [120] the analysis was limited to a lattice of partitions, rather than encompassing entire families of
frames.
In related work, Bissig, Kohlas and Lehmann proposed a so-called Fast-Division architecture [291] for
Dempster’s rule computation. The latter has the advantage, over the Shenoy-Shafer and the Lauritzen-
Spiegelhalter architectures [305], of guaranteeing all intermediate results to be belief functions. Each of
them has a Markov tree as the underlying computational structure.
When the evidence is ordered in a complete direct acyclic graph it is possible to formulate algorithms
with lower computational complexity [300]. Credal networks [129, 306] have also been proposed.
6.2. Monte-Carlo methods. Monte-Carlo methods are extremely useful in Bayesian estimation
when the need arises to represent complex, multi-modal probability distributions at an acceptable com-
putational cost. Some work on MonteCarlo methods for belief functions has been done in the past by
Wilson and Moral [307, 308]. Kramosil [309] also worked on adapting Monte-Carlo estimation to belief
functions. Resconi et al. [310] achieved a speed-up of Monte-Carlo methods by using a physical model
of belief measures. This approach could potentially provide the ultimate solution to efficient implemen-
tation of belief calculus. In particular, estimation techniques based on the notion of ‘particle filtering’
[311, 312] may be very useful in the context of the theory of belief functions, as a way or reducing the
damning computational complexity of handling belief functions.
6.3. Transformation approaches. One approach to efficient belief calculus that has been explored
since the late Eighties, known as ‘probability transformation’ [313] consists in approximating belief
functions by means of appropriate probability measures prior to using them for making decisions. A
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number of distinct transformations have been introduced [314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320]. It is worth
noticing that different approximations appear to be aimed at different goals, and do not necessarily seek
an efficient implementation of the rule of combination [321].
Given a frame of discernment Θ, let us denote by B the set of all belief functions on Θ, and by P the
set of all probability measures on Θ.
According to [322], we call a probability transform [323] of belief functions an operator
pt : B → P , b 7→ pt[b]
mapping belief measures onto probability measures, such that
(27) b(x) ≤ pt[b](x) ≤ plb(x) = 1− b({x}c).
Note that (27) requires the probability which results from the transform to be compatible with the
upper and lower bounds the original b.f. b enforces on the singletons only, and not on all the focal sets
as in Equation (24). This is a minimal, sensible constraint which does not require probability transforms
to adhere to the credal semantics of belief functions (Section 1.4). As a matter of fact, important such
transforms are not compatible with such semantics.
As mentioned above, in Smets’ ‘Transferable Belief Model’ [324, 173] decisions are made by resorting
to the pignistic probability:
(28) BetP [b](x) =
∑
A⊇{x}
mb(A)
|A| ,
generated by what he called the pignistic transform BetP : B → P , b 7→ BetP [b] [325]. Justified by
a ‘linearity’ axiom [173], the pignistic probability is the result of a redistribution process in which the
mass of each focal element A is re-assigned to all its elements x ∈ A on an equal basis, and is perfectly
compatible with the upper-lower probability semantics of belief functions, as it is the center of mass of
the polytope (24) of consistent probabilities [132]. Generalizations of the pignistic transform for partial
bet have been recently proposed by Burger [326] and Dezert [327].
Originally developed by Voorbraak [328] as a probabilistic approximation intended to limit the com-
putational cost of operating with belief functions in the Dempster-Shafer framework, the plausibility
transform [329] has later been supported by Cobb and Shenoy [330] in virtue of its desirable commu-
tativity properties with respect to Dempster’s sum. Although initially defined in terms of commonality
values, the plausibility transform p˜l : B → P , b 7→ p˜l[b] maps each belief function b onto the probability
distribution p˜l[b] = p˜lb obtained by normalizing the plausibility values plb(x)
1 of the element of Θ:
(29) p˜lb(x) =
plb(x)∑
y∈Θ plb(y)
.
We call the output p˜lb (29) of the plausibility transform relative plausibility of singletons [331]. Voor-
braak proved that his (in our terminology) relative plausibility of singletons p˜lb is a perfect representative
of b when combined with other probabilities p ∈ P through Dempster’s rule ⊕:
p˜lb ⊕ p = b⊕ p ∀p ∈ P .
Dually, a relative belief transform b˜ : B → P , b 7→ b˜[b] mapping each belief function to the corre-
sponding relative belief of singletons b˜[b] = b˜ [332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 322] such that:
(30) b˜(x) =
b(x)∑
y∈Θ b(y)
1With a harmless abuse of notation we denote the values of b.f.s and pl.f.s on a singleton x by mb(x), plb(x) instead of
mb({x}), plb({x}).
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can be defined. This notion (under the name of ‘normalized belief of singletons’) was first proposed by
Daniel [322]. Some initial analyses of the relative belief transform and its close relationship with the
(relative) plausibility transform were presented in [332, 335].
More recently, other proposals have been brought forward by Dezert et al. [337] and Sudano [338,
339, 340], based on redistribution processes similar to that of the pignistic transform. Two new Bayesian
approximations of belief functions have been derived by the author of this Book from purely geometric
considerations [341] in the context of the geometric approach to the ToE [342], in which belief and
probability measures are represented as points of a Cartesian space (see Part II, Chapter 4). Consonant
transformation approaches have also been proposed [343].
6.4. Reducing the number of focal elements. Probability (and possibility [344]) transforms reduce
the number of focal elements to store toO(N) by re-distributing the mass assignment of a belief function
to size-1 subsets or chains of subsets, respectively. An alternative approach to efficiency can be sought
by re-distributing all the mass to subsets of size up to k, obtaining a k-additive belief function [345, 346,
347, 326, 348]. Some approaches to probability transformation explicitly aim at reducing the complexity
of belief calculus. Tessem [349], for instance, incorporates only the highest-valued focal elements in his
mklx approximation. A similar approach inspires the summarization technique formulated by Lowrance
et al. [170].
7. Continuous belief functions
The original formulation of the theory of evidence summarized in Chapter 2 is inherently linked to
finite frames of discernment. Since the late Seventies, the need for a general formulation of the theory
of evidence to continuous domains has been recognized. Numerous efforts have been made since then
in order to extend the theory of belief functions to infinite sets of possibilities. None of them has been
found entirely convincing yet (see [10, 350]). Nevertheless, they all contributed to a clearer vision of
this issue – we summarize here the most significant ones.
7.1. Shafer’s allocation of probabilities. The first attempt (1979) is due to Shafer himself, and
goes under the name of allocation of probabilities [351]. Shafer proved that every belief function can be
represented as an allocation of probability, i.e., a ∩-homomorphism into a positive and completely addi-
tive probability algebra, deduced from the integral representation due to Choquet. Canonical continuous
extensions of belief functions defined on ‘multiplicative subclasses’ E to an arbitrary power set can be
introduced by allocation of probability: for every belief function there exists a complete Boolean algebra
M , a positive measure µ and a mapping ρ between E and M such that f = µ ◦ ρ.
In [351] the concepts of continuity and condensability are defined for belief functions, and it is shown
how to extend a b.f. defined on an algebra of subsets to the whole power set. Canonical extensions satisfy
Shafer’s notion of belief function definable on infinitely many compatible frames, and show significant
resemblance with the notions of inner measure (Section 1.3) and extension of capacities [352]. This
approach was later reviewed by Jurg Kohlas [353], who conducted an algebraic study of argumentation
systems ([354],[355]) as ways of defining numerical degrees of support of hypotheses by means of
allocation of probability.
7.2. From belief functions to random sets. Possibly the most elegant formalism in which to formu-
late a continuous version of the theory of belief functions is the theory of random sets [31, 115, 32, 117],
i.e., probability measures over power sets, of which traditional belief functions are indeed a special case
(recall Section 1.2). A serious obstacle, however, is given by the formulation of aggregation operators
for random sets. Neither Shafer’s allocations of probability approach nor Nguyen’s random set interpre-
tation seemed to be much concerned with combination rules, and not much progress seems to have been
made since.
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7.3. Belief functions on Borel intervals. Almost in syncronous, Strat [356] and Smets [357] had
the idea of making the problem of generalising belief functions to continuous frames tractable via stan-
dard calculus, by allowing only focal elements which are closed intervals of the real line. Such extension
of belief functions to mere Borel sets of the real line [29] has demonstrated in time its fertility. General-
izations of combination and conditioning rules follow quite naturally [357]. Inference mechanisms with
predictive b.f.s on real numbers have been proposed [358]. The computation of a pignistic probability
for b.f.s on Borel intervals is straightforward, allowing the formulation of a theory of decision making
with continuous belief functions.
7.4. Theory of hints. Kohlas and Monney proposed a very similar definition of belief functions on
real numbers. Indeed, some of the relations introduced in [357] and [359] had already appeared in [54].
This led to the so-called mathematical theory of hints [359, 353, 359, 360, 361] (see the monograph
[25] for a detailed exposition). Hints [360] are bodies of information inherently imprecise and uncertain,
that do not point to precise answers but are used to judge hypotheses, leading to support and plausibility
functions similar to those introduced by Shafer. They allow a logical derivation of Dempster’s rule,
and originate a theory valid for general, infinite frames of discernment. Among others, hints have been
applied to model-based diagnostic [362].
7.5. Monotone capacities and Choquet integrals. Monotone capacities [132, 363, 364] have been
also suggested as a general framework for the mathematical description of uncertainty [365].
DEFINITION 27. Let S be a finite set, and 2S be the power set of S. Then v : 2S → [0, 1] is a capacity
on S if v(∅) = 0, v(S) = 1 and:
• if E ⊆ F then v(E) ≤ v(F ), for E,F ∈ S (monotonicity).
Obviously [35]:
PROPOSITION 20. Belief functions are totally monotone capacities.
Hendon et al. [34] examined the question of defining the product of two independent capacities.
In particular, for the product of two belief functions as totally monotone capacities, there is a unique
minimal product belief function.
The Choquet’s integral [366] of monotone set functions (such as belief functions) is a generalization
of the Lebesgue integral with respect to σ-additive measures. Wang and Klir investigated the relations
between Choquet integrals and belief measures in [36].
8. Other theoretical developments
8.1. Inverting Dempster’s rule: Canonical decomposition. The quest for an inverse operation
to Dempster’s combination rule has a natural appeal and an intuitive interpretation. If Dempster’s rule
reflects a modification of one’s system of belief when the subject becomes familiar with the degrees
of beliefs of another subject and accepts the arguments on which these degrees are based, the inverse
operation would enable to erase the impact of this modification, and to return back to one’s original
degrees of beliefs, supposing that the reliability of the second subject is put into doubts. This inversion
problem, called also ‘canonical decomposition’, was solved in an algebraic framework by Smets in [367].
Kramosil also proposed a solution to the inversion problem, within his measure-theoretic approach [368].
8.2. Frequentist formulations. The theory of evidence was born as an attempt to formulate a math-
ematical theory of subjective belief, in a rather incompatible approach to theories of chance in which
probabilities are the result of series of empirical trials. To our knowledge only Walley has tried, in an
interesting even if not very recent paper [369], to formulate a frequentist theory of upper and lower
probabilities (see also [370]). Namely, he considered models for independent repetitions of experiments
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described by interval probabilities, and suggested generalizations of the familiar concepts of indepen-
dence and asymptotic behavior.
8.3. Gaussian belief functions. The notion of Gaussian belief function [371, 372] is an interesting
effort to extend Dempster-Shafer theory to represent mixed knowledge, some of which logical and some
uncertain. The notion of Gaussian b.f. was proposed by A. Dempster and formalized by L. Liu in
[373]. Technically, a Gaussian belief function is a Gaussian distribution over the members of the parallel
partition of an hyperplane. By adapting Dempster’s rule to the continuous case, Liu derives a rule
of combination and proves its equivalence to Dempster’s geometrical description [374]. In [375], Liu
proposed a join-tree computation scheme for expert systems using Gaussian belief functions, for he
proved their rule of combination satisfies the axioms of Shenoy and Shafer [95].
9. Relation with other mathematical theories of uncertainty
Currently several different mathematical theories of uncertainty compete to be adopted by practitioners
of all field of applied science [33, 376, 26, 27, 377, 378], a process resulting in a growing number of
applications of these frameworks. The consensus is that there no such a thing as the best mathematical
description of uncertainty (compare [379], [124], [9], [2, 380] and [381] to cite a few), and that the choice
of the most suitable methodology depends on the actual problem at hand (an extensive presentation of a
possible unified theory of imprecise probability can be found in [382, 383]). Smets ([384], [137]) also
contributed to the analysis of the difference between imprecision and uncertainty [385], and compared
the applicability of various models of uncertainty. Whenever a probability measure can be estimated,
most authors suggest the use of a classical Bayesian approach. If probability values cannot be reliably
estimate, upper and lower probabilities should instead be preferred.
Here we briefly survey the links between the theory of evidence and other approaches to uncertainty
theory.
9.1. Lower probabilities. A lower probability P is a function from 2Θ, the power set of Θ, to the
unit interval [0, 1]. With any lower probability P is associated a dual upper probability function P ,
defined for any A ⊆ Θ as P (A) = 1 − P (Ac), where Ac is the complement of A. With any lower
probability P we can associate a (closed convex) set
(31) P(P ) =
{
p : P (A) ≥ P (A),∀A ⊆ Θ
}
of probability distributions p whose measure P dominates P . Such a polytope or convex set of prob-
ability distributions is usually called a credal set [128]. Note, however, that not all convex sets of
probabilities can be described by merely focusing on events (see Walley [386]).
A lower probability P is called ‘consistent’ if P(P ) 6= ∅ and ‘tight’ if
inf
p∈P(P )
P (A) = P (A)
(respectively P ‘avoids sure loss” and P is ‘coherent’ in Walley’s [386] terminology). Consistency
means that the lower bound constraints P (A) can indeed be satisfied by some probability measure,
while tightness indicates that P is the lower envelope on subsets of P(P ).
Belief functions are indeed a special type of coherent lower probabilities, which in turn can be seen as
a special class of lower previsions (consult [386], Section 5.13). Walley has proved that coherent lower
probabilities are closed under convex combination: the relationship of belief functions with convexity
will be discussed in Part II.
46 3. STATE OF THE ART
9.2. Probability intervals. Dealing with general lower probabilities defined on 2Θ can be difficult
when Θ is large: it may then be interesting for practical applications to focus on simpler models.
A set of probability intervals or interval probability system [387, 388] is a system of constraints on
the probability values of a probability distribution p : Θ→ [0, 1] on a finite domain Θ of the form:
(32) P(l, u) .=
{
p : l(x) ≤ p(x) ≤ u(x),∀x ∈ Θ
}
.
Probability intervals were introduced as a tool for uncertain reasoning in [388, 389], where combination
and marginalization of intervals were studied in detail. The authors also studied the specific constraints
such intervals ought to satisfy in order to be consistent and tight.
As pointed out for instance in [390], probability intervals typically arise through measurement errors.
As a matter of fact, measurements can be inherently of interval nature (due to the finite resolution of
the instruments). In that case the probability interval of interest is the class of probability measures
consistent with the measured interval.
A set of constraints of the form (32) also determines a credal set: credal sets generated by probability
intervals are a sub-class of all credal sets generated by lower and upper probabilities [110]. Note that
given a set of bounds P(l, u) we can obtain lower and upper probability values P (A) on any subset
A ⊆ Θ by using the following simple formulas:
(33) P (A) = max
{∑
x∈A
l(x), 1−
∑
x 6∈A
u(x)
}
, P (A) = min
{∑
x∈A
u(x), 1−
∑
x 6∈A
l(x)
}
.
Belief functions are also associated with a set of lower and upper probability constraints of the form
(32): they correspond therefore to a special class of probability intervals, associated with credal sets of a
specific form.
9.3. Possibility theory. Possibility theory [391, 30, 392] is a theory of uncertainty based on the
notion of possibility measure.
DEFINITION 28. A possibility measure on a domain Θ is a function Pos : 2Θ → [0, 1] such that
Pos(∅) = 0, Pos(Θ) = 1 and
Pos(
⋃
i
Ai) = sup
i
Pos(Ai)
for any family {Ai|Ai ∈ 2Θ, i ∈ I} where I is an arbitrary set index.
Each possibility measure is uniquely characterized by a membership function or possibility distribution
pi : Θ → [0, 1] s.t. pi(x) .= Pos({x}) via the formula Pos(A) = supx∈A pi(x). Its dual Nec(A) =
1− Pos(Ac) is called necessity measure.
A number of studies have pointed out that necessity measures coincide in the theory of evidence with
the class of consonant belief functions (Definition 25). Let us call plausibility assignment p¯lb [393] the
restriction of the plausibility function to singletons p¯lb(x) = plb({x}). From Condition 4 of Proposition
18 it follows immediately that:
PROPOSITION 21. The plausibility function plb associated with a belief function b on a domain Θ
is a possibility measure iff b is consonant, in which case the membership function coincides with the
plausibility assignment: pi = p¯lb.
Equivalently, a b.f. b is a necessity measure iff b is consonant.
Possibility theory (in the finite case) is then embedded in the ToE as a special case.
The links between the Transferable Belief Model and possibility theory have been briefly investigated
by Ph. Smets in [394], while Dubois and Prade [395] have worked extensively on consonant approxima-
tions of belief functions [396, 397]. Their work has been later considered in [398, 399].
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9.4. Fuzzy measures. While evidential reasoning generalises both standard probability and pos-
sibility theory, a further generalization of the class of belief measures is expressed by fuzzy measures
[400].
DEFINITION 29. Given a domain Θ and a non-empty family C of subsets of Θ, a fuzzy measure µ on
〈Θ, C〉 is a function µ : C → [0, 1] which meets the following conditions:
• µ(∅) = 0;
• if A ⊆ B then µ(A) ≤ µ(B), for every A,B ∈ C;
• for any increasing sequence A1 ⊆ A2 ⊆ · · · of subsets in C,
if
∞⋃
i=1
Ai ∈ C, then lim
i→∞
µ(Ai) = µ
( ∞⋃
i=1
Ai
)
(continuity from below);
• for any decreasing sequence A1 ⊇ A2 ⊇ · · · of subsets in C,
if
∞⋂
i=1
Ai ∈ C and µ(A1) <∞, then lim
i→∞
µ(Ai) = µ
( ∞⋂
i=1
Ai
)
(continuity from above).
Clearly, from Definition 2 a belief measure is also a fuzzy measure [401].
Klir et al. published an excellent discussion [402] on the relations between belief and possibility the-
ory [403, 404], and examined different methods for constructing fuzzy measures in the context of expert
systems. Authors like Heilpern [405], Yager [406], Palacharla [407], Romer [408] and others [409]
also studied the connection between fuzzy numbers and Dempster-Shafer theory. Lucas and Araabi
proposed in [410] their own generalization of the Dempster-Shafer theory [411] to a fuzzy valued mea-
sure, while Mahler [412] formulated his own ‘fuzzy conditioned Dempster-Shafer (FCDS) theory’, as a
probability-based calculus for dealing with possibly imprecise and vague evidence. Palacharla and Nel-
son [407, 413], instead, focused on comparing their application to data fusion problems in transportation
engineering.
Ronal Yager [414, 406], one of the main contributors to fuzzy logic, proposed [415] a combined fuzzy-
evidential framework for fuzzy modeling. In another work, Yager investigated the issue of normalization
(i.e., the assignment of non-zero values to empty sets as a consequence of the combination of evidence)
in the fuzzy Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence, proposing a technique called smooth normalization
[416].
9.5. Probabilistic logic. Generalizations of classical logic in which propositions are assigned prob-
ability values have been proposed in the past. As belief functions naturally generalize probability mea-
sures, it is quite natural to define non-classical logic frameworks in which propositions are assigned
belief values [417], rather than probability values [418, 419, 420, 421]. This approach has been brought
forward in particular by Saffiotti [422, 423, 424], Haenni [425], and others [187, 426, 427, 428].
In propositional logic, propositions or formulas are either true or false, i.e., their truth value T is either
0 or 1 [429]. Formally, an interpretation or model of a formula φ is a valuation function mapping φ
to the truth value ‘true’ or ‘1’. Each formula can therefore be associated with the set of interpretations
or models under which its truth value is 1. If we define the frame of discernment of all the possible
interpretations, each formula φ is associated with the subset A(φ) of this frame which collects all its
interpretations.
If the available evidence allows to define a belief function on this frame of possible interpretations, to
each formulaA(φ) ⊆ Θ is then naturally assigned a degree of belief b(A(φ)) between 0 and 1 [422, 425],
measuring the total amount of evidence supporting the proposition ‘φ is true’.
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Saffiotti [430] built a hybrid logic for representing uncertain logic called belief function logic by
attaching degrees of belief and degrees of doubt to classical first-order logic, and elaborating original
angles on the role of Dempster’s rule. The issue was studied by other authors as well. In [431] and
[136], Benferhat et al., for instance, defined a semantics based on -belief assignments where values
committed to focal elements are either close to 0 or close to 1. Andersen and Hooker [168] proved
probabilistic logic and Dempster-Shafer theory to be instances of a certain type of linear programming
model, with exponentially many variables (see also the work of Hunter [432]). In particular it is worth
mentioning the work of Resconi, Harmanec et al. [5, 433, 427, 434, 435], who proposed ‘propositional
modal logic’ as a unifying framework for various uncertainty theories, including fuzzy, possibility and
evidential theory, and proposed an interpretation of belief measures on infinite sets. In a series of papers
by Tsiporkova et al [436, 437] Harmanec’s modal logic interpretation was further developed, and a
modal logic interpretation of Dempster’s rule was proposed. The links of DS theory with penalty logic
were explored by Dupin et al [438].
To conclude this survey, incidence calculus [439, 440] is a probabilistic logic for dealing with uncer-
tainty in intelligent systems. Incidences are assigned to formulae: they are the logic conditions under
which a formula is true. Probabilities are assigned to incidences, and the probability of a formula is
computed from the sets of incidences assigned to it. In [440] Liu, Bundy et al. did propose a method for
discovering incidences that can be used to calculate mass functions for belief functions.
10. Applications
The number of applications of the theory of evidence to a variety of fields of engineering, computer
science, and business has been steadily growing in the past decades [441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447,
448] - we will therefore not attempt to provide a comprehensive review of the matter here.
10.1. Machine learning. Machine learning, including clustering, classification [449] and decision
making, is a natural field of application for evidential reasoning [450, 451, 452, 453, 454]. A lot of work
in this fields has been done by Thierry Denoeux and his co-workers [455]. Recent efforts to generalise
the maximum entropy classification framework were made by the Author [456].
Already in the Nineties Denoeux and Zouhal [457] proposed a k-nearest neighbor classifier based on
the theory of evidence, in which each neighbor of a test sample was considered as an item of evidence
supporting hypotheses about the class membership of the test measure. The pieces of evidence provided
by the k nearest neighbors were then pooled as usual by Dempster’s sum. The problem of tuning the
parameters of the classification rule was solved by minimizing an error function [458]. Le-Hegarat,
Bloch et al. also worked on unsupervised classification in a multisource remote sensing environment
[459] in the framework of the theory of evidence, as it allows to consider unions of classes. Binaghi et
al [460] defined an empirical learning strategy for the automatic generation of Dempster-Shafer classi-
fication rules from a set of training data. Fixsen et al. described a modified rule of combination with
foundations in the theory of random sets and proved this ‘modified Dempster-Shafer’ (MDS) [461, 462]
approach’s relation to Smets’ pignistic probabilities. MDS was then used to build an original classifica-
tion algorithm. Elouedi et al. [261, 262] adapted the classical ‘decision tree’ technique to the presence
of uncertainty on the class value, uncertainty represented by a belief function.
Several papers have been written on the application of the theory of evidence to neural network clas-
sifiers (see for instance [463, 464, 465]). In [465], for instance, Loonis et al. compared a multi-classifier
neural network fusion scheme with the straightforward application of Dempster’s rule in a pattern recog-
nition context [466, 467]. Original work has been conducted by J. Schubert, who much contributed to
studying the clustering problem in an evidential context [468, 469, 470, 471]. In his approach, 2n − 1
pieces of evidence were clustered into n clusters by minimizing a ‘metaconflict’ function. He found
neural structures more effective and much faster than optimization methods for larger problems.
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Building on his work on clustering of nonspecific evidence, Schubert [472] developed a classification
method based on the comparison with prototypes representing clusters, instead of going for a full cluster-
ing of all the evidence. The resulting computational complexity isO(M ·N), where M is the maximum
number of subsets and N the number of prototypes chosen for each subset.
Since they both are suitable to solve classification problems [473], neural networks and belief func-
tions are sometimes integrated to yield more robust systems [474, 475]. Giacinto et al., on their side,
ran a comparison of neural networks and belief-based approaches to pattern recognition in the context of
earthquake risk evaluation [476].
10.2. Computer vision and pattern recognition. Computer vision applications are still rare [477,
478, 479, 480], although of late there seems to be a growing interest of vision scientists for approximate
reasoning and related techniques [481, 482, 483].
Andre´ Ayoun and Philippe Smets ([484]) used the Transferable Belief Model to quantify the conflict
among sources of information in order to solve the data association problem (see Chapter 7 for our
approach to the problem), and applied this method to the detection of sub-marines. F. Martinerie et al.
[485] proposed a solution to target tracking [486] from distributed sensors by modeling the evolution
of a target as a Markovian process, and combining the hidden Markov model formalism with evidential
reasoning in the fusion phase.
To our knowledge only a few attempts have been made to apply the theory of evidence to recognition
problems [487]. Ip and Chiu [488] adopted DS theory to deal with uncertainties on the features used to
interpret facial gestures. In an interesting work published on Computing ([489]), Borotschnig, Paletta et
al. compared probabilistic, possibilistic and evidential fusion schemes for active object recognition (in
which, based on tentative object hypotheses, active steps are decided until the classification is sufficiently
unambiguous), using parametric eigenspaces as representation. The probabilistic approach seemed to
outperform the other, probably due to the reliability of the produced likelihoods.
In another paper appeared on Pattern Recognition Letters, Printz, Borotschnig et al. [478] perfected this
active fusion framework for image interpretation.
In [467] Ng and Singh applied the data equalization technique to the output node of individual classi-
fiers in a multi-classifier system for pattern recognition, combining outputs by using a particular kind of
support function (see Definition 19).
Some work has been done in the segmentation field, too. In [490] Vasseur, Pegard et al. proposed a
two-stage framework to solve the segmentation task on both indoor and outdoor scenes. In the second
stage, in particular, a Dempster-Shafer-style fusion technique was used to detects object in the scene
by forming groups of primitive segments (perceptual organization). Similarly, B. Besserer et al. [446]
exploited multiple sources of evidence from segmented images to discriminate among possible object
classes, using Dempster’s rule to update beliefs in classes.
Among evidential applications to medical imaging and diagnostics [491, 492, 182, 493, 494, 495], I.
Bloch used some key features of the theory, such as its representation of ignorance and conflict compu-
tation, for the purpose of classifying multi-modality medical images [496]. Chen et al. used multivariate
belief functions to identify anatomical structures from x-ray data ([497]).
10.3. Sensor fusion. Sensor fusion applications are more common [498, 499, 500], since Demp-
ster’s rule fits naturally in an information integration schemes [501]. An and Moon, for instance, [502]
implemented an evidential framework for representing and integrating geophysical and geological infor-
mation from remote sensors. Filippidis [503] compared fuzzy and evidential reasoning in surveillance
tasks (deriving actions from identity attributes, such as ‘friend’ or ‘foe’), illustrating the superior perfor-
mance of belief calculus. Hong [504] designed an interesting recursive algorithm for information fusion
using belief functions.
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Target tracking is a typical problem whose solution relies on sensor fusion. Buede [505] proposed a
comparison between Bayesian and evidential reasoning by implementing the same target identification
problem involving multiple levels of abstraction (type, class and nature). He argued from the algorithms’
convergence rates the superiority of the classical approach. A similar comparison was conducted in
[506], using real-life as well as simulated radar data.
10.4. Robotics and autonomous navigation. Decision problems are very common in autonomous
navigation and path planning [507, 508, 509, 510]. For example, robot localization techniques usually
exploit different types of sensors to estimate the current position of the robot on a map. The inverse
problem, called ‘map building’, consists in inferring the structure of an unknown environment from
sensor data. For instance, Pagac et al. [511] examined the problem of constructing and maintaining a
map (namely a simple 2D occupancy grid) of an autonomous vehicle environment and used Dempster’s
rule to fuse sensor readings. In a related work Gambino et al. [512] adopted Smets’ Transferable
Belief Model for sensor fusion and compared the results to those of a straightforward application of
Dempster’s rule. Murphy [513], instead, used the evidential ‘weight of conflict’ (see Chapter 2, Section
2.2) to measure the consensus among different sensors, and attempted to integrate abstract and logical
information.
10.5. Other applications. Another field of information technology which is seeing an increasing
number of application of the theory of evidence is database management [514]: in particular, data min-
ing [450] and concept-oriented databases [515]. Mc Lean et al. showed how to represent incomplete
data frequently present in databases [516] by means of mass functions, and how to integrate distributed
databases [517] using the evidential sensor fusion scheme.
It is also worth citing the work of Webster et al. [518] on an entropy criterion based on the theory of
evidence for the validation of expert systems [519, 520, 521] performance. In [522], some strategies for
explanations [523] for belief-based reasoning in the context of expert systems were suggested.
Several applications to control theory and the theory of dynamical systems have been brought forward
in recent years [524]. Climate change [525] is a promising testbed for theories of uncertainty as well.
Finally, economics has always experimented with mathematical models in an attempt to describe the
amazing complexity of the systems it needs to describe. To cite a few, applications of evidential reasoning
to project management [526], exchange rate forecasting [444] and monetary unit sampling [527] have
been proposed.
Part 2
Advances

CHAPTER 4
A geometric approach to belief calculus
When one tries and apply the theory of evidence to classical computer vision problems, a number of
important issues arise. Object tracking [528], for instance, consists in estimating at each time instant
the current configuration or ‘pose’ of a moving object from a sequence of images of the latter. Image
features can be represented as belief functions and combined to produce an estimate qˆ(t) ∈ Q˜ of the
object’s pose, where Q˜ is a finite approximation of the pose space Q of the object collected in a training
stage (compare Chapter 8).
Deriving a pointwise estimate from the belief function emerging from the combination is desirable to
provide an expected pose estimate - this can be done, for example, by finding the ‘best’ probabilistic
approximation of the current belief estimate and computing the corresponding expected pose. This
requires a notion of ‘distance’ between belief functions, or between a belief function and a probability
distribution.
In data association [529], a problem described in detail in Chapter 7, the correspondence between
moving points appearing in consecutive images of a sequence is sought. Whenever these points belong
to an articulated body whose topological model is known, the rigid motion constraint acting on each link
of the body can be used to obtain the desired correspondence. Since the latter can only be expressed in a
conditional way, the notion of combining conditional belief functions in a filtering-like process emerges.
Conditional belief functions can again be defined in a geometric fashion, as those objects which minimise
an appropriate distance [530, 531, 532, 533] between the original belief function and the ‘conditional
simplex’ associated with the conditioning event A (an approach developed in [534, 535, 536]).
From a more general point of view, the notion of representing uncertainty measures such as belief
functions [537] and probability distributions as points of a certain space [538, 539, 540, 541, 542] can
be appealing, as it provides a picture in which different forms of uncertainty descriptions are unified in a
single geometric framework. Distances can there be measured, approximations sought, and decomposi-
tions easily calculated.
In this Chapter we conduct therefore a geometric analysis of the basis concepts of the theory of evidence,
such as basic probability assignments and Dempster’s rule, laying the foundations for such a geometric
approach to uncertainty theory.
53
54 4. A GEOMETRIC APPROACH TO BELIEF CALCULUS
Chapter Outline. A central role is played by the notion of belief space B, introduced in Section 1,
as the space of all the belief functions one can define on a given frame of discernment.
In Section 2 we characterize the relation between the focal elements of a belief function and the convex
closure operator in the belief space. In particular, we show that every belief function can be uniquely
decomposed as a convex combination of ‘basis’ or ‘categorical’ belief functions, giving B the form of a
simplex, i.e., the convex closure of a set of affinely independent points.
In Section 3, instead, the Moebius inversion lemma (5) is exploited to investigate the symmetries of the
belief space. With the aid of some combinatorial results, a recursive bundle structure of B is proved and
an interpretation of its components (bases and fibers) in term of important classes of belief functions is
provided.
In Section 4 the global behavior of Dempster’s rule of combination within this geometric framework is
analysed, by proving that the orthogonal sum commutes with the convex closure operator. This allows us
to give a geometric description of the set of belief functions combinable with a given b.f. b, and the set
of belief functions that can be generated from b by combination with additional evidence (its conditional
subspace).
In Section 5, instead, the pointwise geometry of Dempster’s rule is briefly studied and a geometric algo-
rithm for Dempster’s combination of two belief functions, based on the notion of ‘focus’ of a conditional
subspace, is outlined.
Finally (Section 6) some of the many potential applications of the geometric approach to belief theory
are discussed. In particular, we consider the computation of the canonical decomposition of a separable
belief function (Section 6.1), the study of two different order relations associated with belief functions
(Section 6.2) and the search for a probabilistic approximation of belief functions based on its behavior
with respect to Dempster’s rule of combination (Section 6.3).
1. The space of belief functions
Consider a frame of discernment Θ and introduce in the Euclidean space R|2Θ| an orthonormal refer-
ence frame {~xi}i=1,...,|2Θ|.
DEFINITION 30. The belief space associated with Θ is the set BΘ of vectors ~v of R|2Θ| such that there
exists a belief function b : 2Θ → [0, 1] whose belief values correspond to the components of ~v, for an
appropriate ordering of the subsets of Θ.
In the following we will drop the dependency on the underlying frame Θ, and denote the belief space
by B.
1.1. Limit simplex. The have a first idea of the shape of the belief space it can be useful to start
understanding the geometric properties of Bayesian belief functions.
LEMMA 1. Whenever p : 2Θ → [0, 1] is a Bayesian belief function defined on a frame Θ, and B is an
arbitrary subset of Θ, we have that: ∑
A⊆B
p(A) = 2|B|−1p(B).
PROOF. The sum can be rewritten as
∑
θ∈B kθp(θ) where kθ is the number of subsets A of B con-
taining θ. But kθ = 2|B|−1 for each singleton, so that:∑
A⊆B
p(A) = 2|B|−1
∑
θ∈B
p(θ) = 2|B|−1p(B).

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As a consequence, all Bayesian belief functions are constrained to belong to a well-determined region
of the belief space.
COROLLARY 1. The set P of all the Bayesian belief functions which can be defined on a frame of
discernment Θ is a subset of the following |Θ| − 1-dimensional region
(34) L =
{
b : 2Θ → [0, 1] ∈ B s.t.
∑
A⊆Θ
b(A) = 2|Θ|−1
}
of the belief space B, which we call the limit simplex1.
THEOREM 2. Given a frame of discernment Θ, the corresponding belief space B is a subset of the
region of R|2Θ| ‘dominated’ by the limit simplex L:∑
A⊆Θ
b(A) ≤ 2|Θ|−1,
where the equality holds iff b is Bayesian.
PROOF. The sum
∑
A⊆Θ b(A) can be written as∑
A⊆Θ
b(A) =
f∑
i=1
ai ·m(Ai)
where f is the number of focal elements of b and ai is the number of subsets of Θ which include the i-th
focal element Ai, namely: ai = |{B ⊂ Θ s.t. B ⊇ Ai}|.
Obviously, ai = 2|Θ\A| ≤ 2|Θ|−1 and the equality holds iff |A| = 1. Therefore:∑
A⊆Θ
b(A) =
f∑
i=1
m(Ai)2
|Θ\A| ≤ 2|Θ|−1
f∑
i=1
m(Ai) = 2
|Θ|−1 · 1 = 2|Θ|−1,
where the equality holds iff |Ai| = 1 for every focal element of b, i.e., b is Bayesian. 
It is important to point out that P does not, in general, sell out the limit simplex L. Similarly, the
belief space does not necessarily coincide with the entire region bounded by L.
1.2. Consistent probabilities and L1 norm. Another hint on the structure of B comes from a par-
ticular property of Bayesian belief functions with respect to the classical L1 distance in the Cartesian
space R|Θ|. Let Cb denote the core of a belief function b, and introduce the following order relation:
(35) b ≥ b′ ⇔ b(A) ≥ b′(A) ∀A ⊆ Θ.
LEMMA 2. If b ≥ b′, then Cb ⊆ Cb′ .
PROOF. Trivially, since b(A) ≥ b′(A) for every A ⊆ Θ, that holds for Cb′ too, so that b(Cb′) = 1. But
then, Cb ⊆ Cb′ . 
THEOREM 3. If b : 2Θ → [0, 1] is a belief function defined on a frame Θ, then
‖b− p‖L1 =
∑
A⊆Θ
|b(A)− p(A)| = const
for every Bayesian belief function p : 2Θ → [0, 1] dominating b according to order relation (35).
1As it can be proved that L is indeed a simplex, i.e., the convex closure of a number of affinely independent points
(http://www.cis.upenn.edu/ cis610/geombchap2.pdf).
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PROOF. Lemma 2 guarantees that Cp ⊆ Cb, so that p(A)− b(A) = 1− 1 = 0 for every A ⊇ Cb. On
the other hand, if A ∩ Cb = ∅ then p(A) − b(A) = 0 − 0 = 0. We are left with sets which amount to
the union of a non-empty proper subset of Cb and an arbitrary subset of Θ \ Cb. Given A ⊆ Cb there exist
2|Θ\Cb| subsets of the above type which contain A. Therefore:∑
A⊆Θ
|b(A)− p(A)| = 2|Θ\Cb|
[ ∑
A⊆Cb
p(A)−
∑
A⊆Cb
b(A)
]
.
Finally, by Lemma 1 the latter is equal to:
(36) f(b) .= 2|Θ\Cb|
[
2|Cb|−1 − 1−
∑
A⊆Cb
b(A)
]
.

The L1 distance (36) between a belief function and any Bayesian belief function p dominating it is not
a function of p, and depends only on b. A probability distribution satisfying the hypothesis of Theorem
3 is said to be consistent with b [126]. Ha et al. [543] proved that the set P [b] of probability measures
consistent with a given belief function b can be expressed (in the probability simplex P) as the sum of the
probability simplexes associated with its focal elements Ai, i = 1, ..., k, weighted by the corresponding
masses:
P [b] =
k∑
i=1
m(Ai)conv(Ai)
where conv(Ai) is the convex closure of the probabilities {pθ : θ ∈ Ai} assigning mass 1 to a single
element θ of Ai. The analytical form of the set P [b] of consistent probabilities has been further studied
in [544].
1.3. Exploiting the Moebius inversion lemma. These preliminary results suggest that the belief
space may have the form of a simplex. To proceed in our analysis we need to resort to the axioms of
basic probability assignments (Definition 3).
Given a belief function b, the corresponding basic probability assignment can be found by applying the
Moebius inversion lemma (5), which we recall here:
(37) m(A) =
∑
B⊆A
(−1)|A\B|b(B).
We can exploit it to determine whether a point b ∈ R|2Θ| corresponds indeed to a belief function, by
simply computing the related b.p.a. and checking whether the resulting m meets the axioms b.p.a.s must
obey.
The normalization constraint
∑
A⊆Θm(A) = 1 trivially translates into B ⊆ {b : b(Θ) = 1}. The
positivity condition is more interesting, for it implies an inequality which echoes the third axiom of
belief functions (compare Definition 2 or [52], page 5):
(38)
b(A)−
∑
B⊆A,|B|=|A|−1
b(B) + · · ·+ (−1)|A\B|
∑
|B|=k
b(B) + · · ·+ (−1)|A|−1
∑
θ∈Θ
b({θ}) ≥ 0 ∀A ⊆ Θ.
1.3.1. Example: ternary frame. Let us see how these constraints act on the belief space in the case
of a ternary frame Θ = {θ1, θ2, θ3}. After introducing the notation
x = b({θ1}), y = b({θ2}), z = b({θ3}), u = b({θ1, θ2}), v = s({θ1, θ3}), w = b({θ2, θ3})
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the positivity constraint (38) can be rewritten as
(39) B :

x ≥ 0, u ≥ (x+ y)
y ≥ 0, v ≥ (x+ z)
z ≥ 0, w ≥ (y + z)
1− (u+ v + w) + (x+ y + z) ≥ 0.
Note that b(Θ) is not needed as a coordinate, for it can be recovered by normalization.
By combining the last equation in (39) with the others, it follows that the belief space B is the set of
points [x, y, z, u, v, w]′ of R6 such that:
0 ≤ x+ y + z ≤ 1, 0 ≤ u+ v + w ≤ 2.
After defining k .= x+ y + z, it necessary follows that points of B ougth to meet:
u ≥ (x+ y), v ≥ (x+ z), w ≥ (y + z), 2k ≤ u+ v + w ≤ 1 + k.
1.4. Convexity of the belief space. Now, all the positivity constraints of Equation (38) (which
determine the shape of the belief space B) are of the form:∑
i∈G1
xi ≥
∑
j∈G2
xj
where G1 and G2 are two disjoint sets of coordinates, as the above example and Equation (39) confirm.
It immediately follows that:
THEOREM 4. The belief space B is convex.
PROOF. Let us consider two points of the belief space b0, b1 ∈ B (two belief functions) and prove
that all the points bα of the segment b0 + α(b1 − b0), 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, belong to B. Since b0, b1 belong to B:∑
i∈G1
x0i ≥
∑
j∈G2
x0j ,
∑
i∈G1
x1i ≥
∑
j∈G2
x1j
where x0i , x
1
i are the i-th coordinates in R2
|Θ| of b0, b1, respectively. Hence, for every point bα with
coordinates xαi we have that:∑
i∈G1
xαi =
∑
i∈G1
[x0i + α(x
1
i − x0i )] =
∑
i∈G1
x0i + α
∑
i∈G1
(x1i − x0i ) = (1− α)
∑
i∈G1
x0i + α
∑
i∈G1
x1i ≥
≥ (1− α)
∑
j∈G2
x0j + α
∑
j∈G2
x1j =
∑
j∈G2
[x0j + α(x
1
j − x0j)] =
∑
j∈G2
xαj ,
hence bα meets the same constraints. Therefore, B is convex. 
1.4.1. Belief functions and coherent lower probabilities. It is well-known that belief functions are
a special type of coherent lower probabilities (see Chapter 3, Section 9.1), which in turn can be seen
as a sub-class of lower previsions (consult [386], Section 5.13). Walley proved that coherent lower
probabilities are closed under convex combination — this implies that convex combinations of belief
functions (completely monotone lower probabilities) are still coherent.
Theorem 4 is a stronger result, stating that they are also completely monotone.
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1.5. Symmetries of the belief space. In the ternary example 1.3.1, the system of equations (39)
exhibits a natural symmetry which reflects the intuitive partition of the variables in two sets, each associ-
ated with subsets of Θ of the same cardinality, respectively {x, y, z} ∼ |A| = 1 and {u, v, w} ∼ |A| = 2.
It is easy to see that the symmetry group of B (i.e., the group of transformations which leave the belief
space unchanged) is the permutation group S3, acting onto {x, y, z}× {u, v, w} via the correspondence:
x↔ w, y ↔ v, z ↔ u.
This observation can be extended to the general case of a finite n-dimensional frame Θ = {θ1, · · · , θn}.
Let us adopt here for sake of simplicity the following notation:
xixj...xk
.
= b({θi, θj, ..., θk}).
The symmetry of the belief space in the general case is described by the following logic expression:
∨
1≤i,j≤n
n−1∧
k=1
∧
{i1, ..., ik−1} ⊂ {1, ..., n} \ {i, j}
xixi1 · · ·xik−1 ↔ xjxi1 · · ·xik−1 ,
where
∨
(
∧
) denotes the logical or (and), while↔ indicates the permutation of pairs of coordinates.
To see this, let us rewrite the Moebius constraints using the above notation:
xi1 · · ·xik ≥
k−1∑
l=1
(−1)k−l+1
∑
{j1,...,jl}⊂{i1,...,ik}
xj1 · · ·xjl .
Focussing on the right side of the equation, it is clear that only a permutation between coordinates
associated with subsets of the same cardinality may leave the inequality inalterate.
Given the triangular form of the system of inequalities (the first group concerning variables of size 1,
the second one variables of size 1 and 2, and so on), permutations of size-k variables are bound to be
induced by permutations of variables of smaller size. Hence, the symmetries of B are determined by
permutations of singletons. Each such swap xi ↔ xj determines in turn a number of permutations of the
coordinates related to subsets containing θi and θj .
The resulting symmetry Vk induced by xi ↔ xj for the k-th group of constraints is then:
(xi ↔ xj) ∧ · · · ∧ (xixi1 · · ·xik−1 ↔ xjxi1 · · ·xik−1) ∀{i1, ..., ik−1} ⊂ {1, ..., n} \ {i, j}.
Since Vk is obviously implied by Vk+1, and Vn is always trivial (as a simple check confirms), the overall
symmetry induced by a permutation of singletons is determined by Vn−1, and by considering all the
possible permutations xi ↔ xj we have as desired.
In other words, the symmetries of B are determined by the action of the permutation group Sn on the
collection of cardinality-1 variables, and the action of Sn naturally induced on higher-size variables by
set-theoretical membership:
(40) s ∈ Sn : Pk(Θ) → Pk(Θ)
xi1 · · ·xik 7→ sxi1 · · · sxik ,
where Pk(Θ) is the collection of the size-k subsets of Θ.
It is not difficult to recognize in (40) the symmetry properties of a simplex, i.e., the convex closure of
a collection v0, v1, ..., vk of k + 1 of affinely independent2 points (vertices) of Rm.
2The points v0, v1, ..., vk are said to be affinely independent iff v1 − v0, ..., vk − v0 are linearly independent.
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2. Simplicial form of the belief space
Indeeed, B is a simplex, with as vertices the special belief functions which assign unitary mass to a
single subset of the frame of discernment.
Let us call categorical belief function focused on A ⊆ Θ, and denote it by bA, the unique belief function
with b.p.a. mbA(A) = 1, mbA(B) = 0 for all B 6= A.
THEOREM 5. Every belief function3 b ∈ B can be uniquely expressed as a convex combination of all
the categorical belief functions:
(41) b =
∑
∅6=A(Θ
m(A)bA,
with coefficients given by the basic probability assignment m.
PROOF. Every belief function b in B is represented by the vector:
b =
[∑
B⊆A
m(B), ∅ 6= A ( Θ
]′
=
∑
∅6=A(Θ
m(A)
[
δ(B), ∅ 6= B ( Θ]′ ∈ RN−2,
where N .= |2Θ| and δ(B) = 1 iff B ⊇ A. As the vector [δ(B), B ⊆ Θ]′ is the vector of belief values
associated with the categorical b.f. bA, we have the thesis. 
This ‘convex decomposition’ property can be easily generalized in the following way.
THEOREM 6. The set of all the belief functions with focal elements in a given collection X ⊂ 22(Θ) is
closed and convex in B, namely: {
b : Eb ⊂ X
}
= Cl({bA : A ∈ X}),
where Cl denotes the convex closure of a set of points of a Cartesian space:
(42) Cl(b1, ..., bk) =
{
b ∈ B : b = α1b1 + · · ·+ αkbk,
∑
i
αi = 1, αi ≥ 0 ∀i
}
.
PROOF. By definition:{
b : Eb ⊂ X
}
=
{
b : b =
[ ∑
B⊆A,B∈Eb
m(B), ∅ 6= A ( Θ
]′
, Eb ⊂ X
}
.
But
b =
[ ∑
B⊆A,B∈Eb
m(B), ∅ 6= A ( Θ
]′
=
∑
B∈Eb
m(B)bB =
∑
B∈X
m(B)bB
after extending m to the elements B ∈ X \ Eb, by enforcing m(B) = 0 for those elements. Since m is a
basic probability assignment,
∑
B∈X m(B) = 1 and the thesis follows. 
As a direct consequence,
COROLLARY 2. The belief space B is the convex closure of all the categorical belief function, namely:
(43) B = Cl(bA, ∀∅ 6= A ⊆ Θ).
As it is easy to see that the vectors {bA, ∅ 6= A ( Θ} associated with all categorical belief functions
(except the vacuous one) are linearly independent, the vectors {bA − bΘ = bA, ∅ 6= A ( Θ} (since
bΘ = 0 is the origin of RN−2) are also linearly independent, i.e., the vertices {bA, ∅ 6= A ⊆ Θ} of the
belief space (43) are affinely independent. Hence:
3Here and in the rest of the Chapter we will denote both a belief function and the vector of RN−2 representing it by b.
This should not lead to confusion.
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COROLLARY 3. B is a simplex.
FIGURE 1. The belief space B2 for a binary frame is a triangle in R2 whose vertices are
the categorical belief functions bx, by, bΘ focused on {x}, {y} and Θ, respectively.
2.1. Simplicial structure on a binary frame. As an example let us consider a frame of discernment
containing only two elements, Θ2 = {x, y}. In this very simple case each belief function b : 2Θ2 → [0, 1]
is completely determined by its belief values b(x), b(y), as b(Θ) = 1 and b(∅) = 0 ∀b.
We can therefore collect them in a vector of RN−2 = R2 (since N = 22 = 4):
(44) [b(x) = m(x), b(y) = m(y)]′ ∈ R2.
Since m(x) ≥ 0, m(y) ≥ 0, and m(x) +m(y) ≤ 1 we can easily infer that the set B2 of all the possible
belief functions on Θ2 can be depicted as the triangle in the Cartesian plane of Figure 1, whose vertices
are the points:
bΘ = [0, 0]
′, bx = [1, 0]′, by = [0, 1]′
(compare Equation (43)). These correspond (through Equation (44)) to the ‘vacuous’ belief function bΘ
(mbΘ(Θ) = 1), the categorical Bayesian b.f. bx with mbx(x) = 1, and the categorilca Bayesian b.f. by
with mby(y) = 1, respectively.
Bayesian belief functions on Θ2 obey the constraint m(x) + m(y) = 1, and are therefore located on
the segment P2 joining bx = [1, 0]′ and by = [0, 1]′. Clearly the L1 distance between b and any Bayesian
b.f. dominating it is constant and equal to 1−m(x)−m(y) (see Theorem 3).
The limit simplex (17) is the region of set functions such that:
b(∅) + b(x) + b(y) + b(x, y) = 1 + b(x) + b(y) = 2,
i.e. b(x) + b(y) = 1. Clearly P2 is a proper4 subset of the limit simplex (recall Section 1.1).
3. The bundle structure of the belief space
As the convexity results of Theorem 4 suggested us that the belief space may have the form of a
simplex, the symmetry analysis of Section 1.5 and the ternary example of Section 1.3.1 advocate an
interesting additional structure for B.
4The limit simplex is indeed the region of normalized sum functions (Section 3.3) ς which meet the constraint∑
x∈Θmς(x) = 1
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Indeed, in the ternary example Θ = {x, y, z}we can note that the variables d = [mb(x),mb(y),mb(z)]′
(x, y, z in the notation of Section 1.3.1) associated with the masses of the singletons can move freely
in the unitary simplex D (the ‘base space’), while the variables mb({x, y}),mb({x, z}),mb({y, z})
(u, v, w) associated with size-2 subsets are constrained to belong to a separate simplex (the ‘fiber’) which
is a function on the mass d already assigned to subsets of smaller cardinality. We can express this fact
by saying that there exists a projection pi : B → D such that all the belief functions of a given fiber F(d)
project onto the same point d of the base space: F(d) = {b : pi[b] = d} (see Figure 3).
FIGURE 2. Bundle decomposition of the belief space in the ternary case.
This decomposition is a hint of a general feature of the belief space: B can be recursively decomposed
into bases and fibers, each parameterized by sets of coordinates related to subsets of Θ with a same
cardinality. Formally, the belief space has the structure of a fiber bundle [545].
3.1. Fiber bundles. A fiber bundle [545, 546] is a generalization of the familiar Cartesian product,
in which each point of the (total) space analyzed can be smoothly projected onto a base space – this
projection determines a the decomposition of the total space into a collection of fibers formed by points
which all project onto the same element of the base.
DEFINITION 31. A smooth fiber bundle ξ is a composed object {E,B, pi, F,G,U}, where
(1) E is an s+ r-dimensional differentiable manifold called total space;
(2) B is an r-dimensional differentiable manifold called base space;
(3) F is an s-dimensional differentiable manifold called fiber;
(4) pi : E → B is a smooth application of full rank r in each point of B, called projection;
(5) G is the structure group;
(6) the atlas U = {(Uα, φα)} defines a bundle structure; namely
• the base B admits a covering with open sets Uα such that
• Eα .= pi−1(Uα) is equipped with smooth direct product coordinates
(45) φα : pi
−1(Uα) → Uα × F
e 7→ (φ′α(e), φ′′α(e))
satisfying two conditions:
– the coordinate component with values in the base space is compatible with the pro-
jection map:
(46) pi ◦ φ−1α (x, f) = x
or equivalently φ′α(e) = pi(e);
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– the coordinate component with values on the fiber can be transformed, jumping from
a coordinate chart into another, by means of elements of the structure group. For-
mally the applications
λαβ
.
= φβφ
−1
α : Uαβ × F → Uαβ × F
(x, f) 7→ (x, Tαβ(x)f)
called gluing functions are implemented by means of transformations Tαβ(x) : F →
F defined by applications from a domain Uαβ to the structure group
Tαβ : Uαβ → G
satisfying the following conditions
(47) Tαβ = (T βα)−1, TαβT βγT γα = 1.
Intuitively, the base space is covered by a number of open neighborhoods {Uα}, which induce a similar
covering {Eα = pi−1(Uα)} on the total space E. Points e of each neighborhood Eα of the total space
admit coordinates separable into two parts: the first one φ′(e) = pi(e) is the projection of e onto the
base B, while the second part is its coordinate on the fiber F . Fiber coordinates are such that in the
intersection of two different charts Eα ∩ Eβ they can be transformed into each other by means of the
action of a group (the ‘structure group’) G.
Note that in the following all the involved manifolds are linear spaces, so that each of them can be
covered by a single chart. This makes the bundle structure trivial, i.e., the identity transformation. The
reader can then safely ignore the gluing conditions on φ′′α.
3.2. Combinatorial facts. To prove the bundle decomposition of the belief space B we first need a
simple combinatorial result.
LEMMA 3. The following inequality holds:
∑
|A|=i
b(A) ≤ 1 +
i−1∑
m=1
(−1)i−(m+1)
(
n− (m+ 1)
i−m
) ∑
|B|=m
b(B),
and the upper bound is reached whenever∑
|A|=i
mb(A) = 1−
∑
|A|<i
mb(A).
PROOF. Since
(
n−m
i−m
)
is the number of subsets of size i containing a fixed set B, |B| = m in a frame
with n elements, we can write:
(48)
∑
|A|=i
b(A) =
∑
|A|=i
∑
B⊆A
mb(B) =
i∑
m=1
∑
|B|=m
(
n−m
i−m
)
mb(B)
=
∑
|B|=i
mb(B) +
i−1∑
m=1
∑
|B|=m
(
n−m
i−m
)
mb(B)
≤ 1−
∑
|B|<i
mb(B) +
i−1∑
m=1
∑
|B|=m
(
n−m
i−m
)
mb(B),
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as
∑
|B|=i
mb(B) = 1−
∑
|B|<i
mb(B) by normalization. By Mo¨bius inversion (5):
(49)
∑
|A|<i
mb(A) =
∑
|A|<i
∑
B⊆A
(−1)|A\B|b(B) =
i−1∑
|A|=m=1
m∑
|B|=l=1
(−1)m−l
(
n− l
m− l
)∑
|B|=l
b(B)
for, again,
(
n−l
m−l
)
is the number of subsets of size m containing a fixed set B, |B| = l in a frame with n
elements. The role of the indexes m and l can be exchanged, obtaining:
(50)
i−1∑
|B|=l=1
mb(B) =
i−1∑
|B|=l=1
[ ∑
|B|=l
b(B) ·
i−1∑
m=l
(−1)m−l
(
n− l
m− l
)]
.
Now, a well known combinatorial identity ([547], volume 3, Equation (1.9)) states that, for i−(l+1) ≥ 1:
(51)
i−1∑
m=l
(−1)m−l
(
n− l
m− l
)
= (−1)i−(l+1)
(
n− (l + 1)
i− (l + 1)
)
.
By applying (51) to the last equality, (49) becomes:
(52)
i−1∑
|B|=l=1
[ ∑
|B|=l
b(B) · (−1)i−(l+1)
(
n− (l + 1)
i− (l + 1)
)]
.
Similarly, by (50) we have:
i−1∑
m=1
∑
|B|=m
(
n−m
i−m
)
mb(B) =
i−1∑
l=1
∑
|B|=l
b(B) ·
i−1∑
m=l
(−1)m−l
(
n− l
m− l
)(
n−m
i−m
)
=
i−1∑
l=1
∑
|B|=l
b(B) ·
i−1∑
m=l
(−1)m−l
(
i− l
m− l
)(
n− l
i− l
)
,
as it is easy to verify that
(
n− l
m− l
)(
n−m
i−m
)
=
(
i− l
m− l
)(
n− l
i− l
)
.
By applying (51) again to the last equality we get:
(53)
i−1∑
m=1
∑
|B|=m
(
n−m
i−m
)
mb(B) =
i−1∑
l=1
∑
|B|=l
(−1)i−(l+1)
(
n− l
i− l
)
.
By replacing (50) and (53) in (48) we get the thesis. 
The bottom line of Lemma 3 is that, having assigned mass to events of size 1, ..., i−1 the upper bound
for
∑
|A|=i b(A) is obtained by assigning all the remaining mass to the collection of size-i subsets.
3.3. Normalized sum functions. The definition of fiber bundle (see Appendix) requires the in-
volved spaces (bases and fibers) to be manifolds. The ternary case suggests instead that the belief space
decomposes into simplices. The idea of recursively assigning mass to subsets of increasing size, however,
does not necessarily require the mass itself to be positive.
Indeed, each vector v = [vA, ∅ ( A ( Θ]′ ∈ RN−2 can be thought of as a set function
ς : 2Θ \ ∅ → R s.t. ς(A) = vA, ς(Θ) = 1−
∑
A 6=Θ
vA.
By applying the Mo¨bius transformation (5) to such a ς we obtain another set function mς : 2Θ \ ∅ → R
with ς(A) =
∑
B⊆Amς(B) (as it is the case for belief functions, compare (18)). Contrarily to basic
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probability assignments, however, the Mo¨bius inverse mς of such a normalized sum function (n.s.f.)
[541, 548] ς is not guaranteed to meet the non-negativity constraint:
mς(A) 6≥ 0 ∀A ⊆ Θ.
Geometrically, normalized sum functions correspond to arbitrary points of S = RN−2.
3.4. Recursive convex fiber bundle structure. If we recursively assign mass to normalized sum
functions, we obtain a classical fiber bundle structure for the space S of all n.s.f.s on Θ, in which all the
involved bases and fibers are ‘conventional’ linear spaces.
THEOREM 7. The space S = RN−2 of all the sum functions ς with domain on a finite frame Θ of
cardinality |Θ| = n has a recursive fiber bundle structure. Namely, there exists a sequence of smooth
fiber bundles
ξi =
{
F (i−1)S ,D(i)S ,F (i)S , pii
}
, i = 1, ..., n− 1
where F (0)S = S = RN−2, the total space F (i−1)S , the base space D(i)S and the fiber F (i)S of the i-th bundle
level are linear subspaces of RN−2 of dimension
∑n−1
k=i
(
n
k
)
,
(
n
i
)
,
∑n−1
k=i+1
(
n
k
)
respectively.
Both F (i−1)S and D(i)S admit a global coordinate chart. As
dimF (i−1)S =
∑
k=i,...,n−1
(
n
k
)
=
∣∣∣{A ⊂ Θ : i ≤ |A| < n}∣∣∣,
each point ς i−1 of F (i−1)S can be written as
ς i−1 =
[
ς i−1(A), A ⊂ Θ, i ≤ |A| < n
]′
and the smooth direct product coordinates (45) at the i-th bundle level are
φ′(ς i−1) =
{
ς i−1(A), |A| = i
}
, φ′′(ς i−1) =
{
ς i−1(A), i < |A| < n
}
.
The projection map pii of the i-th bundle level is a full-rank differentiable application
pii : F (i−1)S → D(i)S
ς i−1 7→ pii[ς i−1]
whose expression in this coordinate chart is
(54) pii[ς i−1] = [ς i−1(A), |A| = i]′.
PROOF. (sketch) The bottom line of the proof of Theorem 7 is that the mass associated with a sum
function can be recursively assigned to subsets of increasing size. The proof is done by induction [548].

As the belief space is a simplex immersed in S = RN−2, the fibers of RN−2 do intersect the space of
belief functions too. The belief space B then inherits some sort of bundle structure from the Cartesian
space in which it is immersed.
THEOREM 8. The belief space B ⊂ S = RN−2 inherits by intersection with the recursive bundle
structure of S a ‘convex’-bundle decomposition. Each i-th level ‘fiber’ can be expressed as
(55) F (i−1)B (d1, ..., di−1) =
{
b ∈ B : Vi ∧ · · · ∧ Vn−1(d1, ..., di−1)
}
,
3. THE BUNDLE STRUCTURE OF THE BELIEF SPACE 65
where Vi(d1, ..., di−1) denotes the system of constraints
(56) Vi(d1, ..., di−1) :

mb(A) ≥ 0 ∀A ⊆ Θ : |A| = i,∑
|A|=i
mb(A) ≤ 1−
∑
|A|<i
mb(A)
and depends on the mass assigned to lower size subsets dm = [mb(A), |A| = m]′, m = 1, ..., i− 1.
The corresponding i-th level convex ‘base’ D(i)B (d1, ..., di−1) can be expressed in terms of basic prob-
ability assignments as the collection of b.f.s b ∈ F (i−1)(d1, ..., di−1) such that
(57)

mb(A) = 0, ∀A : i < |A| < n
mb(A) ≥ 0, ∀A : |A| = i∑
|A|=i
mb(A) ≤ 1−
∑
|A|<i
mb(A).
PROOF. (sketch) The proof is based on understanding the effect on B ⊂ S of the bundle decompo-
sition of the space of normalized sum functions S = RN−2. This is done by applying the non-negativity
mς ≥ 0 and normalization
∑
Amς(A) = 1 constraints on the admissible values of the coordinates of
points of S, recursively to collections of subsets of the same size. For a full proof see [548]. 
The intersections of the fibers of S = RN−2 with the simplex B are themselves simplices: bases and
fibers in the belief space case are polytopes, rather than linear spaces.
3.5. Bases and fibers as simplices. We have seen that the (i− 1)-th level fiber F (i−1)B (d1, ..., di−1)
of B admits a pseudo-bundle structure whose pseudo-base space isD(i)B (d1, · · · , di−1) given by Equation
(57). Let us denote by k =
∑
|A|<imA the total mass already assigned to lower size events, and call
P(i)(d1, ..., di−1) .=
{
b ∈ F (i−1)B (d1, ..., di−1) :
∑
|A|=i
mb(A) = 1− k
}
O(i)(d1, ..., di−1) .=
{
b ∈ F (i−1)B (d1, ..., di−1) : mb(Θ) = 1− k
}
the collections of belief functions on the fiber F (i−1)B (d1, ..., di−1) assigning all the remaining basic prob-
ability 1− k to subsets of size i or to Θ, respectively.
Each belief function b ∈ F (i−1)B (d1, ..., di−1) on such a fiber can be written as:
b = k
∑
|A|<i
mb0(A)bA + (1− k)
∑
|A|≥i
mb′(A)bA = kb0 + (1− k)b′
where b0 ∈ Cl(bA : |A| < i) and b′ ∈ Cl(bA : |A| ≥ i). Note that b0 is the same for all the b.f.s on the
fiber, while the second component b′ is free to vary in Cl(bA : |A| ≥ i).
It can be proven that the following convex expressions for F (i−1)B ,P(i) and O(i) (neglecting for sake
of simplicity the dependence on d1, ..., di−1 or, equivalently, on b0) hold [548]:
(58)
F (i−1)B =
{
b = kb0 + (1− k)b′, b′ ∈ Cl(bA, |A| ≥ i)
}
= kb0 + (1− k)Cl(bA, |A| ≥ i),
P(i) = kb0 + (1− k)Cl(bA : |A| = i),
O(i) = kb0 + (1− k)bΘ,
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and we can write:
D(i)B = Cl(O(i),P(i)).
As a consequence, the elements of the convex bundle decomposition of B possess a natural meaning in
terms of belief values. In particular, P(1) = P is the set of all the Bayesian belief functions, while D(1)
is the collection of all the discounted probabilities [52], i.e., belief functions of the form (1− )p+ bΘ,
with 0 ≤  ≤ 1 and p ∈ P .
B.f.s assigning mass to events of cardinality smaller than a certain size i are called in the literature
i-additive belief functions [549]. The set P(i) (58) is nothing but the collection of all i-additive b.f.s. The
i-th level base of B can then be interpreted as the region of all ‘discounted’ i-additive belief functions.
4. Global geometry of Dempster’s rule
Once established the geometrical properties of belief functions as set functions, we take a step forward
and analyze the behaviour of the rule of combination in the framework of the belief space.
4.1. Commutativity. In [342] we proved the following fundamental results on the relationship be-
tween Dempster’s sum and the convex combination of belief functions as points of a Cartesian space.
PROPOSITION 22. Consider a belief function b and a collection of b.f.s {b1, · · · , bn} such that at least
one of them is combinable with b. If
∑
i αi = 1, αi ≥ 0 for all i = 1, ..., n5 then
b⊕
∑
i
αibi =
∑
i
βi(b⊕ bi),
where
(59) βi =
αik(b, bi)∑n
j=1 αjk(b, bj)
and k(b, bi) is the normalization factor for the sum b⊕ bi: k(b, bi) .=
∑
A∩B 6=∅mb(A)mbi(B).
Proposition 22 can be used to prove that convex closure and Dempster’s sum commute [342], i.e., the
order of their action on a set of b.f.s can be swapped.
THEOREM 9. Cl and⊕ commute in the belief space. Namely, if b is combinable (in Dempster’s sense)
with bi, ∀i = 1, ..., n then:
b⊕ Cl(b1, · · · , bn) = Cl(b⊕ b1, · · · , b⊕ bn).
PROOF. Sufficiency. We need to prove that if b′ ∈ b⊕ Cl(b1, ..., bn) then b′ ∈ Cl(b⊕ b1, ..., b⊕ bn).
If b′ = b⊕∑ni=1 αibi,∑i αi = 1, αi ≥ 0, then by Proposition 22:
b′ =
n∑
i=1
βib⊕ bi ∈ Cl(b⊕ b1, ..., b⊕ bn),
as βi given by Equation (59) is such that
∑
i βi = 1, βi ≥ 0 for all i.
Necessity. We have to show that if b′ ∈ Cl(b⊕ b1, ..., b⊕ bn) then b′ ∈ b⊕Cl(b1, ..., bn). An arbitrary
element of Cl(b⊕ b1, ..., b⊕ bn) has the form:
(60)
n∑
i=1
α′ib⊕ bi
5Here n is only an index, with nothing to do with the cardinality of the frame on which the belief functions are defined.
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for some set of coefficients α′i such that
∑
i α
′
i = 1, α
′
i ≥ 0.
On the other hand, elements of b⊕
(∑n
i=1 αibi
)
,
∑
i α = 1, α ≥ 0 for all i, have the form:
n∑
i=1
βib⊕ bi
where βi is given by Equation (59).
Hence, any belief function b′ of the form (60) with coefficients {α′i, i = 1, ..., n} belongs to the region
b⊕ Cl(b1, · · · , bn) iff we can find another collection of coefficients {αi, i = 1, ..., n},
∑
i αi = 1, such
that the following constraints are met:
(61) α′i = βi =
αiki∑
i αiki
∀i = 1, ..., n,
where ki = k(b, bi) for all i.
An admissible solution to the system of equations (61) is α˜i
.
= βi/ki, as ∀i βi = βi/
∑
i βi = βi (since
the βis sum to one), and system (61) is satisfied up to the normalization constraint.
We can further normalize the solution by setting:
αi = α˜i/
∑
j
α˜j =
βi
ki
∑
j(
βj
kj
)
,
for which (61) is still met. 
4.2. Conditional subspaces. The fact that orthogonal sum and convex closure commute is a pow-
erful tool, for it provides us with a simple language in which to express the geometric interpretations of
the notions of combinability and conditioning.
DEFINITION 32. The conditional subspace 〈b〉 associated with a belief function b is the set of all the
belief functions conditioned by b, namely
(62) 〈b〉 .= {b⊕ b′, ∀b′ ∈ B s.t. ∃ b⊕ b′}.
In other words, the conditional subspace 〈b〉 is the possible ‘future’ of the imprecise knowledge state
encoded by a belief function b, under the assumption that evidence combination follows Dempster’s rule.
Since belief functions are not necessarily combinable, we first need to understand the geometry of the
notion of combinability.
DEFINITION 33. The non-combinable region NC(b) associated with a belief function b is the collec-
tion of all the b.f.s which are not combinable with b, namely:
NC(b)
.
= {b′ : @b′ ⊕ b} = {b′ : k(b, b′) = 0}.
The results of Section 2 once again allow us to understand the shape of this set. As a matter of fact the
non-combinable region NC(b) of b is also a simplex, whose vertices are the categorical belief functions
related to subsets disjoint from the core Cb of b (the union of its f.e.s) [342].
PROPOSITION 23. NC(b) = Cl(bA, A ∩ Cb = ∅).
Clearly, as the vertices of a simplex are affinely independent (see Footnote 2), the dimension of the
linear space generated by NC(b) is 2|Θ\Cb| − 2. Using Definition 33 we can write:
〈b〉 = b⊕ (B \NC(b)) = b⊕ {b′ : Cb′ ∩ Cb 6= ∅},
where \ denotes, as usual, the set-theoretic difference A \B = A ∩B.
Unfortunately, B \NC(b) does not satisfy Theorem 6: for a b.f. b′ to be compatible with b it suffices
for it to have one focal element intersecting the core Cb, not necessarily all of them. Geometrically, this
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means that B \NC(b) is not a simplex. Hence, we cannot apply the commutativity results of Section 4.1
directly to B \NC(b) to find the shape of the conditional subspace.
Nevertheless, 〈b〉 can still be expressed as a Dempster’s sum of b and a simplex.
DEFINITION 34. The compatible simplex C(b) associated with a belief function b is the collection of
all b.f.s whose focal elements are in the core of b:
C(b)
.
= {b′ : Cb′ ⊆ Cb} = {b′ : Eb′ ⊆ 2Cb}.
From from Theorem 6 it follows that
COROLLARY 4. C(b) = Cl(bA : A ⊆ Cb).
The compatible simplex C(b) is only a proper subset of the collection of b.f.s combinable with b,
B \NC(b) — nevertheless, it contains all the relevant information. As a matter of fact:
THEOREM 10. The conditional subspace 〈b〉 associated with a belief function b coincides with the
orthogonal sum of b and the related compatible simplex C(b), namely:
〈b〉 = b⊕ C(b).
PROOF. Let us denote by Eb = {Ai, i} and Eb′ = {Bj, j} the lists of focal elements of b and b′,
respectively. By definition Ai = Ai ∩ Cb so that Bj ∩ Ai = Bj ∩ (Ai ∩ Cb) = (Bj ∩ Cb) ∩ Ai. Once
defined a new belief function b′′ with focal elements {B′k, k = 1, ...,m} .= {Bj ∩ Cb, j = 1, ..., |Eb′ |}
(note that m ≤ |Eb′| since some intersections may coincide) and basic probability assignment
mb′′ (B
′
k) =
∑
j:Bj∩Cb=B′k
mb′(Bj)
we have that b⊕ b′ = b⊕ b′′ . 
We are now ready to understand the convex geometry of conditional subspaces. From Theorems 6 and
10 it follows that:
COROLLARY 5. The conditional subspace 〈b〉 associated with a belief function b is the convex closure
of the orthogonal sums involving b and all the categorical belief functions compatible with it. Namely:
〈b〉 = Cl(b⊕ bA,∀A ⊆ Cb).
Note that, since b ⊕ bCb = b (where bCb is the categorical belief function focused on the core of b), b
is always one of the vertices of 〈b〉. Furthermore, 〈b〉 ⊆ C(b), since the core of a belief function b is a
monotone function on the partially ordered set (B,≥⊕), namely [52] Cb⊕b′ = Cb ∩ Cb′ ⊆ Cb.
Furthermore:
(63) dim(〈b〉) = 2|Cb| − 2,
as the dimension of the linear space generated by 〈b〉 is simply the cardinality of C(b) (note that ∅ is not
included) minus 1. We can observe that, in general:
dim(NC(b)) + dim(〈b〉) 6= dim(B).
5. Pointwise geometry of Dempster’s rule
Corollary 5 depicts, in a sense, the global behavior of the rule of combination in the belief space, as it
describes the form of the collection of all the possible outcomes of the combination of new evidence with
a given belief function. We still do not know understand the pointwise geometric behavior of⊕, i.e., how
the location (in the belief space B) of a Dempster’s sum b1 ⊕ b2 is related to that of the belief functions
b1, b2 to combine. In this Section we will analyze the simple case of a binary frame Θ = {x, y}, and
recall the recent general results on the matter [541].
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5.1. Binary case. Given two belief functions b1 = [m1(x),m1(y)]′ and b2 = [m2(x),m2(y)]′ de-
fined on a binary frame Θ = {x, y}, it is straightforward to derive the point b1 ⊕ b2 = [m(x),m(y)]′ of
the belief space B2 which corresponds to their orthogonal sum:
(64)
m(x) = 1− (1−m1(x))(1−m2(x))
1−m1(x)m2(y)−m1(y)m2(x)
m(y) = 1− (1−m1(y))(1−m2(y))
1−m1(x)m2(y)−m1(y)m2(x) .
Let us fix the first belief function b1, and analyze the behaviour of b1 ⊕ b2 as a function of of b2 (or,
equivalently, of the two variables m2(x),m2(y)). If we assume m2(x) constant in Equation (64), the
combination b1 ⊕ b2 = [m(x),m(y)]′ describes a line segment in the belief space. Analogously, if we
keep m2(y) constant the combination describes a different segment.
These facts are illustrated in Figure 3.
FIGURE 3. Pointwise geometrical representation of Dempster’s rule in the binary belief
space B2.
As we know from Section 4, the region of all orthogonal sums involving b1 is a triangle whose sides
are the probability simplex P , the locus {b = b1 ⊕ b2 : m2({x}) = 0} and its dual {b = b1 ⊕ b2 :
m2({y}) = 0}. In other words, the collection of all the belief functions obtainable from b1 by Dempster’s
combination of additional evidence is:
〈b1〉 = Cl({b1, b1 ⊕ bx, b1 ⊕ by}) = Cl({b1, bx = [1, 0]′, by = [0, 1]′})
(where Cl as usual denotes the convex closure operator (42)), confirming Corollary 5.
5.2. Foci of a conditional subspace in the binary case. Indeed, collections of Dempster’s com-
binations of the form b1 ⊕ b2 with m2({x}) = const are intersections with the conditional subspace
〈b1〉 of lines all passing through a ‘focal’ point Fx outside the belief space . Dually, sums b1 ⊕ b2 with
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m2({y}) = const lie on a set of lines all passing through a twin point Fy (see Figure 3).
The coordinates of Fx are obtained by simply intersecting the line associated with m2({x}) = 0 with
that associated with m2({x}) = 1 – dually for Fy. We get:
(65) Fx =
[
1,− m1(Θ)
m1({x})
]′
Fy =
[
− m1(Θ)
m1({y}) , 1
]′
.
We call these points foci of the conditional subspace generated by b1 (see Figure 3 again). By Equation
(65) it follows that:
PROPOSITION 24. limb1→bΘ Fx/y =∞, limb1→p, p∈P Fx/y = bx/y.
where∞ denotes the point at infinity of the Cartesian plane.
In other words, the ‘categorical’ probabilities bx, by can be interpreted as the foci of the probability
simplex P , seen as the conditional subspace generated by any probability measure p6.
FIGURE 4. The x focus of a conditional subspace 〈b1〉 in the binary belief space B2
(when m1(Θ) 6= 0). The white circle in correspondence of Fx indicates that the latter is a
missing point for each of the lines representing images of constant mass loci.
6The case in which b1 = p ∈ P is a Bayesian belief function is a singular one, as pointed out in [541].
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5.3. Probabilistic ‘coordinates’ of conditional belief functions. From Figure 3 we can appreciate
that to each point b2 ∈ 〈b1〉 of the conditional subspace generated by a belief function b1 (at least in the
binary case considered so far) is uniquely attached a pair of probabilities, the intersections of the lines
lx = Fxb2 and ly = Fyb2 with the probability simplex P:
(66) px
.
= lx ∩ P py .= ly ∩ P .
DEFINITION 35. We call px and py the probabilistic coordinates of the conditional belief function
b2|b1 ∈ 〈b1〉.
In the binary case we can calculate their analytical form by simply exploiting their definition.
We obtain for py:
(67)
py =
[
(1−m2(x)−m2(y))(1−m1(y))(1−m2(y))
(1−m2(x))(1−m2(y)−m1(y)m2(x))−m2(y)(1−m1(y))(1−m2(y)) ,
m1(y)(1−m2(x)−m2(y))(1−m2(x))
(1−m2(x))(1−m2(y)−m1(y)m2(x))−m2(y)(1−m1(y))(1−m2(y))
]′
.
Similar expressions can be derived for px.
Probabilistic coordinates have some remarkable properties. For instance:
PROPOSITION 25. If b1 ∈ P then px = py = b1 ⊕ b2 ∈ P for all b2 ∈ 〈b1〉.
namely, when the conditioning b.f. is Bayesian the probabilistic coordinates of every conditional b.f.
coincide (it suffices to look at Figure 3).
FIGURE 5. Graphical construction of Dempster’s orthogonal sum in B2.
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5.4. Geometric construction of Dempster’s rule. Most importantly, probabilistic coordinates al-
low us to formulate a geometrical construction for the orthogonal sum of a pair of belief functions
b1, b2 ∈ B2 defined on a binary frame (Figure 5).
Algorithm (binary case).
(1) Compute the foci Fx, Fy of the conditional subspace 〈b1〉;
(2) project b2 onto P along the orthogonal directions, obtaining two Bayesian belief functions p′x
and p′y;
(3) combine b1 with p′x and p
′
y to obtain the probabilistic coordinates px and py of b2;
(4) finally, draw the lines pxFx and pyFy: their intersection is the desired orthogonal sum b1 ⊕ b2.
This geometric algorithm’s main feature is that the convex structure of conditional subspaces can be
used to ‘decompose’ the belief function b2 to combine into a pair of probabilities (Bayesian b.f.s). Such
probabilities are then combined with the first operand (a quite simpler operation than the orthogonal
sum of two proper belief functions) and used in a simple intersection of lines to generate the desired
Dempster’s combination. A generalization of the above algorithm would therefore be rather appealing,
as it would allow a significant reduction of the computational complexity of Dempster’s rule.
Indeed, such a general geometric construction exists, and has been proven in [541]. In the general
case, each conditional subspace 〈b〉 possesses a separate focus FA(b) for each subset A of the core Cb of
the generating belief function b.
Algorithm (general case).
(1) All the foci {FA(b), A ⊆ Cb} of the subspace 〈b〉 conditioned by the first belief function b are
calculated as the affine subspaces7 generated by their focal points (see [541], Corollary 4):
(68) ςB =
1
1− plb(B)b+
plb(B)
plb(B)− 1b⊕ bB, B ⊆ Cb, B 6= A;
(2) given the second belief function to combine b′, an additional point b⊕mb′(A)bA for each event
A ⊆ Cb is detected (these correspond to b′s ‘probabilistic coordinates’ in the binary case);
(3) for each A ⊆ Cb, each pair focus + additional point selects an affine subspace of normalized
sum functions (see Section 3.3), namely that generated by the points:
b⊕ [mb′(A)bA + (1−mb′(A))bB] ∀B ⊂ Cb, B 6= A;
(4) all such affine subspaces are intersected, yielding the desired combination b⊕ b′.
The pointwise behavior of the rule of combination depends, in conclusion, on the notion of ‘constant
mass locus’ [541].
It is interesting to note that the focal points (68) have to be computed just once as trivial functions
of the upper probabilities (plausibilities) plb(B). In fact, each focus is nothing more than a particular
selection of 2|Cb| − 3 focal points among a collection of 2|Cb| − 2. Furthermore, the computation of each
focal point ςB involves a single application of Bayes’ conditioning rather then general Dempster’s sum,
avoiding time-consuming multiplications of probability assignments.
6. Applications of the geometric approach
6.1. Towards a geometric canonical decomposition. The graphical representation introduced above
can be used to find the canonical decomposition of a generic belief function b ∈ B2 defined on a binary
7The affine space generated by a set of points v1, ..., vm is the set {α1v1 + ...+ αmvm,
∑m
i=1 αi = 1}.
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frame of discernment Θ = {x, y} (since any b.f. in B2 is separable, but bx and by). Let us call COx and
COy the sets of simple support functions focussing on {x} and {y}, respectively8.
THEOREM 11. For all b ∈ B2 there exist two uniquely determined simple belief functions ex ∈ COx
and ey ∈ COy such that:
b = ex ⊕ ey.
The two simple support functions are geometrically defined as the intersections:
(69) ex = byb ∩ COx, ey = bxb ∩ COy.
where bxb denotes the line passing through bx and b.
PROOF. The proof is illustrated in Figure 6. The ordinate axis is mapped by Dempster’s combination
with the first simple component ex⊕ (.) to byb. As ex = ex⊕ bΘ and bΘ belongs to the ordinate, ex must
lie on the line byb, while belonging to COx by definition. The thesis trivially follows.
Analogously, the abscissa is mapped by Dempster’s combination with the second simple component
ey ⊕ (.) to bxb. As ey = ey ⊕ bΘ and bΘ belongs to the abscissa, ey must lie on the line bxb (while also
belonging to COy). 
FIGURE 6. Geometric canonical decomposition of a belief function in B2.
Proposition 5 suggests the possibility of exploiting our knowledge of the geometry of conditional
subspaces to generalize Theorem 11 to arbitrary belief spaces.
Indeed, Equation (69) can be expressed in the following way:
ex/y = Cl(b, b⊕ bx/y) ∩ Cl(bΘ, bx/y) = Cl(b, bx/y) ∩ Cl(bΘ, bx/y).
This shows that the geometric language we introduced in this Chapter, based on the two operators of con-
vex closure and orthogonal sum, may be powerful enough to provide a general solution to the canonical
decomposition problem (see Chapter 3), alternative to both Smets’ [367] and Kramosil’s [368]).
6.2. Order relations. One of the problems which motivate the introduction of a geometrical rep-
resentation of belief measures is the search for a rigorous computation of consonant and probabilistic
approximations of belief functions. In order to tackle this problem we need to introduce two sets of
coordinates naturally associated with the belief space, which we call here simple and belief coordinates.
8The notation comes from the fact that simple support functions coincide with consonant belief functions on a binary
frame, see Chapter 2, Section 8.
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6.2.1. Partially ordered sets and lattices.
DEFINITION 36. A partially ordered set or poset consists of a set P together with a binary relation
≤ over P which is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive. Namely, for all p, q and r in P the following
properties hold:
• p ≤ p (reflexivity);
• if p ≤ q and q ≤ p then p = q (antisymmetry);
• if p ≤ q and q ≤ r then p ≤ r (transitivity).
We also write q ≥ p whenever p ≤ q. A chain of a poset is a collection of consecutive elements:
two elements p, q are consecutive if p ≥ q (or q ≥ p) and 6 ∃r s.t. p ≥ r ≥ q (q ≥ r ≥ p). The
length of a chain is the number of consecutive elements which form it. A poset is said to have finite
length if the length of all its chains is bounded. An interval I[p, q] in P is the following subset of P :
{r ∈ L : p ≤ r ≤ q}.
In a poset the dual notions of least upper bound and greatest lower bound of a pair of elements can be
introduced.
DEFINITION 37. Given two elements p, q ∈ P of a poset P their least upper bound supP (p, q) is the
smallest element of P that is bigger than both p and q. Namely, supP (p, q) ≥ p, q and
∃r s.t. r ≤ sup
P
(p, q), r ≥ p, q ⇒ r = sup
P
(p, q).
DEFINITION 38. Given two elements p, q ∈ P of a poset P their greatest lower bound infP (p, q) is
the biggest element of P that is smaller than both p and q. Namely, infP (p, q) ≤ p, q and
∃r s.t. r ≥ inf
P
(p, q), r ≤ p, q ⇒ r = inf
P
(p, q).
The standard notations for greatest lower bound and least upper bound are inf(p, q) = p ∧ q and
sup(p, q) = p ∨ q, respectively. By induction sup and inf can be defined for arbitrary finite collections,
too. However, any collection of elements of a poset does not admit inf and/or sup, in general.
DEFINITION 39. A lattice is a poset in which any arbitrary finite collection of elements admits both
inf and sup. The latter meet the following properties:
(1) associativity: p ∨ (q ∨ r) = (p ∨ q) ∨ r, p ∧ (q ∧ r) = (p ∧ q) ∧ r;
(2) commutativity: p ∨ q = q ∨ p, p ∧ q = q ∧ p;
(3) idempotence: p ∨ p = p, p ∧ p = p;
(4) (p ∨ q) ∧ p = p, (p ∧ q) ∨ p = p.
6.2.2. The order relation ≥+. We have seen that the following relation:
(70) b ≥+ b′ ≡ b(A) ≥ b′(A) ∀A ⊆ Θ,
known as ‘weak inclusion’, plays an important role in our geometric framework. Indeed:
PROPOSITION 26. The belief space endowed with the weak inclusion relation (70), (B,≥+), is a
partially ordered set.
It is interesting to note that:
PROPOSITION 27. If b ≥+ b′ then Cb ⊆ Cb′ , i.e., the core is a monotone function on the poset (B,≥+).
PROOF. If b ≥+ b′ then b(Cb′) ≥ b′(Cb′) = 1 so that b(Cb′) = 1, i.e., Cb′ ⊇ Cb. 
The inverse condition does not hold. We can prove, however, that:
PROPOSITION 28. If Cb ⊆ Cb′ then b(A) ≥ b′(A) ∀A ⊇ Cb.
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Unfortunately (B,≥+) is not a lattice (compare Definition 39), i.e., there exist finite collections F of
belief functions in B which have no common upper bound, namely: @u ∈ B s.t. u ≥+ f ∀f ∈ F . For
instance, any finite set of probabilities {p1, ..., pk} form such a collection (observe Figure 7-left). The
vacuous belief function bΘ : mbΘ(Θ) = 1, on the other hand, is a lower bound for every arbitrary subset
of the belief space.
FIGURE 7. Left: geometrical representation of inf≥+ and sup≥+ in the binary belief
space B2. Right: least upper bound and greatest lower bound for the order relation ≥⊕ in
B2.
6.2.3. Bayesian and consonant belief functions. Bayesian and consonant belief functions behave in
a opposite ways with respect to order relation (70). For instance, Bayesian b.f.s are greater than any
belief function which does not assign any mass to the singleton elements of the frame. Furthermore,
Bayesian belief functions are upper elements in the partially ordered set (B,≥+).
PROPOSITION 29. If b ≥+ p, and p is Bayesian, then b = p.
PROOF. Since by hypothesismb({x}) = b({x}) ≥ p(x) ∀x ∈ Θ, and by normalization
∑
xmb({x}) =
1 =
∑
x p(x), it must follow that mb({x}) = p(x) ∀x. 
As a consequence:
COROLLARY 6. Probability measures are upper elements in any interval of belief functions, i.e., if
I = [b, b′] is an interval with respect to the order relation (70), and ∃p ∈ I Bayesian, then [p, b′] ⊆ P .
On the other hand, we prove that:
THEOREM 12. If b′ ≥+ b and ∩Ai∈EbAi = ∅ (i.e., the intersection of all the focal elements of b is void)
then b′ is not consonant.
PROOF. Suppose that b′ is consonant. Hence A1, the innermost focal element of b′, must be a subset
of all the focal elements of b. But since ∩Ai∈EbAi = ∅ this is impossible. 
6.2.4. Order relation≥⊕. The operation of orthogonal sum⊕ is internal for any belief space (setting
aside the combinability problem). It therefore generates an order relation of its own. Let us briefly see
its properties, as we have done for ≥+.
76 4. A GEOMETRIC APPROACH TO BELIEF CALCULUS
DEFINITION 40. A setM endowed with an operation · is called a commutative monoid whenever for
every p, q, r ∈M the following properties hold:
(1) p · (q · r) = (p · q) · r (associativity);
(2) p · q = q · p (commutativity);
(3) ∃1 ∈M such that p · 1 = p ∀p ∈M (existence of unit).
The monoid is said to be ‘with annihilator’ if, in addition, ∃0 ∈M such that p · 0 = 0 ∀p ∈M.
THEOREM 13. The belief space endowed with Dempster’s sum, (B,⊕), is a commutative monoid.
PROOF. Commutativity: b⊕ b′ = b′ ⊕ b by definition. Associativity: b⊕ (b′ ⊕ b′′) = (b⊕ b′)⊕ b′′ by
the associativity of set-theoretical intersection.
Unity: b⊕ bΘ = b for all b, by direct application of Dempster’s rule. 
Dempster’s sum has a ‘preferential’ direction, so there is no opposite element b−1 such that b⊕ b−1 =
bΘ for any non-vacuous belief function: evidence combination cannot be reversed.
It is interesting to note that the only ‘annihilators’ of ⊕ are the categorical probabilities {bx, x ∈ Θ}:
b⊕ bx = bx for all x ∈ Θ such that the combination exists.
DEFINITION 41. We say that b ‘is conditioned by’ b′ and write b ≥⊕ b′ if b belongs to the subspace of
B conditioned by b′. Namely:
b ≥⊕ b′ ≡ b ∈ 〈b′〉 ≡ ∃b′′ ∈ S s.t. b = b′ ⊕ b′′.
PROPOSITION 30. ≥⊕ is an order relation.
PROOF. Monoids are inherently associated with an order relation (see Chapter 5, Section 3.1). ≥⊕
is clearly the order relation induced by the monoid (B,⊕) of Theorem 13. 
Is (B,≥⊕) also a lattice, namely, do every finite collection of belief functions admit a greater lower
bound inf and a smaller upper bound sup? The analysis of the binary case B2 suggests that only pairs
of separable support functions (Chapter 2, Section 3) whose cores are not disjoint admit inf⊕ and sup⊕.
Their analytic expressions can be easily calculated for B2, and their geometric locations are shown in
Figure 7-right.
The latter also suggests a significant relationship between canonical decomposition and Dempster’s
rule-induced ordering.
PROPOSITION 31. If b, b′ : 2Θ → [0, 1] are two belief functions defined on a binary frame Θ = {x, y}
and b = ebx⊕ eby, b′ = eb′x ⊕ eb′y are the unique canonical decompositions of b and b′, respectively, we have
that:
inf⊕(b, b′) = inf(ebx, e
b′
x )⊕ inf(eby, eb′y )
sup⊕(b, b
′) = sup(ebx, e
b′
x )⊕ sup(eby, eb′y ),
where inf and sup on the right hand side of the equations denote the standard greatest lower bound and
least upper bound on real numbers.
Namely, inf and sup commute with canonical decomposition.
Furthermore:
PROPOSITION 32. b ≥⊕ b′, with b = ebx ⊕ eby and b′ = eb′x ⊕ eb′y , if and only if eb′x ≥ ebx and eb′y ≥ eby.
In other words, ≥⊕ is induced by the usual order relation over real numbers, when applied to the
canonical components of the two belief functions.
Bayesian belief functions play the role of upper bounds also under the order relation induced by the rule
of combination.
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PROPOSITION 33. Probabilities are upper elements of any interval of belief functions with respect to
≥⊕. Namely, if I = [b, b′] is an interval with respect to the order relation ≥⊕, and p ∈ I is a Bayesian
belief function, then b′ = p.
6.3. A Dempster’s rule-based probabilistic approximation. To conclude, let us investigate the
possibility of exploiting our geometric approach to belief calculus in order to approximate, according to
a criterion to be established, a given belief function with a finite probability (or Bayesian b.f.).
Indeed, much work has already been done on both probabilistic [328, 324] and possibilistic [395, 550,
396, 343, 178] approximation of belief functions. The reader is referred to Chapter 3, Section 6.3 for a
more complete review of the topic.
Nevertheless, we explore in this Section a different angle on the problem provided by the geometric
framework introduced here.
6.3.1. Approximation criteria. Suppose first that the desired approximation is the Bayesian belief
function which minimizes a certain distance from the original b.f., measured in the belief space B. Such
an approximation should meet a number of sensible criteria. In particular, the desired transformation
should be such that:
• the result does not depend on the choice of a specific distance function in the belief space;
• the outcome is a single pointwise approximation, rather than a whole set of approximations;
• its rationale is consistent with the main principles of the theory of belief functions.
In Section 6.2 we have learned that not every belief function has canonical coordinates (in particular,
non-separable ones do not). Hence, no distance function based on canonical coordinates is suitable to
induce such a ‘sensible’ probabilistic approximation.
Let us then focus on belief coordinates {b(A), ∅ 6= A ⊂ Θ}. The issue of what specific distance
function based on them we should be choosing arises.
A (limited) number of options are provided by the usual Lp norms:
(71)
‖b−p‖L1 =
∑
A⊂Θ
|b(A)−p(A)|, ‖b−p‖L2 =
√∑
A⊂Θ
|b(A)− p(A)|2, ‖b−p‖L∞ = sup
A⊂Θ
|b(A)−p(A)|.
Theorem 3, however, states that every belief function b is related to a whole subset of Bayesian belief
functions at the same (minimum) L1 distance from it. Clearly, L1 does not satisfy our criteria for a
probabilistic approximation.
6.3.2. External behavior and approximation criterion. On the other side, there seems to be no jus-
tification for the choice of any the above distances. The raison d’etre of the theory of evidence is the
rule of combination: a belief function is useful only when fused with others in an automated reasoning
process. Consequently, from the principles of evidential reasoning it follows that a good approxima-
tion, when combined with any other belief function, has to produce results ‘similar’ to what obtained by
combining the original function. Now, how ‘similarity’ between the result of evidence combination is
measured remains to be decided.
Analytically, such a criterion translates into looking for approximations of the form:
(72) bˆ = arg min
b′∈Cl
∫
t∈C(b)
dist(b⊕ t, b′ ⊕ t)dt,
where dist is a distance function in Cartesian coordinates (for instance, an Lp norm (71)), and Cl is the
class of belief functions where the approximation must belong.
6.3.3. The desired approximation in B2. At least in the binary frame, such an approximation can
indeed be computed. Let us focus, in particular, on the target class of Bayesian belief functions: Cl = P .
Firstly, intuition suggests a slight simplification of expression (72).
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Conjecture. When computing the probabilistic approximation of a given belief function b, it suffices
to measure the integral distance (72) only on the collection of Bayesian belief functions compatible with
b, P ∩ C(b), namely:
(73) pˆ = arg min
p∈P
∫
t∈P∩C(b)
dist(b⊕ t, p⊕ t)dt.
As we know, on a binary frame the compatible subset coincides with the whole belief space B2 for every
belief function distinct from bx and by, so that P ∩ C(b) = P ∀b ∈ B2.
The outcome of approximation criterion (73) turns out to be rather interesting.
THEOREM 14. For every belief function b ∈ B2 defined on a binary frame the solution of the optimiza-
tion problem (73) is unique, and corresponds to the normalized plausibility of singletons (29) regardless
the choice of the distance function Lp ∀p.
PROOF. Using the analytic expression (64) of Dempster’s rule in B2, and adopting the notations
b = [a1, a2]
′, p = [pi, 1− pi] and t = [τ, 1− τ ]′ for the involved belief and probability functions, we get:
b⊕ t− p⊕ t = τ(1− τ)
1− pt ·
pi(1− a1 + 1− a2)− (1− a2)
(1− a1) + τ(a1 − a2) · [1,−1]
′,
since both b ⊕ t and p ⊕ t belong to P (the line a1 + a2 = 1), so that their difference is proportional to
the vector [1,−1]′. This implies:
‖b⊕ t− p⊕ t‖pLp = 2 ·
∣∣∣∣τ(1− τ)1− piτ · pi(1− a1 + 1− a2)− (1− a2)(1− a1) + τ(a1 − a2)
∣∣∣∣p .
The solution of the desired approximation problem (73) becomes therefore:∫ 1
0
‖b⊕ t− p⊕ t‖pLpdτ =
= 2 · |pi(1− a1 + 1− a2)− (1− a2)|p ·
∫ 1
0
∣∣∣∣ τ(1− τ)(1− piτ)[(1− a1) + τ(a1 − a2)]
∣∣∣∣p dτ
= 2 · |pi(1− a1 + 1− a2)− (1− a2)|p · I(pi) = F (pi) · I(pi).
Of the two factors involved, I(pi) 6= 0 for every pi, since its argument is strictly positive for pi ∈ (0, 1).
The other factor F (pi), instead, is nil whenever pi(1− a1 + 1− a2)− (1− a2) = 0, i.e., when:
pi =
1− a2
1− a1 + 1− a2 .
The sought approximation is therefore:
pˆ =
[
1− a2
1− a1 + 1− a2 ,
1− a1
1− a1 + 1− a2
]′
.

Going back to Chapter 2, Equation (21), we can recognize the Bayesian belief function p˜lb obtained by
normalizing the plausibility values of the singleton elements of the binary frame, or ‘relative plausibility
of singletons’ [328, 329, 551, 552, 331]. It is interesting to note that, also:
p˜lb = arg min
p∈P
‖b− p‖2,
i.e., the normalized plausibility of singletons is also the unique probability that minimizes the standard
quadratic distance from the original belief function in the Euclidean space.
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Theorem 14 suggests that the optimal approximation, according to criterion (72), could be computed
in closed form in the general case as well, at least in the case of probability transformations. In any
case the proposed criterion has a general scope and rests on intuitive principles at the foundation of the
theory of evidence. It has therefore the potential to bring order to the matter of transformations of belief
functions if further developed, as we intend to do in the near future.
7. Conclusive comments
The geometric framework introduced in this Chapter is still in its early days [553, 554, 555], although
some interesting results have already been achieved. We now have an overall picture of the behavior of
belief functions as geometrical objects, but many questions still need to be addressed [544].
As far as our approximation criterion is concerned, our preliminary results appear to confirm the sound-
ness of our criteria. Simple maths in the consonant approximation case confirm the independence of
the outcome from the chosen distance function, and its link to what obtained by minimizing a standard
quadratic distance.
The lack of an evidential counterpart of the notion of random process is perhaps one of the major
drawbacks of the theory of evidence (as we mentioned in the Introduction), preventing a wider applica-
tion of belief calculus to engineering problems. The knowledge of the geometrical form of conditional
subspaces could indeed be useful to predict the behavior of series of belief functions:
lim
n→∞
(b1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ bn)
and their asymptotic properties.
On the other side, the geometric description of conditional subspaces promises to be a suitable tool for
the solution of problems such as canonical decomposition and the search for a geometric construction
of Dempster’s rule, providing as well a quantitative measure of the distance from separability of an
arbitrary belief function. Recently, the Author has worked towards extending this geometric analysis of
other combination operators [556].
It seems safe to argue that, although the geometric interpretation of belief functions was originally
motivated by the approximation problem, its potential applications are rather more far-reaching [557,
558].

CHAPTER 5
Algebraic structure of the families of compatible frames
The introduction of belief functions as the most suitable mathematical descriptions of empirical evi-
dence or subjective states of belief, and the related mechanisms for their combination in a belief revision
process is the most important contribution of the theory of evidence. Another major pillar of evidential
reasoning is the formalization of the idea of structured collection of representations of the external world,
encoded by the notion of ‘family of frames’ (see Chapter 2, Section 4).
Indeed, in sensor fusion applications [559] and computer vision [528], among others, a variety of mea-
surements of different nature need typically to be extracted in order to make inferences on the problem
at hand – think for instance of different types of images features. If we choose to represent such mea-
surements as belief functions, the latter turn out to be inherently defined on distinct frames of a family.
Nevertheless, they need to be combined in order to reach a decision or to provide an estimate of the
internal state of a system (e.g., the pose of an articulated body [560]).
Unfortunately, the combination of belief functions defined on distinct, compatible frames is not always
possible. As we show in the following (Theorem 28), this is guaranteed at all times only when their
domains are ‘independent’ in the sense of Definition 15. The existence of collections of belief functions
which are not combinable under Dempster’s rule is an issue often referred to by the term conflict problem
[561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566]. A naive solution to the conflict problem consists in building a graph
whose nodes are associated with the belief functions to combine, and recursively detecting the most
coherent set of belief functions as a maximal clique of this graph [528]. This, however, is a rather ad-
hoc solution which suffers from a high computational cost. In addition, no clear criteria for choosing a
specific ‘maximal’ collection of belief functions rather than a different one are provided by the theory.
Scope of the Chapter. In this Chapter we lay the foundations for a rigorous algebraic analysis of
the conflict problem, by studying the algebraic structure of the families of compatible frames [354] as
mathematical objects obeying a small number of axioms, namely those proposed by Shafer in [52].
The intuition comes from a striking resemblance between the notion of independence of frames (see
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Definition 15)
ρ1(A1) ∩ · · · ∩ ρn(An) 6= ∅, ∀Ai ⊂ Θi
and the familiar linear independence relation for collections of subspaces {Vi} of a vector space V :
v1 + · · ·+ vn 6= 0, ∀vi ∈ Vi.
As we will see in Chapters 5 and 6, this is more than a simple analogy: it is the symptom of a deeper
similarity of these structures at an algebraic level.
Given a collection of arbitrary elements of a vector space a well-known procedure (the Gram-Schmidt
algorithm) can be applied to generate a new collection of independent vectors, spanning the same sub-
space. A similar procedure acting on a set of belief functions defined on arbitrary elements of a family of
frames, and able to generate a second collection of (combinable) belief functions defined on independent
frames with Dempster’s sum ‘equivalent’ (in a sense to be defined) to that of the original set of b.f.s,
would provide a definitive solution to the conflict problem.
In Chapter 5 we prepare the mathematical ground for this ambitious goal, by studying the monoidal
and lattice structures of families of compatible frames of discernment. We distinguish finite from general
families of frames, describe the monoidal properties of compatible collections of both frames and refin-
ings, and introduce the internal operation of ‘maximal coarsening’, which in turns induces in a family of
frames the structures of Birkhoff, upper semimodular and lower semimodular lattice [567, 568].
Both vector subspaces and families of frames share the structure of Birkhoff lattice [70] (Corollary 11).
A formal linear independence relation can be introduced on the atoms of a Birkhoff lattice (the ele-
ments covering its initial element 0), which form therefore a matroid [569, 570, 571, 572], the algebraic
structure which constitutes the classical formalization of the notion of independence. Unfortunately, this
linear independence relation cannot be uniquely extended to arbitrary elements of the lattice, nor the
resulting relations make the lattice itself a matroid.
In Chapter 6 we will investigate the relation between Shafer’s classical definition of independence of
frames and these various extensions of matroidal independence to compatible frames, as elements of a
Birkhoff lattice, and draw some conclusions on the conjectured algebraic solution to the conflict problem
[573].
Related Work. To out knowledge not much work has been done along this line of research. In [120]
an analysis of the collections of partitions of a given frame in the context of a hierarchical representation
of belief could be found. A more extensive discussion of the algebraic properties of the families of frames
appeared in [574]. There, Chapter 7 was devoted to the lattice-theoretical interpretation of families of
frames (compare Section 3 of this Chapter) and the meaning of the concept of independence. Chapter 8,
instead, explored the consequences of the application of suitable constraints to the structure of the family
and developed in more detail the properties of Markov trees.
Chapter Outline. The Chapter is structured as follows. We start from Shafer’s definition of a family
of compatible frames, and look for a ‘constructive’ set of axioms (Section 1). Assuming a finite knowl-
edge of the problem at hand (a realistic assumption in real-world applications), the latter allows us to
build the subfamily of compatible frames of discernment generated by any given frame.
In Section 2 we focus on these finite subfamilies of frames, and show that the minimal refinement
operator ⊗ induces on them a structure of commutative monoid with annihilator (Theorem 17). The
collection of refinings of a finite subfamily of frames is also a monoid, as one can build an isomorphism
between frames and refinings (Equation (75)). More importantly, both the set of frames (F ,⊗) and
the set of refinings (R,⊗) of a general family of compatible frames of discernment admit the algebraic
structure of commutative monoid (Section 3.4.2), with finite subfamilies as their submonoids.
As the internal operation of a monoid induces an order relation, we are led to a lattice-theoretic inter-
pretation of families of frames (Section 3). As a matter of fact, in Section 4 we prove that the collection
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of sets of a family of compatible frames is a Birkhoff lattice (with minimal refinement as least upper
bound, and the dual operation of ‘maximal coarsening’ as greatest lower bound) of locally finite length
and with a smallest element. Families of frames are also both upper semimodular and lower semimodular
lattices, with respect to a dual pair of order relations.
1. Axiom analysis
Let us recall, for sake of simplicity, the axioms which define a family of frames {F ,R} (Chapter 2,
Definition 13).
AXIOM 1. Composition of refinings: if ρ1 : 2Θ1 → 2Θ2 and ρ2 : 2Θ2 → 2Θ3 are in R, then ρ1 ◦ ρ2 is
inR.
AXIOM 2. Identity of coarsenings: if ρ1 : 2Θ1 → 2Ωand ρ2 : 2Θ2 → 2Ω are in R and ∀ θ1 ∈
Θ1 ∃ θ2 ∈ Θ2 such that ρ1({θ1}) = ρ2({θ2}) then Θ1 = Θ2 and ρ1 = ρ2.
AXIOM 3. Identity of refinings: if ρ1 : 2Θ → 2Ω and ρ2 : 2Θ → 2Ω are inR, then ρ1 = ρ2.
AXIOM 4. Existence of coarsenings: if Ω ∈ F and A1, ..., An is a disjoint partition of Ω, then there is
a coarsening Ω′ of Ω in F corresponding to this partition, i.e., ∀Ai there exists an element of Ω′ whose
image under the appropriate refining is Ai.
AXIOM 5. Existence of refinings: if θ ∈ Θ ∈ F and n ∈ N then there exists a refining ρ : 2Θ → 2Ω
inR and Ω ∈ F such that ρ({θ}) has n elements.
AXIOM 6. Existence of common refinements: every pair of elements in F has a common refinement
in F .
Consider now an arbitrary finite set S and assess the results of applying the above axioms. We first
need to apply Axiom A4, obtaining the collection of all the possible partitions of S and the refinings
between each of them and S itself. By applying A4 again to the sets so generated we obtain all the
refinings between them: no other set is added to the collection. Axioms A2 and A3 guarantee the
uniqueness of the maps and sets so generated. Observe that rule A1 is in this situation redundant, for it
does not add any new refining.
Besides, it is clear at a first glance that rule A6 states an existence condition but is not ‘constructive’, i.e.,
it does not allow us to generate new frames from a given initial collection.
Let us therefore introduce a new axiom:
AXIOM 7. Existence of the minimal refinement: every pair of elements of F (compatible frames)
have a minimal refinement in F , i.e., a frame satisfying the conditions of Proposition 1.
and build a new set of axioms by replacing A6 with A7.
Let us call A1..6 and A1..5,7 these two formulations.
THEOREM 15. A1..6 and A1..5,7 are equivalent formulations of the notion of family of frames.
PROOF. It is necessary and sufficient to prove that (i) Axiom A7 can be obtained by using the set of
axioms A1, ..., A6 and (ii) that A6 can be obtained from A1, ..., A5, A7.
(i) See [52] or Proposition 1. (ii) Each common refinement of a given pair of frames Θ1,Θ2 can be
obtained by arbitrarily refining Θ1 ⊗ Θ2 by means of Axiom A5. In fact their minimal refinement is
obviously itself a refinement, so that A7⇒ A6. 
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1.1. Family generated by a set. If we assume that our knowledge of the phenomenon is finite and
static, Axiom A5 of the definition of families of compatible frames (Definition 13) cannot be used.
According to the notation established above we will call A1..4,7 the set of axioms corresponding to such
finite knowledge case.
DEFINITION 42. We define the subfamily generated by a collection of sets Θ1, ...,Θn by means of a
set of axioms A as the smallest collection of frames 〈Θ1, · · · ,Θn〉A which includes Θ1, ...,Θn and is
closed under the application of the axioms in A.
LEMMA 4. The minimal refinement of two coarsenings Θ1, Θ2 of a frame Θ is still a coarsening of Θ.
PROOF. By hypothesis Θ is a common refinement of Θ1 and Θ2. Since the minimal refinement is a
coarsening of every other refinement the thesis follows. 
Lemma 4 allow us to prove that:
THEOREM 16. The subfamily of compatible frames generated by the application of the restricted set
of rules A1..4,7 to a basis frame Θ is the collection of all the disjoint partitions of Θ along with the
associated refinings.
Note that this is not necessarily true when Axiom A6 is employed.
2. Monoidal structure of families of frames
Let us introduce in a family of compatible frames the internal operation
(74) ⊗ : F × · · · × F −→ F{Θ1, ...,Θn} 7→ ⊗iΘi
mapping a collection of frames to their minimal refinement. The above operation is well defined, for
Axiom A7 ensures the existence of ⊗iΘi and the results which follow guarantee its associativity and
commutativity.
2.1. Finite families as commutative monoids. Let us first consider finite subfamilies of frames of
the form {F ′,R′} = 〈Ω〉A1..4,7 for some Ω ∈ F .
THEOREM 17. A finite family of frames of discernment (F ′,⊗) is a finite commutative monoid with
annihilator (recall Chapter 4, Definition 40) with respect to the internal operation of minimal refinement.
PROOF. Associativity and commutativity. Going back to Theorem 1, associativity and commutativity
follow from the analogous properties of set-theoretic intersection.
Unit. Let us prove that there exists a unique frame inF ′ of cardinality 1. As Θ ∈ F ′, due to AxiomA4
(existence of coarsenings) there exists a coarsening 1Θ of Θ, together with the refining ρ1ΘΘ : 2
1Θ −→
2Θ. But then, by Axiom A1 there exists another refining 1ρ ∈ R′ such that
1ρ : 2
1Θ −→ 2Ω.
Now, consider a pair of elements of F ′, say Θ1, Θ2. The above procedure yields two pairs set-refining
(1Θi , 1ρi) with 1ρi : 2
1Θi → 2Ω. If we call 1θi the single element of 1Θi we have that:
1ρi({1θi}) = Ω ∀i = 1, 2.
By AxiomA2 (‘identity of coarsenings’) the uniqueness of the unit frame follows: 1ρ1 = 1ρ2 , 1Θ1 = 1Θ2 .
Annihilator. If Θ ∈ F ′ then obviously Θ is a coarsening of Ω. Therefore, their minimal refinement
coincides with Ω itself. 
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2.1.1. Isomorphism frames-refinings. A family of frames can be dually viewed as a set of refining
maps with attached the associated domains and codomains (perhaps the most correct approach, for it
takes frames into account automatically). The following correspondence can be established in a finite
family of frames 〈Ω〉A1..4,7:
(75) Θ←→ ρΘΩ : 2Θ → 2Ω,
which associates each frame of the family with the corresponding unique refining to the base set Ω. As
a consequence, the minimal refinement operator induces a composition of refinings as follows.
DEFINITION 43. Given two refinings ρ1 : 2Θ1 → 2Ω and ρ2 : 2Θ2 → 2Ω, their composition induced
by the operation of minimal refinement is the unique (by Axiom A3) refining from Θ1 ⊗Θ2 to Ω:
(76) ρ1 ⊗ ρ2 : 2Θ1⊗Θ2 → 2Ω.
THEOREM 18. The subcollection of refinings of a finite family of frames 〈Ω〉A1..4,7 with codomain Ω,
namely:
〈Ω〉ρ
(.)
Ω
A1..4,7
.
=
{
ρΘΩ, Θ ∈ 〈Ω〉A1..4,7
}
is a finite commutative monoid with annihilator with respect to operation (76).
PROOF. Associativity and commutativity follow from the analogous properties of the minimal re-
finement operator. The unit element is 1ρ : 21Ω → 2Ω, as
Dom(1ρ ⊗ ρ) = 1Ω ⊗Dom(ρ) = Dom(ρ)
which implies 1ρ⊗ ρ = ρ by Axiom A2. On the other side, if we consider the unique refining 0ρ : 2Ω →
2Ω from Ω onto itself (which exists by Axiom A4 with n = 1) we have:
Dom(0ρ ⊗ ρ) = Ω⊗Dom(ρ) = Ω,
so that 0ρ is an annihilator for 〈Ω〉ρ
(.)
Ω
A1..4,7
. 
From Theorem 18’s proof it follows that:
COROLLARY 7. Given a finite family of compatible frames, the map (75) is an isomorphism between
commutative monoids.
It is interesting to note that the existence of both the unit element and the annihilator in a finite family
of frames are consequences of the following result.
PROPOSITION 34. (ρΘΩ ◦ ρΘ′Θ )⊗ ρΘΩ = ρΘΩ ∀Θ,Θ′ ∈ 〈Ω〉A1..4,7 .
PROOF. As Cod(ρΘΩ ◦ ρΘ′Θ ) = Ω, the mapping ρΘΩ ◦ ρΘ′Θ is a refining to the base set Ω of the finite
family of frames 〈Ω〉A1..4,7 , and the composition of refinings ⊗ (76) can be applied. After noting that
Dom(ρΘΩ ◦ ρΘ′Θ ) = Θ′ is a coarsening of Dom(ρΘΩ) = Θ we get:
Dom((ρΘΩ ◦ ρΘ′Θ )⊗ ρΘΩ) = Dom(ρΘΩ ◦ ρΘ′Θ )⊗Dom(ρΘΩ) = Dom(ρΘΩ) = Θ.
By Axiom A3 the thesis follows. 
As a matter of fact, if Θ′ = 1Ω then ρΘΩ ◦ ρΘ′Θ = ρΘΩ ◦ ρ1ΩΘ = 1ρ and we get 1ρ ⊗ ρΘΩ = ρΘΩ . On the other
hand, whenever Θ = Ω we have ρΘΩ = ρ
Ω
Ω = 0ρ and the annihilation property ρ
Θ′
Ω ⊗ 0ρ = 0ρ holds.
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2.1.2. Generators of finite families of frames. Given a monoidM, the submonoid 〈S〉 generated by
its subset S ⊂M is defined as the intersection of all the submonoids ofM containing S.
DEFINITION 44. The set of generators of a monoid M is a finite subset S of M whose generated
submonoid coincides withM: 〈S〉 =M.
THEOREM 19. The set of generators of a finite family of frames 〈Ω〉A1..4,7 , seen as a finite commutative
monoid with respect to the internal operation ⊗ of minimal refinement, is the collection of all its binary
frames. The set of generators of a finite family of refinings 〈Ω〉ρ
(.)
Ω
A1..4,7
is the collection of refinings from all
the binary partitions of Ω to Ω itself:
〈Ω〉A1..4,7 =
〈{
ρij : 2
Θij → 2Ω
∣∣∣ |Θij| = 2, ρij ∈ R}〉.
PROOF. We need to prove that all possible partitions of Ω can be obtained as the minimal refinement
of a number of binary partitions. Consider a generic partition Π = {Ω1, · · · ,Ωn} of Ω, and define the
following associated partitions:
Π1 =
{
Ω1,Ω2 ∪ · · · ∪ Ωn} .= {A1, B1}
Π2 =
{
Ω1 ∪ Ω2,Ω3 ∪ · · · ∪ Ωn} .= {A2, B2}
· · ·
Πn−1 =
{
Ω1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ωn−1,Ωn} .= {An−1, Bn−1}.
It is not difficult to see that every arbitrary intersection of elements of Π1, · · · ,Πn−1 is an element of the
n-ary partition Π. Indeed,
Ai ∩Bk = ∅ ∀k ≥ i, Ai ∩ Ak = Ai ∀k ≥ i, Bi ∩Bk = Bk ∀k ≥ i
so that: ⋂
iAi = A1 = Ω
1,
⋂
iBi = Bn−1 = Ω
n.
If both As and Bs are present in the intersection, the result is ∅ whenever there exists a pair Bl, Am with
l ≥ m. Consequently, the only non-empty mixed intersections in the class {X1 ∩ · · · ∩ Xn} are of the
following kind:
B1 ∩ · · · ∩Bk ∩ Ak+1 ∩ · · · ∩ An−1 = (Ωk+1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ωn) ∩ (Ω1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ωk+1) = Ωk+1,
with k + 1 ranging from 2 to n − 1. This meets the fundamental condition for Π to be the minimal
refinement of Π1, ...,Πn−1: note that the choice of the binary frames is not unique.
The second part of the thesis, concerning the set of generators of finite families of refinings, comes
directly from the existence of isomorphism (75). 
2.2. General families as commutative monoids. We can ask whether a general family of frames
also possesses the algebraic structure of monoid. The answer is positive.
THEOREM 20. A family of compatible framesF is an infinite commutative monoid without annihilator.
PROOF. The proof of Theorem 17 holds for the first two points (associativity and commutativity).
Existence of unit. Suppose there exist two frames 1 = {1} and 1′ = {1′} of cardinality 1. By Axiom
A6 they have a common refinement Θ, with ρ1 : 21 → 2Θ and ρ1′ : 21′ → 2Θ refinings. But then
ρ1({1}) = Θ = ρ1′({1′}), and by Axiom A2 1 = 1′.
Now, for every frame Θ′ ∈ F AxiomA4 ensures that there exists a partition of Θ′ with only one element,
1Θ′ . From the above argument it follows that 1Θ′ = 1. In conclusion, there is only one monic frame in
F , and since this frame is a refinement of every other frame, it is the unit element with respect to ⊗.
2. MONOIDAL STRUCTURE OF FAMILIES OF FRAMES 87
Annihilator. Suppose a frame 0Θ exists such that 0Θ ⊗ Θ = 0Θ for each Θ. Then we would have,
given a refinement Θ′ of 0Θ (obtained via Axiom A5), that 0Θ ⊗Θ′ = Θ′, which is a contradiction. 
In a general family of frames, whatever basis frame Ω you choose there exist refinings with codomain
distinct from Ω. It is therefore impossible to establish a 1-1 correspondence between frames and refin-
ings. Nevertheless, after noticing that for any two refinings ρ1 and ρ2 their codomains Ω1, Ω2 always
have a common refinement (which we denote by Ω), we can write:
(77) ρ1 ⊗ ρ2 .= ρ′1 ⊗ ρ′2
where, calling w1 (w2) the refining map between Ω1 (Ω2) and Ω:
ρ′1 = w1 ◦ ρ1, ρ′2 = w2 ◦ ρ2
and the ⊗ sign on the right side of Equation (77) stands for the composition of refinings in the finite
family 〈Ω〉A1..4,7 generated by Ω. In this way the composition of refinings ⊗ is again well-defined, even
in general families of frames.
In fact, a more general definition can be provided as follows.
DEFINITION 45. Given a family of frames (F ,R) the composition of two refinings ρ1 : 2Θ1 −→ 2Ω1
and ρ2 : 2Θ2 −→ 2Ω2 , ρ1, ρ2 ∈ R, is defined as:
(78) ρ1 ⊗ ρ2 : 2Θ1⊗Θ2 −→ 2Ω1⊗Ω2 .
This operation is well-defined, for the correspondence
(79) (Dom(ρ), Cod(ρ))←→ ρ
(whose existence is guaranteed by Axiom A3) is a bijection.
THEOREM 21. The set of refinings R of a general family of frames is a commutative monoid with
respect to the internal operation (78).
PROOF. Obviously⊗ is commutative and associative because of the commutativity and associativity
of the operation of minimal refinement of frames.
As for the unit element, it suffices to note that such a refining 1ρ : 2Θ → 2Ω has to be such that:
Θ⊗Θ1 = Θ1 ∀Θ1 ∈ F ∧ Ω⊗ Ω1 = Ω1 ∀Ω1 ∈ F .
This implies Θ = Ω = 1, so that 1ρ : 21 → 21 and 1ρ is simply the identity map on the unit frame 1. 
COROLLARY 8. R is a submonoid of the product monoid (F ,⊗)× (F ,⊗), via the mapping (79).
2.3. Monoidal structure of the family. To complete our picture of the algebraic structures arising
from the notion of family of frames, we need to specify some missing relations.
Clearly, (〈Ω〉ρA1..4,7 ,⊗) (where 〈Ω〉ρA1..4,7 is the collection of all the refinings of the finite family with
base frame Ω) is a monoid, too, and:
PROPOSITION 35. (〈Ω〉ρ
(.)
Ω
A1..4,7
,⊗) is a submonoid of (〈Ω〉ρA1..4,7 ,⊗).
PROOF. Obviously 〈Ω〉ρ
(.)
Ω
A1..4,7
⊂ 〈Ω〉ρA1..4,7 in a set-theoretical sense. We only have to prove that the
internal operation of the first monoid is inherited from that of the second one.
Given ρ1 : 2Θ1 → 2Ω and ρ2 : 2Θ2 → 2Ω, since Ω⊗ Ω = Ω, we have that:
ρ1 ⊗〈Ω〉ρ ρ2 : 2Θ1⊗Θ2 → 2Ω⊗Ω = 2Ω ≡ ρ1 ⊗〈Ω〉ρ(.)Ω ρ2,
where on the right hand side we have the composition of refinings of Definition 43. 
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Clearly, monoids associated with finite families of frames are submonoids of those associated with
general families.
PROPOSITION 36. (〈Ω〉ρA1..4,7 ,⊗) is a submonoid of (R,⊗).
PROOF. It suffices to prove that 〈Ω〉ρA1..4,7 is closed with respect to the composition operator (78). But
then, given two maps ρ1, ρ2 whose domains and codomains are both coarsening of Ω, Dom(ρ1 ⊗ ρ2) =
Dom(ρ1)⊗Dom(ρ1) and Cod(ρ1 ⊗ ρ2) = Cod(ρ1)⊗ Cod(ρ1) are still coarsenings of Ω. 
PROPOSITION 37. (〈Ω〉ΘA1..4,7 ,⊗) is a submonoid of (F ,⊗).
PROOF. Trivial, for the finite family (〈Ω〉ΘA1..4,7 ,⊗) is strictly included in the complete one (F ,⊗)
and 〈Ω〉ΘA1..4,7 is closed with respect to ⊗, i.e., if Θ1 and Θ2 are coarsenings of Ω then their minimal
refinement is still a coarsening of Ω. 
The various relationships between monoidal structures associated with a family of compatible frames
(F ,R) are summarized in the following diagram.
(〈Ω〉ρ
(.)
Ω
A1..4,7
,⊗) ⊂ (〈Ω〉ρA1..4,7 ,⊗) ⊂ (R,⊗)
o o
(〈Ω〉ΘA1..4,7 ,⊗) ⊂
(〈Ω〉ΘA1..4,7 ,⊗)
×
(〈Ω〉ΘA1..4,7 ,⊗)
∩
=
(〈Ω〉ΘA1..4,7 ,⊗) ⊂ (F ,⊗) ⊂
(F ,⊗)
×
(F ,⊗)
3. Lattice structure of families of frames
3.1. Two dual order relations. It is well-known (see [568], page 456) that the internal operation ·
of a monoidM induces an order relation (see Definition 36) | on the elements ofM. Namely:
a|b ≡ ∃ c s.t. b = a · c.
For monoids of compatible frames this monoid-induced order relation reads as:
(80) Θ2 ≥∗ Θ1 ≡ ∃ Θ3 s.t. Θ2 = Θ1 ⊗Θ3 ≡ Θ1 ⊗Θ2 = Θ2,
i.e., Θ2 is a refinement of Θ1. Since both finite and general families of frames are monoids:
PROPOSITION 38. Both 〈Ω〉A1..4,7 and F are partially ordered sets with respect to the order relation
(80).
Indeed, in a family of compatible frames one can define two distinct order relations on pairs of frames,
both associated with the notion of refining (Chapter 2, Section 4):
(81) Θ1 ≤∗ Θ2 ⇔ ∃ρ : 2Θ1 → 2Θ2 refining
(the same as (80)), or
(82) Θ1 ≤ Θ2 ⇔ ∃ρ : 2Θ2 → 2Θ1 refining
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i.e., Θ1 is a refinement of Θ2. Relation (82) is clearly the inverse of (81). It makes sense to distin-
guish them explicitly as they generate two distinct algebraic structures, in turn associated with different
extensions of the notion of matroidal independence, as we will see in Chapter 6.
Immediately:
THEOREM 22. In a family of frames F seen as a poset with order relation (81) the sup of a finite
collection Θ1, · · · ,Θn of frames coincides with their minimal refinement, namely:
sup
(F ,≤∗)
(Θ1, · · · ,Θn) = Θ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Θn.
PROOF. Of course Θ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Θn ≥∗ Θi ∀i = 1, ..., n for there exists a refining between each
Θi and the minimal refinement. Now, if there exists another frame Ω greater than each Θi then Ω
is a common refinement for Θ1, ...,Θn, hence it is a refinement of the minimal refinement – namely,
Ω ≥∗ Θ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Θn according to order relation (81). 
At a first glance is not clear what inf(F ,≤∗){Θ1, ...,Θn}, instead, should represent.
3.2. Common and maximal coarsening. Let us then introduce a new operation acting on finite
collections of frames.
DEFINITION 46. A common coarsening of two frames Θ1,Θ2 is a set Ω such that ∃ρ1 : 2Ω → 2Θ1 and
ρ2 : 2
Ω → 2Θ2 refinings, i.e., Ω is a coarsening of both Θ1 and Θ2.
THEOREM 23. If Θ1,Θ2 ∈ F are elements of a family of compatible frames then they possess a
common coarsening.
PROOF. From the proof of Theorem 20 it follows that Θ1,Θ2 have at least the unit frame 1 as a
common coarsening. 
As is the case for common refinements, among the many common coarsenings of a collection Θ1, ...,Θn
of frames there exists a unique one characterized by being the most refined in the group.
THEOREM 24. Given any collection Θ1, ...,Θn of elements of a family of compatible frames F there
exists a unique element Ω ∈ F such that:
(1) ∀i there exists a refining ρi : 2Ω → 2Θi from Θi to Ω;
(2) ∀ω ∈ Ω 6 ∃A1 ⊆ ρ1({ω}), · · · , An ⊆ ρn({ω}) s.t. η1(A1) = · · · = ηn(An),
where ηi : 2Θi → 2Θ1⊗···⊗Θn , i.e., no subsets of the images in the various Θi of the same element of Ω
are mapped to the same subset of the minimal refinement.
We first need an intermediate Lemma.
LEMMA 5. Suppose Θ1⊗· · ·⊗Θn is the minimal refinement of Θ1, · · · ,Θn, with refinings ηi : 2Θi →
2Θ1⊗···⊗Θn . Suppose also that there exist X1 ⊆ Θ1, ..., Xn ⊆ Θn with η1(X1) = · · · = ηn(Xn) such that:
@A1 ⊆ X1, ..., An ⊆ Xn s.t. η1(A1) = ... = ηn(An)
and Aj 6= Xj for some j ∈ [1, ..., n].
Then, for every common coarsening Ω of Θ1, · · · ,Θn with refinings ρi : 2Ω → 2Θi , there exists ω ∈ Ω
such that Xi ⊆ ρi({ω}) for all i = 1, ..., n.
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PROOF. Let us assume that such an element ω does not exist, and that some Xi is covered instead by
a non-singleton subset {ω1, · · · , ωk} ⊂ Ω of the common coarsening:
Xi ⊆ ρi({ω1, · · · , ωk}).
Clearly, for each of its elements ωj:
ηi(ρi(ωj) ∩Xi) = ηi(ρi(ωj)) ∩ ηi(Xi).
By definition of common coarsening, on the other hand:
η1(ρ1(ωj)) = ... = ηn(ρn(ωj)).
Therefore, since η1(X1) = · · · = ηn(Xn) by hypothesis, we have that:
η1(ρ1(ωj) ∩X1) = · · · = ηn(ρn(ωj) ∩Xn)
with Ai
.
= (ρi(ωj) ∩Xi) ( Xi, which goes against what assumed. 
Now we can tackle the proof of Theorem 24.
PROOF. Existence. The proof is constructive.
Let us take an arbitrary coarsening L of Θ1, ...,Θn (which exists by Theorem 23) and check for every
l ∈ L whether there exists a collection of subsets {Ai ⊂ ρi({l}), i = 1, ..., n} such that η1(A1) = ... =
ηn(An). If the answer is negative L = Ω, and we have the desired frame.
Otherwise we can build a new common coarsening L′ of Θ1, ...,Θn by simply splitting {l} into a pair
{l1, l2} such that for all i:
ρ′i({l1}) = Ai, ρ′i({l2}) = Bi,
where Bi
.
= ρi({l}) \ Ai. This splitting does exist, for we can note that if ρj({l}) \ Aj 6= ∅ for some
j ∈ [1, ..., n] then ρi({l}) \ Ai 6= ∅ for all i.
This splitting procedure can be repeated until there are no subsets {Ai} satisfying condition (2). The
procedure terminates, since the number of possible bisections of the images ρi({l}) of l in the various
frames Θi is finite. More precisely, the maximum number of splitting steps is:
dlog2 max
l∈L
min
i=1,...,n
|ρi({l})|e.
Uniqueness. Suppose Ω′ is another common coarsening satisfying condition (2), with refinings ρ′i :
2Ω
′ → 2Θi , distinct from Ω. If we define Xi .= ρi({ω}) whenever ω ∈ Ω, by Lemma 5 there exists
ω′ ∈ Ω′ such that ρi({ω}) ⊂ ρ′i({ω′}). But then condition (2) implies that ρi({ω}) = ρ′i({ω′}) for every
pair ω, ω′, so that Ω = Ω′. 
DEFINITION 47. We call this unique frame the maximal coarsening of Θ1, ...,Θn, and denote it by
Θ1 ⊕ ...⊕Θn.
3.3. Maximal coarsening as greatest lower bound.
THEOREM 25. If Ω is a common coarsening of a finite set of compatible frames Θ1, ...,Θn then Ω is
a coarsening of their maximal coarsening too, namely there exists a refining ρ : 2Ω → 2Θ1⊕···⊕Θn .
PROOF. Consider a different common coarsening Ω′ of Θ1, ...,Θn, with refinings ρ′i : 2
Ω′ → 2Θi .
If it meets condition (2) of Theorem 24 then, because of the uniqueness of the maximal coarsening
Θ1 ⊕ · · · ⊕Θn, the frame Ω′ coincides with the latter. Otherwise, the splitting procedure of the proof of
Theorem 24 can be applied to generate such a frame. Again, uniqueness guarantees that the outcome is
indeed the maximal coarsening, and by construction it is a refinement of Ω′. 
In other words,
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COROLLARY 9. The maximal coarsening Θ1⊕· · ·⊕Θn of a collection of compatible frames Θ1, ...,Θn
is the greatest lower bound (inf) of Θ1, ...,Θn, seen as elements of the poset (F ,≤∗) associated with
order relation (81).
3.4. The dual lattices of frames. Recalling the definition of lattice (Chapter 4, Definition 39),
Proposition 1 and Theorems 22, 24 and 25 have a straightforward consequence on the algebraic structure
of families of frames [575].
COROLLARY 10. Both (F ,≤) and (F ,≤∗) where F is the collection of all sets of a family of com-
patible frames of discernment are lattices, where:∧
i Θi =
⊗
i Θi,
∨
i Θi =
⊕
i Θi,
∧∗
i Θi =
⊕
i Θi,
∨∗
i Θi =
⊗
i Θi.
An infinite lattice L is said complete if any arbitrary collection (even not finite) of points in L admits
both sup and inf. In a complete lattice L there exist an initial element 0 ≡ ∧L and a final element
1 ≡ ∨L.
For example, the power set 2Θ of a set Θ is a complete lattice, with 0 = ∅ and 1 = {Θ}. The height
h(x) or ‘dimension’ of an element x in a lattice L is the length of the maximal chain from 0 to x. For
the power set 2Θ, the height of a subset A ∈ 2Θ is simply its cardinality |A|.
Now, a family of frames F lacks the attribute of completeness: the axioms which define the notion
of family of compatible frames do not guarantee the existence of a minimal refinement (or a maximal
coarsening) for an infinite (if only countable) collection of sets.
4. Semimodular structure of families of frames
More can be said about the class of lattices a family of compatible frames belongs to. A special such
class arises from projective geometries [576], i.e., collections L(V ) of all the subspaces of any vector
space V .
DEFINITION 48. A lattice L is called modular iff whenever a, b, c ∈ L, if a ≥ b, a ∧ c = b ∧ c and
a ∨ c = b ∨ c then a = b.
Modular lattices, as many authors have shown, are related to abstract independence. Therefore, the
vector independence analogy illustrated in the Introduction to this Chapter would suggest a link between
families of frames and the class of modular lattices. This is not entirely true.
4.1. Upper and lower semimodularity, Birkhoff property. Let us introduce a few necessary al-
gebraic notions. Given two elements x, y ∈ L of a lattice with order relation ≥, we say that x ‘covers’
y (denoted by x  y), whenever x is greater than y (x ≥ y) and they admit no intermediate element,
namely: @z ∈ L such that x ≥ z ≥ y.
DEFINITION 49. A latticeL is upper semimodular [577] if for each pair x, y of elements ofL, x  x∧y
implies x ∨ y  y. A lattice L is lower semimodular if for each pair x, y of elements of L, x ∨ y  y
implies x  x ∧ y.
If L is upper semimodular with respect to an order relation≤, than the corresponding dual lattice with
order relation ≤∗ is lower semimodular, as:
(83) x  x ∧ y ` x ∨ y  y ⇒ x ∨∗ y ∗ x ` y ∗ x ∧∗ y.
For lattices of finite length, upper and lower semimodularity together imply modularity. In this sense
semimodularity is indeed “one half” of modularity.
Another related class is that of ‘Birkhoff’ lattices.
DEFINITION 50. A lattice L is called Birkhoff [567] iff whenever a ∨ b  a, b then a, b  a ∧ b.
As for modular lattices, if a lattice if both upper and lower semimodular, then it is also Birkhoff.
Nevertheless the two concepts remain distinct.
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4.2. The Birkhoff lattice of frames. Indeed, finite families of frames endowed with order relation
(82) are Birkhoff.
THEOREM 26. A finite family of compatible frames (〈Θ〉A1,..,4,7 ,≤) generated by a base set Θ, en-
dowed with order relation (82), is a complete Birkhoff lattice of finite length.
PROOF. 1
• The family (〈Θ〉A1,..,4,7 ,≤) is complete. Indeed, every finite lattice is complete for it does not
contain any infinite collection of elements.
• The family (〈Θ〉A1,..,4,7 ,≤) is Birkhoff (Definition 50). Consider two elements of the family
Θ1, Θ2, and assume that their maximal coarsening indeed covers both frames: Θ1 ⊕ Θ2 =
Θ1 ∨Θ2  Θ1,Θ2. Then Θ1 ⊕Θ2 must have cardinality:
|Θ1 ⊕Θ2| = |Θ1| − 1 = |Θ2| − 1,
so that the associated refinings ρ1 : 2Θ1⊕Θ2 → 2Θ1 and ρ2 : 2Θ1⊕Θ2 → 2Θ2 leave unchanged
each element of Θ1 ⊕Θ2 but one, replaced by two new elements.
Now, Θ1 and Θ2 also represent partitions of their minimal refinement Θ1 ⊗ Θ2. By con-
struction these partitions coincide in all but the elements obtained by refining the above two
elements, as shown by Figure 1.
FIGURE 1. Examples of partitions such as Π1 (solid line) and Π2 (dashed line) of Equa-
tion (84).
Analytically:
(84) Π1 =
{
p1 ∪ p2, p3, ..., pn
}
, Π2 =
{
p1, ..., pn−2, pn−1 ∪ pn
}
,
having denoted the elements of the minimal refinement Θ1⊗Θ2 by {p1, ..., pn}. The cardinality
of the latter is then equal to |Θ1⊗Θ2| = |Θ1|+ 1 = |Θ2|+ 1. Clearly then Θ1⊗Θ2 is covered
by both frames, for there cannot exist a frame with (integer) cardinality between |Θ1| = |Θ2|
and |Θ1 ⊗Θ2| = |Θ1|+ 1.

However, finite lattices of frames (regardless what order relation, ≤ or ≤∗, we pick) are not modular:
Figure 2 shows a simple counterexample in which the two frames on the left Θ1 and Θ2, linked by a
refining (so that both Θ2 ≥∗ Θ1 and Θ1 ≥ Θ2), have the same minimal refinement Θ1 ⊗ Ω = Θ2 ⊗ Ω
and the same maximal coarsening Θ1 ⊕ Ω = Θ2 ⊕ Ω (the unit frame) with the frame on the right Ω.
On the other hand, the proof of Theorem 26 supports the (local) Birkhoff property of general families
of frames as well, within the sublattice [Θ1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Θn,Θ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Θn]. Recall that a poset is said to
have locally finite length is each of its intervals, considered as posets, have finite length.
COROLLARY 11. The collection of setsF of a family of compatible frames is a locally Birkhoff lattice
bounded below, i.e., a Birhoff lattice of locally finite length with initial element.
1For an alternative proof based on the equivalence of (〈Θ〉A1,..,4,7 ,≤) to the equivalence (partition) lattice Π(Θ) see
[567], where it is proven that (〈Θ〉A1,..,4,7 ,≤) is also relatively complemented.
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FIGURE 2. Non-modularity of finite families of frames: a counterexample.
PROOF. It remains to point out that, by Theorem 20, every arbitrary collection of frames in F pos-
sesses a common coarsening 1, which plays the role of initial element of the lattice. 
4.3. The upper and lower semimodular lattices of frames. We can go a step further, and prove a
stonger result: families of frames are both upper and lower semimodular lattices with respect to the dual
order relations (81) and (82), respectively.
THEOREM 27. (F ,≤) is an upper semimodular lattice; (F ,≤∗) is a lower semimodular lattice.
PROOF. We just need to prove the upper semimodularity with respect to ≤ (82).
Consider two compatible frames Θ,Θ′, and suppose that Θ covers their minimal refinement Θ⊗Θ′ (their
inf with respect to ≤). The proof articulates into the following steps (see Figure 3):
• as Θ covers Θ⊗Θ′ we have that |Θ| = |Θ⊗Θ′| − 1;
• this means that there exists a single element p ∈ Θ which is refined into a pair of elements
{p1, p2} of Θ ⊗ Θ′, while all other elements of Θ are left unchanged: {p1, p2} = ρ(p), where
ρ : 2Θ → 2Θ⊗Θ′;
• this in turn implies that p1, p2 each belong to the image of a different element of Θ′ (otherwise
Θ would itself be a refinement of Θ′, and we would have Θ⊗Θ′ = Θ):
p1 ∈ ρ′(p′1), p2 ∈ ρ′(p′2),
where ρ′ is the refining from Θ′ to Θ⊗Θ′;
• now, if we merge p′1, p′2 we obviously have a coarsening Θ′′ of Θ′:
{p′1, p′2} = ρ′′(p′′),
with refining ρ′′ : 2Θ′′ → 2Θ′;
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FIGURE 3. Proof of the upper semimodularity of (F ,≤).
• but Θ′′ is a coarsening of Θ, too, as we can build the refining σ : 2Θ′′ → 2Θ such that:
σ(q)
.
= ρ′(ρ′′(q)).
• Indeed ρ′(ρ′′(q)) is a subset of Θ ∀q ∈ Θ′′, as:
– when q = p′′ we can define:
σ(p′′) = {p} ∪ (ρ′(p′1) \ {p1}) ∪ (ρ′(p′2) \ {p2}),
as both (ρ′(p′1) \ {p1}) and (ρ′(p′2) \ {p2}) are elements of Θ that are not refined through ρ
when moving from Θ to Θ⊗Θ′;
– when q 6= p′′, ρ′(ρ′′(q)) ⊂ Θ ⊗ Θ′ is also a subset of Θ, as all the elements of Θ but p are
left unchanged by ρ.
• as |Θ′′| = |Θ′| − 1 we have that Θ′′ is the maximal coarsening of Θ,Θ′: Θ′′ = Θ⊕Θ′;
• hence Θ ⊕ Θ′ (the sup of Θ,Θ′ in (F ,≤)) covers Θ′, and the lattice is upper semimodular
(compare Definition 49).
The lower semimodularity with respect to ≤∗ is then a consequence of (83). 
In the following we will here focus on finite families of frames. More precisely, given a set of
compatible frames {Θ1, ...,Θn} we will consider the set P (Θ) of all partitions of their minimal re-
finement Θ = Θ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Θn. As the independence condition (Definition 15) involves only partitions of
Θ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Θn, we can conduct our analysis there.
We will denote by L∗(Θ) .= (P (Θ),≤∗), L(Θ) .= (P (Θ),≤) the two lattices associated with the set
P (Θ) of partitions of Θ, endowed with order relations (81), (82) respectively.
4.3.1. Example: the partition lattice P4. Consider for example the partition lattice associated with a
frame of size 4: Θ = {1, 2, 3, 4}, depicted in Figure 4, with order relation ≤∗. Each edge indicates here
that the bottom partition covers  the top one.
To understand how inf and sup work in the frame lattice, pick the following partitions:
x = {1/2, 3, 4}, x′ = {1/2, 3/4}.
According to the diagram the partition x∨∗x′ which refines both and has smallest size is Θ = {1/2/3/4}
itself. Their inf x ∧∗ x′ is x, as x′ is a refinement of x. If we pick instead the pair of partitions y =
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FIGURE 4. The partition (lower) semimodular lattice L∗(Θ) for a frame Θ of size 4.
Partitions A1, ..., Ak of Θ are denoted by A1/.../Ak. Partitions with the same number of
elements are arranged on the same level. An edge between two nodes indicates that the
bottom partition covers the top one.
{1, 2/3/4} and y′ = {1, 3/2, 4}, we can notice that both y, y′ cover their inf y ∧∗ y′ = {1, 2, 3, 4} but
in turn their sup y ∨∗ y′ = Θ = {1/2/3/4} does not cover them. Therefore, (P (Θ),≤∗) is not upper
semimodular (while it is lower semimodular).

CHAPTER 6
Algebra of independence and conflict
As we recalled in Chapter 2, the theory of evidence was born as a contribution towards a mathe-
matically rigorous description of subjective probability. In subjective probability, different observers
(or ‘experts’) of the same phenomenon possess in general different notions of what the decision space
is. Different sensors may capture distinct aspects of the phenomenon to describe. Mathematically, this
translates into admitting the existence of several distinct representations of this decision space at dif-
ferent levels of refinement. This idea is embodied in the theory of evidence by the notion of family of
frames, which we introduced in Chapter 2, and whose algebraic properties we studied in Chapter 5.
As we mentioned in our introduction to Chapter 5, the evidence gathered on distinct frames needs to
be combined on a common frame, typically their minimal refinement. Unfortunately, evidence fusion (at
least under Dempster’s orthogonal sum [53, 54, 55]) is guaranteed to take place in all cases if and only if
the involved frames are independent [52, 575] as dictated by Definition 15, which follows from the notion
of independence of Boolean sub-algebras [74]. We will denote in the following by IF the independence
relation introduced in Definition 15. As Dempster’s sum assumes the conditional independence of the
underlying probabilities generating belief functions through multi-valued mappings [53, 54, 55], it is
not surprising to realize that combinability (in Dempster’s approach) and independence of frames (in
Shafer’s formulation of the theory of evidence) are strictly intertwined.
Scope of the Chapter. In our Introduction to Chapter 5 we outlined a proposal for dealing with
possibly conflicting belief functions defined on different compatible frames in an algebraic setting, based
on building a new collection of combinable b.f.s via a pseudo Gram-Schmidt algorithm. To investigate
this possibility, we analysed the algebraic structure of families of frames and showed that they form
upper and lower semimodular lattices, depending on which order relation we pick (Section 4).
Now, some of the elements of a semimodular lattice possess interesting properties. Recall that if L is
a lattice bounded below then its atoms are the elements of L covering its initial element 0, namely:
A =
{
a ∈ L∣∣a  0}.
As a matter of fact the atoms of a semimodular lattice form a matroid [570, 567], so that a formal
independence relation can be defined on them [578]. The latter can be generalised to arbitrary elements
of the lattice, but the result is not univocal.
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In this Chapter we take a further step forward and investigate the relation between Shafer’s definition
of independence of frames and these various extensions of matroidal independence to compatible frames
as elements of a lattice, in order to draw some conclusions on the conjectured algebraic solution to
the conflict problem. We study relationships and differences between the different forms of lattice-
theoretical independence, and understand whether IF can be reduced to one of them.
As a result, this Chapter poses the notion of independence of frames in a wider context by high-
lighting its relation with classical independence in modern algebra. Although IF turns out not to be a
cryptomorphic form of matroidal independence, it does exhibit correlations with several extensions of
matroidal independence to lattices, stressing the need for a more general, comprehensive definition of
this widespread and important notion [579].
Related Work. Evidence combination has been widely studied [98, 580] in different mathematical
frameworks [561] – a comprehensive review would be impossible here. In particular, work has been
done on the issue of merging conflicting evidence [581, 565, 563, 562], specially in critical situations in
which the latter is derived from dependent sources [564]. Campos and de Souza [156] have presented a
method for fusing highly conflicting evidence which overcomes well known counterintuitive results. Liu
[582] has formally defined when two basic belief assignments are in conflict by means of quantitative
measures of both the mass of the combined belief assigned to the emptyset before normalization, and
the distance between betting commitments of beliefs. Murphy [583], on her side, has studied a related
problem: the failure to balance multiple evidence. The notion of conflicting evidence is well known in
the context of sensor fusion [584]: the matter has been recently surveyed by Sentz and Ferson [585].
In opposition, not much work has been done on the properties of the families of compatible frames
and their link with evidence combination. In [120] an analysis of the collections of all the partitions of
a given frame in the context of the hierarchical representation of belief can nevertheless be found, while
in [574] both the lattice-theoretical interpretation of families of frames and the meaning of the concept
of independence are discussed. In [575] these themes are reconsidered: the structure of Birkhoff lattice
of a family of frames is proven, and the relation between Dempster’s combination and independence of
frames highlighted. Chapter 5 is largely the result of the line of research first explored in [575].
Chapter Outline. We start by characterizing the relationship between conflicting belief functions
and independence of frames (Section 1), proving that Dempster’s combination is guaranteed if and only
if the underlying frames are independent (Theorem 28). In Section 2 the classical notion of independence
on matroids is recalled. Even though families of frames endowed with Shafer’s independence IF do
not form a matroid, the form both upper and lower semimodular lattices, on which atomical matroidal
independence can be extended to arbitrary elements. In Section 3 we identify three diffferent extensions
of matroidal independence to arbitrary elements of the frame lattice. We discuss their interpretation, and
thoroughly analyze their links with Shafer’s independence of frames. Finally, in Section 4 we recap what
we learned about the relationship between independence of frames and the various algebraic definitions
of independence, and outline the steps of a future investigation of the conjectured algebraic solution to
the conflict problem.
1. Independence of frames and Dempster’s combination
Although not equivalent to independence of sources in the original formulation of Dempster’s combi-
nation, independence of frames is strictly intertwined with combinability.
In particular, the combination of belief functions defined on distinct frames of a family is guaranteed
only for trivially interacting feature spaces.
THEOREM 28. Let Θ1, ...,Θn a set of compatible FODs. Then the following conditions are equivalent:
1. INDEPENDENCE OF FRAMES AND DEMPSTER’S COMBINATION 99
(1) all possible collections of belief functions b1, ..., bn defined over Θ1, ...,Θn, respectively, are
combinable over the latter’s minimal refinement Θ1 ⊗ ...⊗Θn;
(2) Θ1, ...,Θn are independent (IF);
(3) there exists a 1-1 correspondence
Θ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Θn ↔ Θ1 × · · · ×Θn,
i.e., the minimal refinement of Θ1, ...,Θn is simply their Cartesian product;
(4) |Θ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Θn| =
∏n
i=1 |Θi|.
PROOF. (1)⇒ (2). We know that if b1, ..., bn are combinable then bi, bj must be combinable ∀i, j =
1, ..., n. Hence ρi(Ci) ∩ ρj(Cj) 6= ∅ ∀i, j, where Ci denotes the core of bi and ρi the refining linking Θi
to the minimal refinement Θ1⊗ ...⊗Θn. As bi, bj can be chosen arbitrarily, their cores Ci, Cj can be any
pair of subsets of Θi,Θj respectively. Consequently, the previous condition can be rewritten as:
ρi(Ai) ∩ ρj(Aj) 6= ∅ ∀Ai ⊆ Θi, Aj ⊆ Θj.
(2)⇒ (1). It suffices to pick Ai = Ci ∀i = 1, ..., n.
(2)⇒ (3). We first note that:⋂
i
ρi(θ
k
i ) =
⋂
i
ρi(θ
l
i)⇔ θki = θli ∀i = 1, ..., n.
Indeed, if θki 6= θli then ρi({θki }) 6= ρi({θli}), by definition of refining. But then:⋂
i
ρi({θki }) 6=
⋂
i
ρi({θli}).
Therefore, the number of such intersections coincides with the number |Θ1| × · · · × |Θn| of n-tuples of
elements picked each from one of the frames.
(3)⇒ (2). By Proposition 1 each element θ of the minimal refinement Θ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Θn corresponds to
a subset of the form
⋂
i ρi({θki }). Since by hypothesis there are |Θ1| × · · · × |Θn| such elements, there
exist an equal number of subsets of the above form. But this is possible only if they all are non-empty:
hence, Θ1, ...,Θn are independent.
(3)⇒ (4). Obvious.
(4) ⇒ (3). Once again Θ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Θn =
{⋂
i ρi({θi}) ∀θi ∈ Θi
}
. Hence, if its cardinality is
|Θ1| × · · · × |Θn| then the intersections which form its elements must all be non-empty. Each of them
can be labeled by (θ1, ..., θn). 
Indeed, as we recalled in Chapter 2, Section 2.2, any given set of belief functions is characterized by
a level of conflict K— if K =∞ they are not combinable. A basic property of the level of conflict is the
following. Given n+ 1 belief functions b1, ..., bn+11:
K(b1, · · · , bn+1) = K(b1, ..., bn) +K(b1 ⊕ ...⊕ bn, bn+1),
so that if K(bi, bj) = +∞ then K(bi, bj, bk) = +∞ ∀k.
This suggests a bottom-up technique [528, 586, 587]. First the level of conflict is computed for each
pair of belief functions (bi, bj), i, j = 1, ..., n. Then a suitable threshold is established and a ‘conflict
graph’ is built in which each node represents a belief function, while an edge indicates a (pairwise)
conflict level below the set threshold. Finally, the subsets of combinabile b.f.s of size d+1 are recorsively
computed from those of size d, eventually leading to the detection of the most coherent set of features.
This approach, however, suffers from a high computational cost when large groups of belief functions
are found to be compatible.
1E.g. the projections on their minimal refinement of belief functions encoding measurements inherently defined on
different compatible domains, see Chapter 8 for an application to object pose estimation.
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2. An algebraic study of independence of frames
Is there an alternative to the computationally expensive conflict graph technique? Theorem 28 sug-
gests that belief functions never conflict when the domains on which they are defined are independent,
according to Definition 15.
As outlined in the introduction to Chapter 5 in [575], starting from an analogy between independence
of frames and linear independence, we conjectured a possible algebraic solution to the conflict problem
based on a mechanism similar to the classical Gram-Schmidt algorithm for the orthogonalization of vec-
tors. Indeed, the independence condition (14) closely resembles the condition under which a collection
of vector subspaces has maximal span:
(85)
v1 + · · ·+ vn 6= ~0, ∀~0 6= vi ∈ Vi ≡ span{V1, ..., Vn} = V1 × · · · × Vn
ρ1(A1) ∩ · · · ∩ ρn(An) 6= ∅, ∀∅ 6= Ai ⊆ Θi ≡ Θ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Θn = Θ1 × · · · ×Θn,
where ~0 is the common origin of the vector spaces {V1, ..., Vn}.
Let us call {V1, ..., Vn} ‘independent’ iff each collection of non-null representative vectors {vi ∈ Vi, i =
1, ..n}, each member of a different subspace, are linearly independent. It follows that while a collection
of compatible frames {Θ1, ...,Θn} are IF iff each selection of representative subsetsAi ∈ 2Θi have non-
empty intersection, a collection of vectors subspaces {V1, ..., Vn} are independent iff for each choice of
non-null vectors vi ∈ Vi their sum is non-zero.
The collection of all subspaces of a vector space (or projective geometry [576]) forms a modular lattice
(see Chapter 5, Definition 48). As we have seen in Chapter 5, instead, families of compatible frames are
semimodular lattices, hinting at a possible explanation of this analogy. Here we move on to analyze the
notion of independence of frames (and its relationships with other definitions of independence in other
fields of modern algebra) from an algebraic point of view.
2.1. Matroids. The paradigm of abstract independence in modern algebra is represented by the
notion of matroid, introduced by Whitney in the 1930s [569]. He and other authors, among which
van der Waerden [588], Mac Lane [589], and Teichmuller [590], recognized at the time that several
apparently different notions of dependence [570, 576] in algebra (such as circuits in graphs, flats in
affine geometries) have many properties in common with that of linear dependence of vectors.
DEFINITION 51. A matroid M = (E, I) is a pair formed by a ground set E and a collection of
independent sets I ⊆ 2E , which obey the following axioms:
(1) ∅ ∈ I;
(2) if I ∈ I and I ′ ⊆ I then I ′ ∈ I;
(3) if I1 and I2 are in I, and |I1| < |I2|, then there is an element e of I2 \ I1 such that I1 ∪ e ∈ I.
Condition (3) is called augmentation axiom, and is the foundation of the notion of matroidal indepen-
dence, as it can be proved that a number of domain-specific independence relations can be reduced to the
augmentation property. The name was coined by Whitney because of a fundamental class of matroids
which arise from the the collections of linearly independent (in the ordinary sense) sets of columns of a
matrix, called ‘vector matroid’ [569].
2.2. Families of frames are not matroids. Unfortunately,
THEOREM 29. A family of compatible frames F endowed with Shafer’s independence IF is not a
matroid.
PROOF. In fact, IF does not meet the augmentation axiom (3) of Definition 51. Consider two
independent compatible frames I = {Θ1,Θ2}. If we pick another arbitrary frame Θ3 of the family, the
collection I ′ = {Θ3} is trivially IF . Suppose Θ3 6= Θ1,Θ2. Then, since |I| > |I ′|, by augmentation
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we can form a new pair of independent frames by adding any of Θ1,Θ2 to Θ3. But it is easy to find
a counterexample, for instance by picking as Θ3 the common coarsening of Θ1 and Θ2 (compare the
remark after Definition 15). 
Matroidal independence, though, generalizes to ‘sister’ relations in other algebraic structures, in par-
ticular semimodular and ‘geometric’ lattices [70]. Although families of frames are not matroids, they
do form (upper and lower) semimodular lattices (Chapter 5, Section 4). As a consequence, IF inherits
interesting relations with some extensions of matroidal independence to semimodular lattices [591], as
we are going to see in Section 3. Indeed, IF is opposed to matroidal independence (Section 3.4).
3. Independence on lattices versus independence of frames
3.1. Atom matroid of a semimodular lattice. Consider again the usual example of linear indepen-
dence of vectors. By definition {v1, ..., vn} are linearly independent iff
∑
i
αivi = ~0 implies αi = 0 ∀i.
This classical definition can be given several equivalent formulations:
(86)
I1 : vj 6⊂ span(vi, i 6= j) ∀j = 1, ..., n;
I2 : vj ∩ span(v1, ..., vj−1) = ~0 ∀j = 2, ..., n;
I3 : dim(span(v1, ..., vn)) = n.
Remember that the one-dimensional subspaces of a vector space V are the atoms of the lattice L(V ) of
FIGURE 1. A lattice can be represented as a (Hasse) diagram in which covering relations
are drawn as undirected edges. The atoms A of a lattice which initial element 0 (bounded
below) are the elements covering 0.
all the linear subspaces of V , for which span = ∨, ∩ = ∧, dim = h and 0 = ~0. Following this intuition,
we can extend the relations (86) to collections of arbitrary (non necessarily atomic) non-zero elements
of an arbitrary semimodular lattice with initial element, as follows.
DEFINITION 52. The following relations on the elements of a semimodular lattice with initial element
0 can be defined:
(1) {l1, ..., ln} are I1 if lj 6≤
∨
i 6=j
li (or, equivalently, lj ∧
∨
i 6=j
li 6= lj) for all j = 1, ..., n;
(2) {l1, ..., ln} are I2 if lj ∧
∨
i<j
li = 0 for all j = 2, ..., n;
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(3) {l1, ..., ln} are I3 if h
(∨
i
li
)
=
∑
i
h(li).
These relations have been studied by several authors in the past. Our goal here is to understand their
relation with independence of frames in the semimodular lattice of frames. Graphical interpretations of
I1, I2 and I3 in terms of Hasse diagrams are given in Figure 2.
FIGURE 2. Graphical interpretation of the relations introduced in Definition 52.
When applied to arbitrary elements of a lattice I1, I2, I3 are distinct, and none of them generates a
matroid. However, when defined on the atoms of an upper semimodular lattice with initial element they
do coincide, and form a matroid [567].
PROPOSITION 39. The restrictions of the above relations to the set of the atoms A of an upper semi-
modular lattice L with initial element coincide, namely I1 = I2 = I3 = I on A, and (A, I) is a
matroid.
As the partition lattice (see Chapter 5, Section 4.3.1) has both an upper L(Θ) and lower L∗(Θ) semi-
modular form, we can introduce there two dual forms I1, I2, I3 and I∗1 , I∗2 , I∗3 of the above relations,
respectively associated with L(Θ) and L∗(Θ). All these relations constitute valid extensions of ma-
troidal independence to all the elements of a semimodular lattice. In the remainder of this Chapter we
will investigate their relations with Shafer’s independence of frames.
3.2. Subspace lattice. It can be interesting to see first how these candidate independence relations
behave in the lattice of all vector subspaces L(V ) (see Equation (86)).
THEOREM 30. In the subspace lattice L(V ) relation I2 implies I1.
PROOF. Let us consider a number of linear subspaces V1, ..., Vn of a vector space V which meet I2,
namely:
V2 ∩ V1 = ~0, V3 ∩ span(V1, V2) = ~0, · · · , Vn ∩ span(V1, ..., Vn−1) = ~0.
Suppose then that there exists a subspace Vk such that:
Vk ⊂ span(V1, · · · , Vk−1, Vk+1, · · · , Vn),
i.e., the collection V1, ..., Vn is not I1. By hypothesis Vk ∩ span(V1, ..., Vk−1) = ~0, so that the last
condition implies Vk ⊂ span(Vk+1, ..., Vn), which is in turn equivalent to:
∃ l ∈ [k + 1, ..., n] s.t. Vk ∩ Vl 6= ~0.
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But again by hypothesis Vl ∩ span(V1, ..., Vl−1) = ~0 which implies Vl ∩ Vk = ~0, since k < l. Therefore,
we have a contradiction. 
By looking at the proof of Theorem 70, page 152 of [567], restated as follows:
PROPOSITION 40. If a finite set of atoms of a semimodular lattice bounded below is I2, then it is I1.
we can note that it is based on the assumption that I1 is a linear independence relation among atoms,
in particular that D1 = I1 satisfies the augmentation axiom (see Definition 51). In L(V ), on the other
hand, this does not hold. Nevertheless, Theorem 30 overcomes this difficulty by providing a proof of the
implication between the two candidate independence relations.
3.3. Boolean and lattice independence in the upper semimodular lattice L(Θ). Let us then con-
sider the candidate independence relations on upper semimodular form of the partition lattice, and inves-
tigate their relationships with independence of frames (IF).
3.3.1. Forms and semantics of extended matroidal independence. In L(Θ) the relations introduced
in Definition 52 assume the forms:
(87) {Θ1, ...,Θn} ∈ I1 ⇔ Θj ⊗
⊕
i 6=j
Θi 6= Θj ∀ j = 1, ..., n,
(88) {Θ1, ...,Θn} ∈ I2 ⇔ Θj ⊗
⊕
i<j
Θi = Θ ∀ j = 2, ..., n,
(89) {Θ1, ...,Θn} ∈ I3 ⇔ |Θ| −
∣∣∣ n⊕
i=1
Θi
∣∣∣ = n∑
i=1
(|Θ| − |Θi|),
as in the lattice L(Θ) we have Θi ∧Θj = Θi⊗Θj , Θi ∨Θj = Θi⊕Θj , h(Θi) = |Θ| − |Θi|, and 0 = Θ.
They read as follows: {Θ1, ...,Θn} are I1 iff no frame Θj is a refinement of the maximal coarsening of
all the others. They are I2 iff ∀ j = 2, ..., n Θj does not have a non-trivial common refinement with the
maximal coarsening of all its predecessors.
The interpretation of I3 is perhaps more interesting, for I3 is equivalent to say that the coarsening that
generates |⊕ni=1 Θi| can be broken up into n steps of the same length of the coarsenings that generate
each of the frames Θi starting from Θ. Namely: first Θ1 is obtained from Θ by merging |Θ| − |Θ1|
elements, then |Θ| − |Θ2| elements of this new frame are merged, and so on until we get |
⊕n
i=1 Θi|. We
will return on this when discussing the dual relation on the lower semimodular lattice L∗(Θ).
To study the logical implications between these lattice-theoretic relations and independence of frames,
and between themselves, we first need a useful lemma. Let 0F denote the unique unitary frame of a
family F of compatible frames of discernment (see Chapter 5).
LEMMA 6. {Θ1, ...,Θn} ∈ IF , n > 1 `
⊕n
i=1 Θi = 0F .
Proof. We prove Lemma 6 by induction. For n = 2, let us suppose that {Θ1,Θ2} are IF . Then
ρ1(A1) ∩ ρ2(A2) 6= ∅ ∀A1 ⊆ Θ1, A2 ⊆ Θ2, A1, A2 6= ∅ (ρi denotes as usual the refining from Θi
to Θ1 ⊗ Θ2). Suppose by absurd that their common coarsening contains more than a single element,
Θ1 ⊕Θ2 = {a, b}. But then
ρ1(ρ
1(a)) ∩ ρ2(ρ2(b)) = ∅
(where ρi denotes the refining between Θ1 ⊕Θ2 and Θi), going against the hypothesis.
Induction step. Suppose that the thesis is true for n − 1. We know that {Θ1, ...,Θn} ∈ IF implies
{Θi, i 6= j} ∈ IF . By inductive hypothesis, the latter implies:⊕
i 6=j
Θi = 0F ∀j = 1, ..., n.
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Then, since 0F is a coarsening of Θj ∀ j, Θj ⊕
⊕
i 6=j
Θi = Θj ⊕ 0F = 0F . 
3.3.2. Pairs of frames. Let us consider first the special case of collections of just two frames. For
n = 2 the three relations I1, I2, I3 read respectively as:
(90) Θ1 ⊗Θ2 6= Θ1,Θ2, Θ1 ⊗Θ2 = Θ, |Θ|+ |Θ1 ⊕Θ2| = |Θ1|+ |Θ2|.
It is interesting to remark that {Θ1,Θ2} ∈ I1 implies Θ1,Θ2 6= Θ.
THEOREM 31. The following relationships between the various form of independence, when applied
to pairs of frames Θ1,Θ2 considered as elements of L(Θ), hold:
(1) {Θ1,Θ2} ∈ IF ` {Θ1,Θ2} ∈ I1 if Θ1,Θ2 6= 0F ;
(2) {Θ1,Θ2} ∈ I1 6` {Θ1,Θ2} ∈ IF;
(3) {Θ1,Θ2} ∈ I2 ` {Θ1,Θ2} ∈ I1 iff Θ1,Θ2 6= Θ;
(4) {Θ1,Θ2} ∈ I3 ` {Θ1,Θ2} ∈ I1 iff Θ1,Θ2 6= Θ;
(5) {Θ1,Θ2} ∈ IF ∧ I3 iff Θi = 0F and Θj = Θ,
where 0F is the unique unitary frame of L(Θ).
PROOF. Let us consider the conjectured properties in the given order.
(1) If {Θ1,Θ2} are IF then Θ1 is not a refinement of Θ2, and vice-versa, unless one of them is 0F .
But then they are I1 (Θ1 ⊗Θ2 6= Θ1,Θ2).
(2) We can give a counterexample (see Figure 3) in which {Θ1,Θ2} are I1 (as none of them is a
FIGURE 3. Counterexample for the conjecture I1 ` IF of Theorem 31.
refinement of the other one) but their minimal refinement Θ1 ⊗ Θ2 has cardinality 4 6= |Θ1| ·
|Θ2| = 6 (hence they are not IF).
(3) Trivial.
(4) I3 ` I1 is equivalent to ¬I1 ` ¬I3. But {Θ1,Θ2} ∈ ¬I1 reads as Θ1 ⊗ Θ2 = Θi, which is in
turn equivalent to Θ1 ⊕Θ2 = Θj . I.E.,
{Θ1,Θ2} ∈ I3 ≡ |Θ|+ |Θj| = |Θi|+ |Θj| ≡ |Θ| = |Θi|.
But then {Θ1,Θ2} ∈ I3 ` {Θ1,Θ2} ∈ I1 iff Θ1,Θ2 6= Θ.
(5) As {Θ1,Θ2} are IF , by Lemma 6 |Θ1 ⊕Θ2| = 1, so that {Θ1,Θ2} ∈ I3 is equivalent to
(91) |Θ|+ 1 = |Θ1|+ |Θ2|.
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Now, by definition:
|Θ| ≥ |Θ1 ⊗Θ2| = |Θ1||Θ2|
(the last passage holding as those frames are IF).
Therefore {Θ1,Θ2} ∈ IF and {Θ1,Θ2} ∈ I3 together imply:
|Θ1|+ |Θ2| = |Θ|+ 1 ≥ |Θ1||Θ2|+ 1
which is equivalent to
|Θ1| − 1 ≥ |Θ1||Θ2| − |Θ2| = |Θ2|(|Θ1| − 1) ≡ |Θ2| ≤ 1.
The latter holds iff Θ2 = 0F , which in turn implies that |Θ2| = 1. By (91) we have |Θ1| = |Θ|,
i.e., Θ1 = Θ.

In the ‘singular’ case Θ1 = 0F ,Θ2 = Θ, by Equation (90) the pair {0F ,Θ} is both I2 and I3, but not
I1. Besides, two frames can be both I2 and IF without being singular in the above sense. The pair of
frames {y, y′} in Chapter 5, Figure 4 provides such an example, as y ⊗ y′ = Θ (I2) and {y, y′} are IF
(easy to check).
As it well known that [567] on an upper semimodular lattice (such as L(Θ))
PROPOSITION 41. I3 ` I2.
the overall picture formed by the different lattice-extended matroidal independence relations for pairs
of frames (excluding singular cases) is as in Figure 4. Independence of frames and the strictest form I3
of extended matroidal independence are mutual exclusive, and are both stronger than the weakest form
I1. Some of those features are retained by the general case too.
FIGURE 4. Relations between independence of frames IF and the different extensions
I1, I2 and I3 of matroidal independence to pairs of frames as elements of the upper semi-
modular lattice L(Θ) (from Theorem 31).
3.3.3. General case, n > 2. The situation is somehow different in the general case of a collection
of n frames. IF and I1, in particular, turn out to be incompatible.
THEOREM 32. If {Θ1, ...,Θn} ∈ IF , n > 2 then {Θ1, ...,Θn} ∈ ¬I1.
PROOF. If {Θ1, ...,Θn} are IF then any collection formed by some of those frames is IF (otherwise
we could find empty intersections in Θ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Θn). But then, by Lemma 6:⊕
i∈L⊂{1,...,n}
Θi = 0F
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for all subsets L of {1, ..., n} with at least 2 elements: |L| > 1.
Thus, as L =
{
i 6= j, i ∈ {1, ..., n}} has cardinality n − 1 > 1 (as n > 2) we have that ⊕i 6=j Θi = 0F
for all j ∈ {1, ..., n}. Therefore:
Θj ⊗
⊕
i 6=j
Θi = Θj ⊗ 0F = Θj ∀j ∈ {1, ..., n},
and {Θ1, ...,Θn} are not I1. 
Indeed, IF is incompatible with I2 as well.
THEOREM 33. If {Θ1, ...,Θn} ∈ IF , n > 2 then {Θ1, ...,Θn} ∈ ¬I2.
PROOF. If {Θ1, ...,Θn} ∈ IF then {Θ1, ...,Θk−1} ∈ IF for all k = 3, ..., n. But by Lemma 6 this
implies
⊕
i<k Θi = 0F , so that:
Θk ⊗
⊕
i<k
Θi = Θk ∀k > 2.
Now, {Θ1, ...,Θn} ∈ IF with n > 2 implies Θk 6= Θ ∀k. The latter holds because, as n > 2, there is at
least one frame Θi in the collection Θ1, ...,Θn distinct from 0F , and clearly {Θi,Θ} are not IF (as Θi
is a non-trivial coarsening of Θ). Hence:
Θk ⊗
⊕
i<k
Θi 6= Θ ∀k > 2,
which is, in fact, a much stronger condition than ¬I2. 
A special case is that in which one of the frames is Θ itself. By Definitions (87) and (88) of I1 and I2,
if ∃j : Θj = Θ then {Θ1, ...,Θn} ∈ I2 ` {Θ1, ...,Θn} ∈ ¬I1. From Proposition 41 it follows that
COROLLARY 12. If {Θ1, ...,Θn} ∈ IF , n > 2 then {Θ1, ...,Θn} ∈ ¬I3.
Theorems 31 and 33 and Corollary 12 considered together imply that IF and I3 are incompatible in
all significant cases.
COROLLARY 13. If {Θ1, ...,Θn} are IF then they are not I3, unless n = 2, Θ1 = 0F and Θ2 = Θ.
3.4. Boolean and lattice independence in the lower semimodular lattice L∗(Θ).
3.4.1. Forms and semantics of extended matroidal independence. Analogously, the extended ma-
troidal independence relations associated with the lower semimodular lattice L∗(Θ) read as:
(92) {Θ1, ...,Θn} ∈ I∗1 ⇔ Θj ⊕
⊗
i 6=j
Θi 6= Θj ∀ j = 1, ..., n,
(93) {Θ1, ...,Θn} ∈ I∗2 ⇔ Θj ⊕
j−1⊗
i=1
Θi = 0F ∀ j = 2, ..., n,
(94) {Θ1, ...,Θn} ∈ I∗3 ⇔
∣∣∣ n⊗
i=1
Θi
∣∣∣− 1 = n∑
i=1
(|Θi| − 1),
as Θi ∧∗ Θj = Θi ⊕Θj , Θi ∨∗ Θj = Θi ⊗Θj , h∗(Θi) = |Θi| − 1, and 0 = 0F .
As in the upper semimodular case, these relations have quite interesting semantics. The frames
{Θ1, ...,Θn} are I∗1 iff none of them is a coarsening of the minimal refinement of all the others. In
other words, there is no proper subset of {Θ1, ...,Θn} which has still Θ1 ⊗ ... ⊗ Θn as common refine-
ment.
They are I∗2 iff ∀j > 1 Θj does not have a non-trivial common coarsening with the minimal refinement
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of its predecessors.
Finally, the third form I∗3 of extended matroidal independence relation can be naturally interpreted in
terms of probability spaces. As the dimension of the polytope of probability measures definable on a
domain of size k is k − 1, Θ1, ...,Θn are I∗3 iff the dimension of the probability polytope for the minimal
refinement is the sum of the dimensions of the polytopes associated with the individual frames:
(95) {Θ1, ...,Θn} ∈ I∗3 ≡ dimP⊗ni=1 Θi =
∑
i
dimPΘi .
From this remark the following analogy between independence of frames and I3 follows. While the
equivalent condition for IF
(96) Θ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Θn = Θ1 × · · · ×Θn
states that the minimal refinement is the Cartesian product of the individual frames, Equation (95) affirms
that under I∗3 the probability simplex of the minimal refinement is the Cartesian product of the individual
probability simplices. We will consider their relationship in more detail in Section 4.
3.4.2. General case.
THEOREM 34. If {Θ1, ...,Θn} ∈ IF and Θj 6= 0F ∀j = 1, ..., n, then {Θ1, ...,Θn} ∈ I∗1 .
PROOF. Let us suppose that {Θ1, ...,Θn} are IF but not I∗1 , i.e., ∃j : Θj coarsening of
⊗
i 6=j Θi
(and therefore Θ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Θn =
⊗
i 6=j Θi).
We need to prove that ∃A1 ⊂ Θ1, ..., An ⊂ Θn s.t.:
ρ1(A1) ∩ · · · ∩ ρn(An) = ∅,
where ρi denotes the refining from Θi to Θ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Θn.
Since Θj is a coarsening of
⊗
i 6=j Θi then there exists a partition Πj of
⊗
i 6=j Θi associated with Θj , and
a refining ρ from Θj to
⊗
i 6=j Θi.
As {Θi, i 6= j} are IF , for all θ ∈
⊗
i 6=j Θi there exist θi ∈ Θi, i 6= j s.t.
{θ} =
⋂
i 6=j
ρi(θi),
where ρi is the refining from Θi to
⊗
i 6=j Θi (remember that Θ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Θn =
⊗
i 6=j Θi).
Now, θ belongs to a certain element A of the partition Πj . By hypothesis (Θj 6= 0F ∀j) Πj contains
at least two elements. But then we can choose an element {θj} = ρ−1(B) of Θj which is refined to a
different element B of the disjoint partition Πj . In that case we obviously get:
ρj(θj) ∩
⋂
i 6=j
ρi(θi) = ∅,
which implies that {Θi, i = 1, ..., n} ∈ ¬IF against the hypothesis. 
Does IF imply I∗1 even when ∃Θi = 0F? The answer is negative. {Θ1, ...,Θn} ∈ ¬I∗1 means that ∃i
s.t. Θj is a coarsening of
⊗
i 6=j Θi. But if Θi = 0F then Θi is a coarsening of
⊗
i 6=j Θi.
The reverse implication does not hold: IF and I1 are distinct.
THEOREM 35. {Θ1, ...,Θn} ∈ I∗1 0 {Θ1, ...,Θn} ∈ IF .
PROOF. We need a simple counterexample. Consider two frames Θ1 and Θ2 in which Θ1 is not a
coarsening of Θ2 (Θ1,Θ2 are I∗1 ). Then Θ1,Θ2 6= Θ1 ⊗Θ2 but it easy to find an example (see Figure 5)
in which Θ1,Θ2 are not IF . 
Besides, as in the upper semimodular case, I∗2 does not imply I∗1 .
THEOREM 36. {Θ1, ...,Θn} ∈ I∗2 0 {Θ1, ...,Θn} ∈ I∗1 .
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FIGURE 5. A counterexample to I∗1 ` IF .
PROOF. Figure 6 shows a counterexample to the conjecture I∗2 ` I∗1 . Given Θ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Θj−1 and
Θj , one possible choice of Θj+1 s.t. Θ1, ...,Θj+1 are I∗2 but not I∗1 is shown. 
FIGURE 6. A counterexample to I∗2 ` I∗1 .
IF is a stronger condition than I∗2 as well.
THEOREM 37. {Θ1, ...,Θn} ∈ IF ` {Θ1, ...,Θn} ∈ I∗2 .
PROOF. We first need to show that {Θ1, ...,Θn} are IF iff ∀j = 1, ..., n the pair {Θj,⊗i 6=jΘi} is
IF . As a matter of fact (96) can be written as:
Θj ⊗
⊗
i 6=j
Θi = Θj ×
(
×i 6=j Θi
)
≡
{
Θj,
⊗
i 6=j
Θi
}
∈ IF .
But then by Lemma 6 we get as desired. 
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It follows from Theorems 34 and 37 that, unless some frame is unitary,
COROLLARY 14. {Θ1, ...,Θn} ∈ IF ` {Θ1, ...,Θn} ∈ I∗1 ∧ I∗2 .
i.e., independence of frames is a more demanding requirement than both the first two forms of lattice-
theoretic independence.
Note that the converse is false. Think of a pair of frames (n = 2), for which
Θ1 ⊕Θ2 6= Θ1,Θ2 ({Θ1,Θ2} ∈ I∗1 ), Θ1 ⊕Θ2 = 0F ({Θ1,Θ2} ∈ I∗2 ).
Such conditions are met, for instance, by the counterexample of Figure 5 (in which the two frames are
not IF).
THEOREM 38. If a collection {Θ1, ...,Θn} of compatible frames is IF then it is not I3, unless n = 2
and one of the frames is the trivial partition.
PROOF. According to Equation (96), {Θ1, ...,Θn} are IF iff | ⊗ Θi| =
∏
i |Θi|, while according to
(94) they are I iff |Θ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Θn| − 1 =
∑
i(|Θi| − 1). Those conditions are both met iff∑
i
|Θi| −
∏
i
|Θi| = n− 1
which happens only if n = 2 and either Θ1 = 0F or Θ1 = 0F . 
Instead of being algebraically related notions, independence of frames and matroidicity work against
each other. As the former derives from independence of Boolean subalgebras of a Boolean algebra [74],
this is likely to have interesting wider implications on the relationship between independence in those
two fields of mathematics.
4. Perspectives
4.1. On abstract independence. Figure 7 illustrates what we have learned in this Chapter about
the relations between independence of frames and the various extensions of matroidal independence to
semimodular lattices, in both the upper (left) and lower (right) semimodular lattice of frames. Only the
general case of a collection of more than two non-atomic frames is shown for sake of simplicity: special
cases (Θi = 0F for L∗(Θ), Θi = Θ for L(Θ)) are also neglected.
FIGURE 7. Left: Relations between independence of frames IF and the various ex-
tended forms of matroidal independence on the upper semimodular lattice L(Θ). Right:
Relations on the lower semimodular lattice L∗(Θ).
In the upper semimodular case, minding the special case in which one of the frames is Θ itself,
independence of frames IF is mutually exclusive with all lattice-theoretic relations I1, I2, I3 (Theorems
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32, 33 and Corollary 12) unless we consider two non-atomic frames, for which IF implies I1 (Theorem
31). In fact they are the negation of each other in the case of atoms of L(Θ) (frames of size n− 1), when
I = I1 = I2 = I3 is trivially true for all frames, while IF is never met. The exact relation between I1
and I2, I3 is not yet understood, but we know that the latter implies the former when dealing with pairs.
In the lower semimodular case IF is a stronger condition than both I∗1 and I∗2 (Theorems 34, 37). On
the other side, notwithstanding the analogy expressed by Equation (95), IF is mutually exclusive with
the third independence relation even in its lower semimodular incarnation.
Some common features do emerge: the first two forms of lattice independence are always trivially
met by atoms of the related lattice. Moreover, independence of frames and the third form of lattice
independence are mutually exclusive in both cases.
The lower semimodular case is clearly the most interesting. Indeed, on L(Θ) independence of frames
and lattice-theoretic independence are basically unrelated (see Figure 7-left). Their lower semimodular
counterparts, instead, although distinct from IF , have meaningful links with it. The knowledge of which
collections of frames are I∗1 , I∗2 and I∗3 tells us much about collections of IF frames, as the latter are
necessarily in:
I∗1 ∩ I∗2 ∩ ¬I∗3 .
We know that IF is strictly included in I∗1 ∩ I∗2 (Section 3.4.2), but the possibility that independence of
frames may indeed coincide with I∗1 ∩ I∗2 ∩ ¬I∗3 still needs to be explored.
4.2. On the conflict problem: towards a pseudo Gram-Schmidt procedure? The problem of
conflicting belief functions, so important for sensor fusion applications, is inherently related to the notion
of independence of frames (Theorem 28). This in turn display similarities with the notion of indepen-
dence of vector subspaces, which have suggested a possible algebraic solution to the conflict problem.
These similarities can be recapped as in the following Table.∑
i vi 6= ~0 ⇐⇒ v1 + ...+ vn 6= ~0, ∀~0 6= vi ∈ Vi~w⋂
i Vi =
~0 ⇐⇒ span{V1, ..., Vn} = Rd1 × · · · × Rdn⊕
i Θi = 0F ⇐⇒ Θ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Θn = Θ1 × · · · ×Θn~w⋂
Ai 6=
∧ ⇐⇒ ρ1(A1) ∩ · · · ∩ ρn(An) 6= ∅, ∀∅ 6= Ai ⊆ Θi,
where
⋂
Ai 6=
∧
(with
∧
the initial element of a Boolean algebra) is the independence condition for
Boolean sub-algebras [74] (Equation 15).
In Chapter 5 we have seen that families of frames form upper semimodular, lower semimodular, and
Birkhoff lattices, but not modular lattices (unlike projective geometries). Here the analogy breaks down
for, while the atoms of a Birkhoff lattice do form a matroid (therefore admitting the notion of indepen-
dence), this matroid cannot be trivially extended to arbitrary elements of the lattice. As a consequence a
true independence relation cannot be defined for frames of a family, although various extensions (as we
have seen in detail) can be defined and do display relationships with Boolean independence of frames.
Given a collection of arbitrary elements of a vector space, the well known Gram-Schmidt algorithm is
able to generate another collection of independent vectors spanning the same subspace. The main ingre-
dients of the algorithm are the notion of linear independence of vectors and a mechanisms for projecting
vectors onto the linear subspace generated by other vectors.
We can then imagine a ‘pseudo Gram-Schmidt’ procedure resting on the algebraic structure of Birkhoff
lattice of commutative monoids (shared by both compatible frames and linear subspaces), and the asso-
ciated independence relation. This algorithm, starting from a set of belief functions bi : 2Θi → [0, 1]
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defined over a finite collection of FODs Θ1, · · · ,Θn, would create a new collection of independent
frames of the same family:
Θ1, ...,Θn ∈ F −→ Θ′1, ...,Θ′m ∈ F ,
with m 6= n in general, and the same minimal refinement:
Θ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Θn = Θ′1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Θ′m.
Once projected the n original b.f.s b1, ..., bn onto the new set of frames (which could be done as the new
frames would belong to the same family) we would achieve a set of surely combinable belief functions
b′1, ..., b
′
m, equivalent, in some sense, to the previous one.
The search for a formal definition of the equivalence of possibly non-combinable collections of belief
functions is the most intriguing element of this proposal: it is reasonable to conjecture that Dempster’s
combination will have to be involved.
5. Conclusive comments
In the last two Chapters we have given a rather exhaustive description of families of compatible frames
in terms of the algebraic structures they form: Boolean sub-algebras (as in their original definition),
monoids, upper and lower semimodular lattices. Many of those structures come with a characteristic
form of ‘independence’, not necessarily derived from classical matroidal independence.
We compared them with Shafer’s notion of independence of frames, with the final goal of pursuing an
algebraic interpretation of independence in the theory of evidence. Although IF cannot be straighfor-
wardly explained in terms of classical matroidal independence, it does possess interesting relations with
the latter’s extended forms on semimodular lattices.
Independence of frames is actually opposed to matroidal independence (Theorem 38). Although this
can be seen as a negative result in the perspective of finding an algebraic solution to the problem of
merging conflicting belief functions on non-independent frames (Chapter 5, Section 4.2), we now un-
derstand much better where independence of frames stands from an algebraic point of view. New lines
of research have opened as a result, e.g. concerning a possible explanation of independence of frames
as independence of flats in a geometric lattice [572]. We believe that the prosecution of this study may
in the future shed more light on both the nature of independence of sources in the theory of subjective
probability, and the relationship between matroidal and Boolean independence in discrete mathematics,
pointing out the necessity for a more general, comprehensive definition of this very important notion.
As a last remark, the implications of our algebraic description of families of frames go beyond a
potential algebraic solution to the problem of conflicting evidence. Many concepts of the theory of
evidence are inherently connected to the structure of the underlying domains. For example, the notion of
support function (Definition 19) rests on that of refining, and may quite possibly be reformulated using
the algebraic language developed here. Its analysis in the context of the lattice structure of F (Corollary
10) could eventually lead to a novel solution to the canonical decomposition problem (Section 6.1),
alternative to Smets’ and Kramosil’s (see Chapter 4).

Part 3
Visions

CHAPTER 7
Data association and the total belief theorem
Data association [592, 593, 594, 595, 484] is one of the more intensively studied computer vision ap-
plications for its important role in the implementation of automated defense systems, and its connections
to the field of structure from motion, i.e., the reconstruction of a rigid scene from a sequence of images.
In data association a number of feature points moving in the 3D space are tracked by one or more cam-
eras, appearing in an image sequence as unlabeled dots (i.e., the correspondences between points in two
consecutive frames are not known) [485]. A typical example is provided by a set of markers set at fixed
positions on a moving articulated body - in order to reconstruct the trajectory of each ‘target’ of the cloud
(each marker placed on the underlying body) we need to associate feature points belonging to pairs of
consecutive images, I(k) and I(k + 1).
A popular approach (the joint probabilistic data association or JPDA filter, [596, 597, 598]) rests on
designing a number of Kalman filters (each associated with a feature point), whose aim is to predict
the future position of the target, in order to generate the most likely labeling for the cloud of points in
the next image. Unfortunately, this method suffers from a number of drawbacks: for instance, when
several feature points converge to the same, small region (coalescence, [599]) the algorithm cannot tell
them apart anymore. A number of techniques have been proposed to overcome this sort of problems, in
particular the condensation algorithm [600] due to Michael Isard and Andrew Blake.
Scope of the Chapter. In the first part of this Chapter we prospect an evidential solution to the
model-based data association task, in which feature points are the images of fixed locations on an artic-
ulated body whose topological model is known. The bottom line of the approach is to express the prior,
logical information carried by the body model in term of belief functions on a suitable frame of discern-
ment. This piece of evidence can then be combined with the probabilistic information carried by the
usual set of Kalman filters, each associated with a target as in the classical JPDA approach. A tracking
process can then be set up, in which the current belief estimate of all model-to-features associations is
continually refined by means of the new, incoming evidence.
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As we shall see in the following, a rigid motion constraint can be derived from each link in the
topological model of the moving body. This constraint, however, can be expressed in a conditional way
only – in order to test the rigidity of the motion of two observed feature points at time k we need to know
the correct association between points of the model and feature points at time k − 1. Hence, the task of
combining conditional belief functions arises.
Unfortunately, as we have seen in Chapter 2, the theory is not currently equipped with any result anal-
ogous to the total probability theorem of classical probability theory. In the second part of the Chapter
we will therefore provide a formal statement of the problem, which consists in combining (conditional)
belief functions defined over disjoint subsets of a frame of discernment, while simultaneously constrain-
ing the resulting total belief function to meet a prior condition represented as a belief function over
a coarsening of the original frame. As there are several admissible solutions to this problem, that of
minimum size is sought.
This ‘total belief’ setting is shown in this Chapter to be equivalent to building a square linear system
with positive solution, whose columns are associated with the focal elements of the candidate total belief
function. We introduce a class of linear transformations of the columns of candidate solution systems,
and show that such candidate solutions form the nodes of a graph whose edges are transformations of
the above class. We claim that there is always at least one path leading to a valid total belief function
whatever starting point in the graph we pick.
We do not provide a full solution to the total belief problem here, but we focus on the restricted case
in which the a-priori belief function only has disjoint focal elements.
1. The data association problem
Let us first formally define the data association problem.
Given a sequence of images {I(k), k}, each containing a number of feature points {zi(k)} which are
projections of 3D locations in the real world, we want to find the correspondences zi(k) ←→ zj(k + 1)
between feature points of two consecutive images that correspond to the same material point. The task
is complicated by the fact that sometimes one or more material points are occluded, i.e., they do not
appear in the current image. In other cases false features may be generated by defects of the vision
system. Overall, the number of feature points at each time instant is in general variable, and not all
visible feature points are images of actual material points.
1.1. Joint probabilistic data association. In the joint probabilistic data association framework
(see [598] for a more detailed illustration) each feature point is tracked by an individual Kalman filter
[601, 594], whose purpose is to generate a prediction of the latter’s future position. These predictions
are then used to estimate the most probable feature labeling in the following image.
Let us assume that each feature measurement z(k+ 1) at time k+ 1, conditioned by the past observa-
tions Zk = [Z(j)]j=1..k (where Z(j) = {zi(j)}i=1..mj is the set of measurements at time j), has a normal
distribution with mean zˆ(k|k + 1) and variance S(k + 1).
For each target γ we call validation region
V˜k+1(γ) =
{
z : V ′(k + 1)S−1(k + 1)V (k + 1) ≤ γ}
the zone outside which it is improbabile to find measurements associated with target γ. Given our
Gaussian assumption, V˜k+1(γ) is an ellipse centered in the mean prediction zˆ(k|k+ 1). Assuming that a
classical linear model for the measurements is adopted,
(97)
{
x(k + 1) = F (k)x(k) + v(k)
z(k) = H(k)x(k) + w(k),
we can distinguish a number of different filtering approaches:
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• nearest neighbor: the measurement which is the closest to the prediction in the validation region
is used to update the filter;
• splitting: multiple hypotheses are formulated by considering all the measurements in the vali-
dation region;
• PDA filter: the probability of it being the correct association is computed for each measurement
at the current time instant k;
• optimal Bayesian filter: the same probability is calculated for entire series of measurements,
rather than at the current time only.
The assumption behind the PDA filter is that the state x(k) of system (97) is also normally distributed
around the current prediction xˆ(k|k − 1) with variance P (k|k − 1).
To get an estimation equation we need to compute βi(k) = P [θi(k)|Zk] for i = 0...mk, where θi, θ0
represent the following hypotheses: θi(k) = {zi(k) true}, θ0(k) = {all the measurements are false}.
Then the update equation for the state becomes:
xˆ(k|k) = E[x(k)|Zk] =
∑
i
xˆi(k|k)βi(k).
The equations for state and output predictions, instead, come from the standard Kalman filter formulation
[602]: {
xˆ(k + 1|k) = F (k)xˆ(k|k) +G(k)u(k)
zˆ(k + 1|k) = H(k + 1)xˆ(k + 1|k).
A simple variant of the PDA filter is the joint probabilistic data association (JPDA) filter, which focuses
on the joint association event:
θ¯ =
⋂
j=1..mk
θjtj , j = 1, ...,mk, t = 0, ..., T,
where θjtj is the event ‘measurement j is associated with target t’. A validation matrix is then defined as
Ω = [ωjt], where ωjt = 1 when zj is found within the ellipse associated to target t. An admissible event
is a matrix of the same kind Ωˆ = [ωˆjt], subject to the following constraints:∑
t
ωˆjt(θ) = 1, δt(θ) =
∑
j
ωˆjt(θ) ≤ 1.
The sum δt(θ) of column t’s components of Ωˆ is called target t’s detection indicator. The filter’s equa-
tions are obtained as in the single target’s case.
1.2. Model-based data association. As anticipated in the Introduction, JPDA suffers from a num-
ber of drawbacks. When several features converge to the same region of space (a phenomenon called
coalescence [599]), for instance, the algorithm cannot tell them apart anymore. The ‘condensation’ algo-
rithm is one technique that has been proposed to address this issue. Here we are bring forward a radically
different solution to a slightly different problem: model-based data association.
Namely, we assume that the targets represent fixed positions on an articulated body, and that we know
which pairs of markers are connected by a rigid link. Clearly, this information is equivalent to the
knowledge of a topological model of the articulated body, in the form of an undirected graph whose
edges represent the rigid motion constraints coupling pairs of targets (see Figure 1). We can then exploit
this a-priori information to solve the association task in those critical situations in which several target
points fall within the validation region of a single Kalman filter. This knowledge can be expressed as a
set of logical constraints on the admissible relative positions of the markers, and consequently on those
of the feature points.
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FIGURE 1. Topological model of a human body: adjacency relations between pairs of
markers are shown are undirected edges.
A suitable environment in which to combine logical and probabilistic pieces of evidence, exploiting
the information carried by the model, is naturally provided by evidential reasoning.
What exactly can be inferred from a topological model of the body? We can identify, for instance:
• a prediction constraint, encoding the likelihood of a measurement in the current image being
associated with a measurement of the past image;
• an occlusion constraint, expressing the chance of a given marker Ml of the model being oc-
cluded in the current image;
• a metric constraint, representing what we know about the lengths of the various rigid links,
lengths that can be learned from the history of past associations;
• a topological or rigid motion constraint acting on pairs of markers linked by an edge in the
topological model (e.g. Mo and Ml in Figure 1).
Now, all these constraints can be expressed as belief functions over a suitable frame of discernment. For
instance, the metric one can be implemented by checking which pairs of feature points (mi,mj), i, j =
1, ..., n(k) (where n(k) is the number of observed features at time k) are at the same distance as any
given pair (Mo,Ml), o, l = 1, ..., N of model points, within a certain tolerance.
For each rigid link Mo−Ml the metric constraint can then be represented as a belief function b on the
frame of discernment:
ΘkMol =
{
(mi,mj), i, j = 1, ..., n(k)
}
of all the pairs of observed feature points at time k, with basic probability assignment:
(98) mb(A) =
 1− p A =
{
(mi,mj) : ‖mi −mj‖ ' ‖Mo −Ml‖
}
p A = ΘkMol .
Here p is the probability of occlusion of at least one of Mo and Ml, estimated by means of a statistic
analysis of past model-to-feature associations.
The likelihood values βi(k) generated by a battery of classical Kalman filters can be encoded in the
same way: quantitative and logical pieces of information may all be combined in the framework of belief
calculus.
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FIGURE 2. The family of past and present association frames. All the constraints of the
model-based association problem are combined over the common refinement Θ and then
re-projected onto the current association frame to yield a belief estimate of the current
feature-to-model association.
1.3. The family of the past-present associations frames. By observing the nature of the con-
straints introduced above, we can note that the information carried by predictions of filters and occlu-
sions inherently concerns associations between feature points belonging to consecutive images, rather
than points of the model. In fact, they are independent from any assumptions on the model of the un-
derlying articulated body. Some constraints can be expressed instantaneously in the frame of the current
feature-to-model associations: the metric constraint is a natural example. Some others, however, depend
on the model-to-measurement association estimated at the previous step. This is the case for belief func-
tions encoding information on the motion of the articulated body, which are expression of topological
and rigid motion constraints.
These three classes of belief functions are defined over distinct frames, elements of a family of com-
patible frames, representing past model-to-feature associations
Θk−1M
.
=
{
mi(k − 1)↔Mj, ∀i = 1, ..., n(k − 1) ∀j = 1, ...,M
}
,
feature-to-feature associations
Θk−1k
.
=
{
mi(k − 1)↔ mj(k), ∀i = 1, ..., n(k − 1) ∀j = 1, ..., n(k)
}
,
and current model-to-feature associations
ΘkM
.
=
{
mi(k)↔Mj, ∀i = 1, ..., n(k) ∀j = 1, ...,M
}
,
respectively. Note that the individual metric constraint (98) is defined on a frame (ΘkMol) which is a
coarsening of ΘkM .
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As all these frames form a compatible family, all the available evidence can then be combined on
their minimal refinement (see Theorem 1), the combined association frame Θk−1M ⊗ Θk−1k (Figure 2).
Projecting the resulting belief function back onto the current association frame ΘkM produces the current
best estimate.
A serious complication comes from the fact that, as we said, constraints of the third type can be
expressed in a conditional way only (i.e., given an estimate of the feature-to-model association at time
k − 1). Consequently, the computation of a belief estimate of the current feature-to-model association
requires combining a set of conditional belief functions [603, 207, 604], induced by the conditional
constraint on the combined association frame Θ = Θk−1M ⊗Θk−1k .
More precisely, the rigid motion constraint generates an entire set of belief functions bi : 2ρ
k−1
M ({ai}) →
[0, 1], each defined over an element ρk−1M ({ai}) of the disjoint partition of Θ = Θk−1M ⊗ Θk−1k induced
on the combined frame by its coarsening Θk−1M (see Figure 2 again). Here ai ∈ Θk−1M is the i-th possible
association at time k − 1.
In order for us to obtain a belief estimate, these conditional belief functions must be reduced to a
single total belief function, that is eventually pooled with those generated by all the other constraints.
2. The total belief theorem
Let us now abstract from the data association problem and state the conditions an overall, total belief
function b must obey, given a set of conditional functions bi : 2Πi → [0, 1] over N of the elements Πi of
the partition Π = {Π1, ...,Π|Ω|} of a frame Θ induced by a coarsening Ω.
(1) A-priori constraint: the restriction (13) on the coarsening Ω of the frame Θ of the candidate
total belief function b must coincide with a given a-priori b.f. b0 : 2Ω → [0, 1].
In the data association problem, in particular, the a-priori constraint is represented by the belief func-
tion encoding the estimate of the past feature-to-model association M ↔ m(k − 1), defined over Θk−1k
(Figure 2). It ensures that the total function is compatible with the last available estimate.
(2) Conditional constraint: the belief function b⊕bΠi obtained by conditioning the total belief func-
tion b with respect to each element Πi of the partition Π must coincide with the corresponding
given conditional belief function bi:
b⊕ bΠi = bi ∀i = 1, ..., N
where mΠi : 2
Θ → [0, 1] is such that:
(99) mΠi(A) =
 1 A = Πi0 A ⊆ Θ, A 6= Πi.
2.1. Formulation. We can then formulate the generalization of the total probability theorem to the
theory of belief functions – the total belief theorem – as follows (Figure 3).
THEOREM 39. [605] Suppose Θ and Ω are two frames of discernment, and ρ : 2Ω → 2Θ the unique
refining between them. Let b0 be a belief function defined over Ω = {ω1, ..., ω|Ω|}. Suppose there exists a
collection of belief functions bi : 2Πi → [0, 1], where Π = {Π1, ...,Π|Ω|}, Πi = ρ({ωi}), is the partition
of Θ induced by its coarsening Ω.
Then, there exists a belief function b : 2Θ → [0, 1] such that:
(1) b0 is the restriction of b to Ω, b0 = b|Ω (Equation (13), Chapter 2);
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(2) b⊕ bΠi = bi ∀i = 1, ..., |Ω|, where bΠi is the categorical belief function with b.p.a. (99);
FIGURE 3. Pictorial representation of the total belief theorem hypotheses.
2.2. Effect of the a-priori constraint. The a-priori constraint induces an interesting condition on
the focal elements of the total function b.
LEMMA 7. Let ρ be the refining between Ω and Θ, and denote by e(.) an arbitrary focal element of a
valid total belief function b. Then, the inner reduction (11) ρ¯(e(.)) of e(.) is a focal element of the a-priori
belief function b0.
In other words, there exists a focal element Ek ∈ Eb0 of b0 such that e(.) is a subset of ρ(Ek) and all the
projections ρ(ω), ω ∈ Ek of singleton elements of Ek have non-empty intersections with e(.):
∀e(.) ∈ Eb ∃Ek ∈ Eb0 s.t. e(.) ⊂ ρ(Ek)
∧
e(.) ∩ ρ(ω) 6= ∅ ∀ω ∈ Ek.
The proof is rather straightforward, and can be found in [52].
2.3. Effect of conditional constraints and structure of the total focal elements. Conditional con-
straints (2), on the other hand, provide the structure all the focal elements of the candidate total belief
function b must adhere to.
Let us denote by ek(.) any focal element of b which is a subset of ρ(Ek), where Ek is again an arbitrary
focal element of the a-priori b.f. b0.
LEMMA 8. Each focal element ek(.) of a total belief function b is the union of exactly one focal element
of each of the conditional belief functions whose domain Πi is a subset of ρ(Ek), whereEk is the smallest
focal element of the a-priori belief function b0 s.t. ek(.) ⊂ ρ(Ek). Namely:
(100) ek(.) =
⋃
i:Πi⊂ρ(Ek)
ejii
where ejii ∈ Ebi ∀i.
122 7. DATA ASSOCIATION AND THE TOTAL BELIEF THEOREM
PROOF. Since b⊕ bΠi = bi, where mΠi(Πi) = 1, by Dempster’s rule it necessarily follows that:
ek(.) ∩ Πi = ejii
for some focal element ejii of bi. Furthermore, e
k
(.) ∩ Πi must be non-empty for all i, for if there existed
an integer l such that ek(.) ∩ Πl = ∅ for some Πl we would have:
ρ¯(ek(.)) ( Ek,
contradicting the assumption that Ek is the smallest focal elements of b0 whose image contains ek(.). 
Note that (100) is a union of disjoint elements.
Lemma 8 is very important, for it describes the general structure of focal elements of a total belief
function b. As represented in Figure 4, each f.e. of b can be seen as an ‘elastic band’ covering a single
focal element for each conditional b.f.s bi.
FIGURE 4. Pictorial representation of the structure of the focal elements of a total belief
function b lying in the image ρ(Ek) = Π1∪Π2∪Π3 of a focal element of b0 of cardinality
3. For each i = 1, 2, 3 an admissible focal element ek(.) of b must be such that e
k
(.) ∩ Πi =
ejii for some ji. Set-theoretical relationships between focal elements of the individual
conditional b.f.s bi are irrelevant, and are not represented in this diagram.
It also determines a constraint on the minimum number of focal elements lying within the image of
each focal element of the prior b0 a total belief function b must possess.
LEMMA 9. Let ρ : 2Ω → 2Θ and let Ek be a focal element of b0.
The minimum number of focal elements ek(.) of the total belief function b which are subsets of ρ(Ek) is:
n =
∑
i=1,...,|Ek|
(ni − 1),
where ni = |Ebi | is the number of focal elements of the i-th conditional belief function.
PROOF. Let us call eji the j-th focal element of bi. Since b ⊕ Πi = bi for all i, we have that, by
definition of Dempster’s rule:
(101) mbi(e
j
i ) =
∑
ek
(.)
∩Πi=eji mb(e
k
(.)) · 1
Z
,
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where Z is just a normalization factor. The minumum number of focal elements of b inside ρ(Ek) is
then equal to the number of contraints of the form (101) imposed by all the conditional b.f.s with domain
within ρ(Ek). For each i Dempster’s sum (101) enforces ni − 1 constraints, for the ni-th is a linear
combination of the other due to the normalization constraint acting on the focal elements of bi.
The thesis easily follows. 
Note that if Ek is the only focal element of the prior b.f. b0, the usual normalization constraint (this
time acting on the focal element of b) needs to be added, setting the minimum number of focal elements
of b to:
n =
∑
i=1,...,|Ek|
(ni − 1) + 1.
3. The restricted total belief theorem
If we enforce the a-priori function b0 to have only disjoint focal elements (i.e., b0 to be the vacuous
extension of a Bayesian function defined on some coarsening of Ω), we have what we call the restricted
total belief theorem. This is the case, for instance, of the data association problem illustrated above.
There, the prior b.f. b0 is usually a simple support function whose core contains only a few disjoint focal
elements.
In this special case it suffices to solve the K = |Eb0 | sub-problems obtained by considering each focal
element Ek of b0 separately, and then combine the resulting partial solutions by simply weighing the
resulting basic probability assignments using the a-priori mass mb0(Ek), to obtain a fully normalized
total belief function.
As we will see in the following, for each individual focal element of b0 the task of finding a suitable
solution to the total belief problem translates into a linear algebra problem.
3.1. A simple case study. Suppose that the considered focal element E of b0 has cardinality three,
so that its image ρ(E) covers three partitions Π1, Π2 and Π3 of Ω. Suppose also that: the conditional
belief function b1 defined on Π1 has two focal elements e11 and e
2
1; the conditional b.f. b2 defined on Π2
has a single focal element e12; b3 on Π3 has two focal elements, e
1
3 and e
2
3 (see Figure 5).
FIGURE 5. The conditional belief functions considered in our case study. Once again
the set-theoretical relations between their focal elements are immaterial to the study’s
solution.
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Clearly in this example n1 = 2, n2 = 1 and n3 = 2. The number of possible focal elements which
satisfy the structure proven in Lemma 8 is therefore nmax = n1×n2×n3 = 4. They are listed as follows:
(102)
e1 = e
1
1 ∪ e12 ∪ e13;
e2 = e
1
1 ∪ e12 ∪ e23;
e3 = e
2
1 ∪ e12 ∪ e13;
e4 = e
2
1 ∪ e12 ∪ e23.
In order to meet the conditional constraints of the total belief problem, the total belief function b with
focal elements {e1, e2, e3, e4} ought to satisfy the following equalities:
(103)
 b⊕ bΠ1 = b1;b⊕ bΠ2 = b2;
b⊕ bΠ3 = b3,
which translate into the following three sets of constraints:{
m1(e
1
1) = m(e1) +m(e2)
m1(e
2
1) = m(e3) +m(e4)
{
m2(e
1
2) =
∑
im(ei) = 1
{
m3(e
1
3) = m(e1) +m(e3)
m3(e
2
3) = m(e2) +m(e4),
where mi denotes the b.p.a. of bi and m that of the candidate total function b.
Now, the last constraint in each set is a direct consequence of (or is equal to) the normalization equality
m(e1) +m(e2) +m(e3) +m(e4) = 1. Therefore, the conditional constraints (103) amount in the end to
the following linear system:
(104)
 m(e1) +m(e2) = m1(e
1
1)
m(e1) +m(e3) = m3(e
1
3)
m(e1) +m(e2) +m(e3) +m(e4) = 1.
As the latter is underdetermined, we have an infinite plurality of solutions in the vector:
~x = [m(e1),m(e2),m(e3),m(e4)]
′,
which form an entire linear variety of normalized sum functions (see Chapter 4, Section 3.3). Possibly,
some of these solutions will have all positive components, i.e., they will correspond to admissible belief
functions. In particular, we are interested in solutions with the minimal number of focal element, in this
case n = 3. Note that this confirms the result of Lemma 9, as 1 +
∑
i(n1 − 1) = 1 + 1 + 0 + 1 = 3
(taking into account the normalization constraint).
System (104) can be written as A~x = ~b, where~b = [m1(e11),m3(e
1
3), 1]
′ and:
A =
 1 1 0 01 0 1 0
1 1 1 1
 .
The matrix has full row rank 3, as rows are all linearly independent. By selecting any three columns from
A, then, we obtain a linear system with a unique solution. There are
(
4
3
)
= 4 possible column selections,
which yield the following matrices for the resulting four linear systems: 1 1 01 0 1
1 1 1
 ,
 1 1 01 0 0
1 1 1
 ,
 1 0 01 1 0
1 1 1
 ,
 1 0 00 1 0
1 1 1
 ,
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whose solutions are, respectively: m(e1) = m1(e
1
1) +m3(e
1
3)− 1
m(e2) = 1−m3(e13)
m(e3) = 1−m1(a11),
 m(e1) = m3(e
1
3)
m(e2) = m1(e
1
1)−m3(e13)
m(e4) = 1−m1(e11), m(e1) = m1(e
1
1)
m(e3) = m3(e
1
3)−m1(e11)
m(e4) = 1−m3(e13),
 m(e2) = m1(e
1
1)
m(e3) = m3(e
1
3)
m(e4) = 1−m1(e11)−m3(e13).
We can notice a number of facts:
(1) minimal solutions can have negative components, i.e, amount to normalized sum function rather
than proper belief functions;
(2) nevertheless, there always exists a solution with all positive components, i.e., a proper total
belief function.
As for 1), looking at the first candidate minimal solution we can notice that the first component m(e1) =
m1(e
1
1) + m3(e
1
3) − 1 is not guaranteed to be non-negative: therefore, it will yield an admissible belief
function only if m1(e11) + m3(e
1
3) < 1. However (Point 2)), we can notice that in the latter case, the
fourth candidate minimal solution is admissible, as m(e4) = 1−m1(e11)−m3(e13) > 0.
Similarly, whenever the second solution is non-admissible (m1(e11) − m3(e13) < 0) the third one is
(m3(e13)−m1(e11) > 0). In conclusion, no matter what the actual b.p.a.s of b1, b2 and b3 are, there always
exists an admissible total b.f.
In the following we will work towards proving that this is the case in the general setting as well.
3.2. Candidate minimal solution systems. In the general case, let N be the number of singleton
elements of a given focal element E of b0 (the number of partition elements of Θ covered by ρ(E)).
From the proof of Lemma 9, an in particular by Equation (101), a candidate solution to the restricted
total belief problem (more precisely, to the subproblem associated with E) is the solution to a linear
system with nmin =
∑
i=1,...,N(ni − 1) + 1 equations and nmax =
∏
i ni unknowns:
(105) A~x = ~b,
where each column of A is associated with an admissible (i.e., meeting the structure of Lemma 8) focal
element ej of the candidate total belief function, ~x = [mb(e1), · · · ,mb(en)] and n = nmin is the number
of equalities generated by the N conditional constraints.
Each solution system has the form:
(106)

∑
ej∩Πi=ejii
m(ej) = mi(e
ji
i ) ∀i = 1, ..., N, ∀ji = 1, ..., ni − 1∑
j
mb(ej) = 1.
where, again, ejii ⊂ Πi denotes the ji-th focal element of bi.
Since it is straightforward to prove that
LEMMA 10. The rows of the solution system (106) are linearly independent.
PROOF. It suffices to point out that each new constraint (row of A) involves candidate focal elements
that are not involved in the constraints preceeding it (for if ej ∩Πi = ejii then obviously ej ∩Πi 6= eki for
all k < ji). 
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any system of equation obtained by selecting nmin columns from A has a unique solution.
A minimal solution to the restricted total belief problem (106) (i.e., a solution with the minimum
number of focal elements) is then uniquely determined by the solution of a system of equations obtained
by selecting nmin columns from the nmax columns of A. Additionally, we need to look for minimal
solutions which are admissible belief functions, i.e., we have to identify a selection of nmin columns
from A such that the resulting square linear system has a solution with all positive components.
3.3. Transformable columns. Consider an arbitrary minimal candidate solution system, obtained
by choosing nmin elements from the set of columns of A. As we have seen in our case study, some
columns may potentially correspond to negative components of the solution.
Nevertheless, the particular form of the square linear systems involved suggests a way to reach an ad-
missible solution by applying a series of linear transformations (or, equivalently, a series of column
substitutions) which may eventually lead to a solution whose components are all positive.
Namely, each row of the solution system (106) enforces the sum of the masses of the selected focal
elements of b to be positive (as mi(e
ji
i ) > 0 for all i, ji). Therefore, whenever m(ek) < 0 for some
component k of the solution there must exist for all i at least another focal element eli of the total belief
function which coincides with ek over the related partition element Πi:
ek ∩ Πi = eli ∩ Πi.
In other words, looking at the A matrix of the candidate minimal solution system, whenever a column
possesses a ‘1’ in a certain row there is at least one (but possibly more) other column with a ‘1’ in the
same row.
We say that ek is a transformable column, and call such columns eli the ‘companions’ of ek.
3.3.1. Case study. Going back to the case study of Section 3.1, the four possible total focal elements
can be represented as ‘elastic bands’ (see Figure 4) as in the following diagram:
FIGURE 6. Graphical representation of the four possible focal elements (102) of the
case study of Section 3.1.
Graphically, the ‘companions’ of a focal element ek on a partition element i are those ejs which cover
on that partition the same node (focal element of bi). For instance, the companions of e1 are e2 (on Π1),
e2, e3 and e4 (on Π2) and e3 (on Π3). Clearly a focal element can be a companion for another on several
partitions of Θ – we will discuss this point later.
Now, if we select e1, e2 and e4 (first, second and fourth column of the complete solution system) to
form a candidate minimal solution system, we can notice that e1 is not ‘covered’ for all i (namely on Π3),
and therefore cannot correspond to a negative solution component (is not ‘transformable’). The same is
true for e4. The only transformable column is e2.
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As we suggested above, we can actually replace the transformable column e2 with another one (namely
e3) by applying the following linear transformation:
e2 7→ e′2 = −e2 + (e1 + e4) =
 −1 + 1 + 00 + 1 + 0
−1 + 1 + 1
 =
 01
1
 = e3,
in which the column to be replaced is subtracted, while its companions are added in to yield another
column corresponding to an admissible focal element. We will study the effect of such a transformation
on the solution of a candidate minimal system in the following.
3.4. A class of linear transformations.
DEFINITION 53. We define a class T of transformations acting on transformable columns e of a
candidate minimal solution system via the following formal sum:
(107) e 7→ e′ = −e+
∑
i∈C
ei −
∑
j∈S
ej
where C, |C| < N is a covering set of companions of e (i.e., every component of e is covered by at least
one of them), and a number of selection columns S, |S| = |C| − 2, are employed to compensate the side
effect of C to yield an admissible column (i.e., a candidate focal element meeting the structure of Lemma
8).
We call the elements of T column substitutions.
A sequence of column substitutions induces a discrete path in the solution space: the values of the
solution components associated with each column vary, and in a predictable way. If we denote by s < 0
the (negative) solution component associated with the old column e:
(1) the new column e′ has as solution component −s > 0;
(2) the solution component associated with each companion column decreases by |s|;
(3) the solution component associated with each selection increases by |s|;
(4) all other columns retain the old values of their solution components.
The proof is a direct consequence of the linear nature of the transformation (107).
Clearly, if we choose to substitute the column with the most negative solution component, the overall
effect is that: the most negative component is changed into a positive one; components associated with
selection columns become more positive (or less negative); as for companion columns, while some of
them may end up being assigned negative solution components, in absolute value these will be smaller
than |s| (since their initial value was positive). Hence:
THEOREM 40. Column substitutions of the class T reduce the absolute value of the most negative
solution component.
3.5. Sketch of an existence proof. We can think of using Theorem 40 to prove that there always
exists a selection of columns of A (focal elements of the total belief function) such that the resulting
square linear system has a positive vector as a solution. This can be done in a constructive way, by
applying a transformation of the type (107) recursively to the column associated with the most negative
component, to obtain a path in the solution space which eventually lead to the desired solution.
The following sketch of an existence proof for the restricted total belief theorem exploits the effects
on solution components of colum substitutions of type T :
(1) at each column substitution the most negative solution component decreases by Theorem 40;
(2) if we keep substituting the most negative variable we keep obtaining distinct linear systems, for
at each step the transformed column is assigned a positive solution component and therefore,
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if we follow the proposed procedure, cannot be changed back to a negative one by applying
transformations of class T ;
(3) this implies that there can be no cycles in the associated path in the solution space;
(4) the number
(
nmax
nmin
)
of solution systems is obviously finite, hence the procedure must terminate.
Incidentally, the (Euclidean) length ‖~x− ~x′ = T (~x)‖2 of a transition in the solution space of the total
belief problem is, trivially:√√√√ n∑
i=1
(~xi − ~x′i)2 =
√
4s2 +
∑
i∈C
s2 +
∑
i∈S
s2 =
√
s2(4 + |C|+ |S|) =
√
2|s|
√
|S|+ 3,
where s is the solution component related to the substituted column. Simple counterexamples show that
the shortest path to an admissible system is not necessarily composed by longest (greedy) steps. This
means that algorithms based on greedy choices or dynamic programming cannot work, for the problem
does not seem to meet the ‘optimal substructure’ property.
If every transformable column (possessing companions on every partition Πi of Θ) was T -transformable
the procedure could not terminate with a minimal solution system with negative solution components,
for in that case they would have one or more companions on each partition Πi.
Unfortunately, counterexamples show that there are ‘transformable’ columns (associated with negative
solution components) which do not admit a transformation of the type (107). Although they do have
companions on every partition Πi, such counterexamples do not admit a complete collection of ‘selec-
tion’ columns.
3.6. Solution graphs and types of candidate solutions. To better understand the complexity of the
problem, and in particular address the issue with the number of admissible solutions to the (restricted)
total belief problem, it is useful to define an adjacency relation between solution systems.
We say that a candidate minimal solution system σ is adjacent to another system τ if τ can be obtained
from σ by substituting a column by means of a transformation of the form (107) (and vice-versa)1.
This allows us to rearrange the candidate minimal solution systems related to a problem of a given size
{ni, i = 1, ..., N} into a solution graph.
FIGURE 7. The solution graph associated with the restricted total belief problem with
N = 2, n1 = 3 and n2 = 2.
1Note that column substitutions of the form (107) are reversible: what we claimed above is that if we keep replacing
columns with the most negative solution component we can never go back to systems we have already visited.
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3.6.1. Examples of solution graphs. It can be educational to see some significant examples of solu-
tion graphs, in order to infer their properties and general structure.
Figure 7 shows the solution graph formed by all the candidate solution systems for the problem of size
N = 2, n1 = 3, n2 = 2. The number of possible minimal solution systems is:(
nmax = n1 · n2 = 6
nmin = (n1 − 1) + (n2 − 1) + 1 = 4
)
= 12.
The twelve candidate solution systems can be arranged into a matrix whose rows and columns are la-
beled respectively with the counts (c1, ..., cni) of focal elements of the associate candidate total function
(columns of the solution system) containing each focal element of bi. For instance, the label (2, 1, 1)
indicates that, of the (n1 − 1) + (n2 − 1) + 1 = 2 + 1 + 1 = 4 focal elements of the minimal total b.f. b
generated by solution systems in that entry of the matrix, 2 cover e11, one covers e
2
1 and one e
3
1.
We can also observe that the candidate solution systems for this problem can be arranged in two
classes according to the number of transformable columns they possess and the number of admissible T
transformations (edges) for each transformable column. Type II systems (in blue, central row) possess
two transformable columns, each admitting only one column substitution of type T ; type I systems,
instead (in yellow, top and bottom rows) only have one transformable column which can be substituted,
however, in two different ways.
In the perspective of proving the existence of a solution to the restricted total belief problem, it is
interesting to note that the graph of Figure 7 can be rearranged to form a chain of solution systems:
its edges form a single, closed loop. This implies that we can reach any solution system starting from
any other: starting from an initial non-admissible solution we can reach an admissible one via column
substitutions of the proposed type2.
FIGURE 8. The solution graph associated with the restricted total belief problem of size
N = 3, n1 = n2 = n3 = 2.
Figure 8 shows a more complex example, in which the overall symmetry of its solution graph emerges.
2Incidentally, such a chain is composed by ‘rings’ whose central node is a type I system connected to a pair of type II
systems. Two consecutive rings are linked by a type II system.
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3.7. Graph symmetries, types of solution systems and number of admissible solutions. Once
again, we can produce counterexamples in which the same entry does contain systems of different type.
Hence, the ‘type’ of a solution system (how many transformable columns it has, and in how many ways
they can be substituted) must be induced by some other global property of the solution graph. Let
(108) G = Sn1 × · · · × SnN
be the group of permutations of focal elements of all the conditional belief functions bi. The group is
trivially the product of the permutation groups Sni acting on the collections of focal elements of each
individual conditional belief function bi. As it alters the ordering of the focal elements of each bi, G acts
on a solution system by moving it to a different location of the solution graph.
Given a solution system σ, the orbit induced by the action of G on σ is the set of all solution systems
(nodes of the graph) obtained by some permutation of the focal elements within at least some of the
partition elements Πi.
The following conjecture originates from the study of the structure of several significant solution
graphs.
Conjecture. The orbits of G coincide with the types of solution systems.
The conjecture is quite reasonable, for the behavior of a solution system in terms of transformable
columns depends only on the cardinality of the collections of focal elements containing each focal ele-
ment of bi for each i = 1, ..., N . It does not depend on which specific e.f. is assigned to which collection.
From group theory we known that the orbits of G are disjoint, forming therefore a partition of the set of
nodes of the graph, as they should if they indeed represented types of solution system.
The number of orbits of (108) could be related to the number of admissible minimal solutions to the
restricted total belief problem. We will pursue this line of research in the near future.
4. Conclusive comments
The notion of transformable column seems to point in the right direction. The algorithm of Section
3.5 can be interpreted as the proof of existence of an optimal path within a graph: having chosen an
arbitrary node σ of the graph, there exists at least one path to a different node which corresponds to a
system with positive solution (an admissible total belief function).
Unfortunately, we still do not have a complete constructive proof of the restricted total belief theorem,
for wanting of a more general class of linear transformations T ′ applicable to any column with negative
solution component. After detecting such a class of transformations an investigation of the properties of
the associated optimal paths will be in place, together with a global analysis of the structure of solution
graphs and their mutual relationships.
The structure of solution graphs for a number of significant special cases suggests that each graph con-
tain a number of ‘copies’ of solution graphs related to lower size problems. For instance, the graph for
the problem N = 2, n1 = 4, n2 = 2 is composed by 32 nodes (candidate minimal solution systems)
arranged in 8 chains, each isomorphic to the graph of Figure 7 associated with the problem N = 2,
n1 = 3, n2 = 2. Each system of the larger graph is covered by 3 of these chains.
Such inclusion relationships between graphs of problems of different size are potentially extremely use-
ful in the perspective of addressing the other major missing element of the restricted total belief problem
– the computation of the number of admissible solutions (proper minimal-size total belief functions).
Our conjecture about the relationship between the action of the group of permutations G and the global
symmetry of the solution graph also needs to be investigated.
Finally, while we know the minimal number of focal elements of the total function in the restricted
case (in which the a-priori belief function b0 has disjoint focal elements), we still do not understand what
the similar bound should look like in the general case of an arbitrary prior, or whether the presence of
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intersecting focal elements in b0 does at all influence the structure of the focal elements of the sought total
function (in other words, how does Lemma 8 generalize to the case of arbitrary prior belief functions).
These challenges are open for the whole belief functions community to be taken on. As for us we will
keep working towards their solution, and investigate the fascinating relationships between the total belief
problem and transversal matroids [571], on one hand, and positive linear systems [606], on the other, in
an ongoing attempt to bridge the mathematics of uncertainty with combinatorics, algebra and geometry.

CHAPTER 8
Belief Modeling Regression
Pose estimation is another well studied problem in computer vision. Given an image sequence cap-
turing the motion and evolution of an object of interest, the problem consists in estimating the position
and orientation of the object at each time instant, along with its internal configuration or pose. Such
estimation is typically based on two pillars: the extraction of salient measurements or features from the
available images and, when present, a model of the structure and kinematics of the moving body. Pose
estimation is, among others, a fundamental ingredient of motion capture, i.e., the reconstruction of the
motion of a person throughout a video sequence, usually for animation purposes in the movie industry or
for medical analysis of posture and gait. Other major applications include human-computer interaction,
image retrieval on the internet, robotics (Figure 1).
Related Work. Current methodologies for pose estimation can roughly be classified into ‘model-
based’, ‘learning-based’ and ‘example-based‘ approaches. The former [312, 607] presuppose an explic-
itly known parametric body model: pose recovery is typically achieved by matching the pose variables
to a forward rendered model based on the extracted features. Initialization is often difficult, and the
pose optimization process can be subject to local minima [608]. In contrast, learning-based approaches
[609, 610, 611, 612] exploit the fact that typical (human) motions involve a far smaller set of poses than
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the kinematically possible ones, and learn a model that directly recovers pose estimates from observable
image quantities. Such methods [613, 614, 615, 616] are appealing and generally faster, due to the lower
dimensionality of the models employed, and typically provide a better predictive performance when the
training set is comprehensive. On the other hand, they sometimes require heavy training to produce a
decent predictive model, and the resulting description can lack generalization power.
FIGURE 1. Some applications of pose estimation: human-machine interaction, robotics,
virtual reality.
Example-based methods, which explicitly store a set of training examples whose 3D poses are known,
estimate pose by searching for training image(s) similar to the given input image and interpolating from
their poses [611, 617]. They can then be used to initialize model-based methods in a ‘smart’ way, as in
the monitoring of an automobile driver’s head movements provided in [616]. No prior analytic structure
of the pose space is incorporated in the estimation process, although the training data itself do amount to
a rough approximation of the configuration space.
Most of these methods share a common architecture. Vectors of feature measurements (such as mo-
ments of silhouette images [618], multi-scale edge direction histograms [619], distribution of shape
contexts [609], and Harr-like features [620]) are extracted from each individual image. Indeed, the in-
tegration of multiple cues is crucial in pose estimation to increase both the resolution/accuracy of the
estimation and its robustness [621, 622, 623, 624, 625]. Then, the likely pose of the object is predicted
by feeding this feature vector to a map from the features space to the pose space, which is learned from
a training set of examples or a model whose parameters are learned from the training data, and whose
purpose is to (globally or locally) represent the relationship between image and pose. This mapping, al-
beit unknown, is bound to be (in general) one-to-many: more than one object configuration can generate
the same feature observation, because of occlusions, self-occlusions and the ambiguities induced by the
perspective image projection model.
Since only limited information is provided to us in the training session, only an approximation of the
true feature-pose mapping can be learned. The accuracy of the estimation depends on the forcibly limited
size and distribution of the available examples, which are expensive and time-consuming to collect. This
has suggested in the past to consider a more constrained, activity-based setting to constrain the search
space of possible poses.
In [618], for instance, an inverse mapping between image silhouette moments and 2D joint configura-
tions is learned, for each cluster obtained by fitting a Gaussian mixture to 2D joint configurations via
the EM algorithm. In [609] a Relevant Vector Machine (RVM) is used to infer human pose from a sil-
houette’s shape descriptor, while more recently an extension to mixtures of RVMs has been proposed
by Thayananthan et al. [626]. In [627], a number of exemplar 2D views of the human body are stored;
the locations of the body joints are manually marked and labeled. The input image is then matched via
‘shape context matching’ to each stored view, and the locations of the body joints in the matched exem-
plar view are transferred to the test image. Other approaches include Local Weighted Regression [611],
BoostMap [617], Bayesian Mixture of Experts [612] and Gaussian Process Regression (GPR) [628].
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The accuracy of example-based approaches critically depends on the amount and representativeness
of the training data. Queries can be potentially computationally expensive, and need to be performed
quickly and accurately [611, 617]. In addition, example-based approaches often have problems when
working in high-dimensional configuration spaces, as it is difficult to collect enough examples to densely
cover them.
Scope of the Chapter. In this Chapter we describe a Belief Modeling Regression (BMR) [560, 629]
framework for example-based pose estimation based on the theory of evidence. Our framework uses the
finite amount of evidence provided in a training session to build, given a new feature value, a belief
function on the set of training poses. In this context we favour the interpretation of belief functions as
convex sets of probability distributions (credal sets, see Chapter 3, Section 1.4), according to which a
belief function on the pose space is equivalent to a set of linear constraints on the actual conditional pose
distribution (given the features). Regression is made possible by learning during training a refining (in the
evidence-theoretical sense of Definition 11) between an approximation of each feature space, obtained
via Expectation-Maximization, and the set of training poses. At test time each feature value, encoded
as a set of likelihoods, translates into a belief function on the set of training poses. This determines a
convex sets of distributions there, which in turn generates an interval of pose estimates.
Multiple features are necessary to obtain decent accuracy in terms of pose estimation. All single-
feature refinings are collected in an ‘evidential model’ of the object: the information they carry is fused
before estimating the object’s pose in the belief framework, allowing a limited resolution for the in-
dividual features to translate into a relatively high estimation accuracy (in a similar way to tree-based
classifiers [630] or boosting approaches, in which weak features are combined to form a strong clas-
sifier). The size of the resulting convex set of probabilities reflects the amount of training information
available: the larger and more densely distributed within the pose space the training set is, the narrower
the resulting credal set. Both a pointwise estimate of the current pose and a measure of its accuracy
[631] can then be obtained. In alternative, a separate pose estimate can be computed for each vertex of
the credal set, in a robust statistical fashion [632, 633].
As we show in the last part of the Chapter, an evidential model essentially provides a constraint on the
family of admissible feature-to-pose maps, in terms of smooth upper and lower bounds. All mappings
(even discontinuous, or 1-many) within those smooth bounds are possible under the model. The width
of this space of mappings reflects the uncertainty induced by the size and distribution of the available
training set.
Chapter Outline. The Chapter is structured as follows.
First (Section 1) the scenario and assumptions of the problem are laid down. The learning of an ‘eviden-
tial model’ of the body from the learning data, based on approximations of the unknown feature-to-pose
maps, is described in Section 2. In Section 3 the special class of Dirichlet belief functions is proposed
to model the uncertainty due to the scarcity of the training data. From the belief estimate which results
from their conjunctive combination either a pointwise estimate or a set of extremal estimates of the pose
can be extracted. The computational complexity of learning and estimation algorithms is also analyzed.
In Section 4 model assessment criteria based on the theory of families of compatible frames are dis-
cussed.
Section 5 illustrates the performance of Belief Modeling Regression in an application to human pose
recovery, showing how BMR outperforms our implementation of both Relevant Vector Machine and
Gaussian Process Regression. Section 6 discusses motivation and advantages of the proposed approach
in comparison with other competitors, and analyzes approaches alternative to Dirichlet modeling for
belief function inference. Finally, Section 7 outlines an extension of Belief Modeling Regression to
fully-fledged tracking, in which temporal consistency is achieved via the total belief theorem (exten-
sively considered in Chapter 7).
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1. Scenario
We consider the following scenario:
• the available evidence comes in the form of a training set of images containing sample poses of
an unspecified object;
• we only know that the latter’s configuration can be described by a vector q ∈ Q ⊂ RD in a pose
space Q which is a subset of RD;
• a source of ground truth exists which provides for each training image Ik the configuration qk
of the object portrayed in the image;
• the location of the object within each training image is known, in the form of a bounding box
containing the object of interest.
In a training session the object explores its range of possible configurations, and a set of poses is collected
to form a finite approximation Q˜ of the parameter space:
(109) Q˜ .=
{
qk, k = 1, ..., T
}
.
At the same time a number N of distinct features are extracted from the available image(s), within the
available bounding box:
(110) Y˜ .=
{
yi(k), k = 1, ..., T
}
, i = 1, ..., N.
In order to collect Q˜ we need a source of ground truth to tell us what pose the object is in at each
instant k of the training session. One option is to use a motion capture system, as it is done in [618] for
the human body tracking problem. After applying a number of reflective markers in fixed positions of the
moving object, the system is able to provide by triangulation the 3D locations of the markers throughout
the training motion. Since we do not know the parameter space of the object, it is reasonable to use as
body pose vector the collection of all marker’s 3D locations.
Based on this evidence, at test time:
• a supervised localization algorithm (trained in the training stage using the annotation provided
in terms of bounding boxes, e.g. [634]) is employed to locate the object within each test image:
image features are only extracted from within the resulting bounding box;
• such features are exploited to produce an estimate of the object’s configuration, together with a
measure of how reliable this estimate is.
2. Learning evidential models
2.1. Building feature-pose maps. Consider an image feature y, whose values live in a feature space
Y , and let us denote by ρ∗ : Y → 2Q the unknown mapping linking the feature space Y to the collection
2Q = {Q ⊆ Q} of sets of object poses. We seek to learn from the training data an approximation ρ˜ of
this unknown mapping, which is applicable to any feature value, and ideally produces only admissible
object configurations. In fact, as evidence is limited, we can only constrain ρ˜ to have output in the space
RD the true pose space Q is embedded into.
We propose to obtain such an approximation by applying EM clustering [635] to the training data (109),
(110), individually for each feature component.
Consider the N sequences of feature values {yi(k), k = 1, ..., T}, i = 1, ..., N , acquired during
training. EM clustering can be applied to them to obtain a Mixture of Gaussians (MoG)
(111)
{
Γji , j = 1, ..., ni
}
, Γji ∼ N (µji ,Σji )
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with ni Gaussian components, separately for each feature space (the range Yi ⊂ Rdi of the unknown
feature function yi : I → Yi acting on the set of all images I). MoG models are often employed in
bottom-up pose estimation1, as their parameters can be speedily estimated via the EM algorithm [635].
Here we use the learnt MoG (111) to build a particle-based discrete approximation of the unknown
feature pose mapping. The former induces an implicit partition
(112) Θi
.
=
{
Y1i , · · · ,Ynii
}
of the i-th feature range, whereYji =
{
y ∈ Yi s.t. Γji (y) > Γli(y) ∀l 6= j
}
is the region ofYi in which the
j-th Gaussian component dominates all the others (Figure 2-right). We call (112) the i-th ‘approximate’
feature space. The purpose here, however, is to model the feature-pose relation in an efficient way rather
than to approximate the actual feature space.
FIGURE 2. Left: a probability measure P on Ω induces a belief function b on Θ through a
multi-valued mapping ρ. Right: a Mixture of Gaussian learned via EM from the training
features defines an implicit partition on the set of training poses Q˜. A set of Gaussian
densities {Γj, j = 1, ..., n} on the range Y of a feature function y define a partition of Y
into disjoint regions {Yj}. Each of those regions Yj is in correspondence with the set Q˜j
of sample poses qk whose feature value y(qk) falls inside Yj .
In virtue of the fact that features are computed during training in synchronous with the true poses
provided by the source of ground truth, each element Yji of the approximate feature space is associated
with the set of training poses qk ∈ Qk whose i-th feature value falls in Yji (Figure 2-right again):
(113) ρi : Yji 7→ Q˜ji .=
{
qk ∈ Q˜ : yi(k) ∈ Yji
}
.
Applying EM clustering separately to each training feature sequence (110) yields therefore both N ap-
proximate feature spaces Θi = {Y1i , · · · ,Ynii }, i = 1, ..., N , and N maps (113) from each of them to
the approximate pose space (the set of training poses) Q˜. The learned feature-pose maps (113) amount
to constraints on the unknown feature pose maps ρ∗i : Y → 2Q, built upon the evidence available in the
specific regions covered by training feature/pose pairs (see Section 6).
Just as their unknown counterparts ρ∗i , the ρis are inherently multi-valued, i.e., they map elements of
each approximate feature space Θi to sets of training poses. The number ni of clusters can be estimated
by cross-validation. Here we will set it to a fixed value for each feature space.
1For instance, in [612] several ‘expert’ predictions are combined in a Gaussian mixture model. In [636] conditional
distributions are also assumed to be Gaussian mixtures.
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2.2. Continuous mapping via belief functions. The maps (113) only apply to partitions of the
feature range, and cannot be used directly to map individual feature values. The structure provided by
the learned MoGs (111) can nevertheless be used to build universal mappings. Given the mixture (111),
each new feature value yi can be represented by its soft assignments
(114) yi 7→
[
Γ1i (yi),Γ
2
i (yi), · · · ,Γnii (yi)
]
to each mixture component. The density values (114) constitute a vector of coordinates of the feature
value in the feature range Yi: in this interpretation, the MoG approximation of Yi provides an atlas
of coordinate charts on the feature space itself. Rather than mapping y we can use (113) to map the
associated coordinates (soft assignments) (114), extending the ‘particle’-like information on the shape
of ρ∗i given by a learnt refining (113) to map any test feature value.
By normalizing (114), each (test) feature value is associated with a probability distribution on the
approximate feature space Θi. By comparing Figures 2-left and 2-right (see Chapter 3, Section 1.1
as well), it is clear that the maps (113) are multi-valued mappings linking the question Q1 “to which
Gaussian component of the MoG (111) does the new feature value y belong” to the question Q2 “what
is the object pose whose observed feature value is y”.
Now, it follows from Chapter 3, Section 1.1, that the probability distribution associated with any
feature value induces a belief function on the (approximate) pose range Q˜ (Equation (18)). Overall, the
learnt universal feature-pose mapping is a cascade of soft assignment and refining-based multi-valued
mapping:
(115) yi ∈ Yi (112)7→
[
Γ1i (yi),Γ
2
i (yi), · · · ,Γnii (yi)
]
7→ pi = [pi(Y1i ), ..., pi(Ynii )]
(17)7→ bi : 2Q˜ → [0, 1]
where
pi(Yji ) =
Γji (yi)∑
k Γ
k
i (yi)
,
associating any test feature value yi with a belief function bi on the set of training poses Q˜.
2.3. Training algorithm. In the training stage the body moves in front of the camera(s), exploring
its configuration space, while a sequence of training poses Q˜ = {qk, k = 1, ..., T} is provided by a source
of ground truth (for instance a motion capture system, Section 1). The sample images are annotated by
a bounding box indicating the location of the object within each image. At the same time:
(1) for each time instant k, a number of feature values are computed from the region of interest of
each available image: {yi(k), k = 1, ..., T}, i = 1, ..., N ;
(2) EM clustering is applied to each feature sequence {yi(k), k = 1, ..., T} (after setting the number
of clusters ni), yielding:
(a) N approximate feature spaces Θi = {Yji , j = 1, ..., ni}, i.e., the implicit partitions of the
feature ranges Yi associated with the EM clusters (Section 2.1);
(b) N maps (113) ρi : Yji ∈ Θi 7→ Q˜ji .= {qk ∈ Q˜ : yi(k) ∈ Yji } mapping EM feature clusters
to sets of sample training poses in the approximate pose space Q˜.
As the applications (113) map approximate feature spaces to disjoint partitions of the approximate
pose space Q˜ they are refinings, and Q˜ is a common refinement (Definition 13) for the collection of
approximate feature spaces Θ1, ...,ΘN .
The collection of FODs Q˜,Θ1, ...,ΘN along with the refinings ρ1, ..., ρN is characteristic of: the object
to track, the chosen features functions yi, and the actual training data.
We call it the evidential model (Figure 3) of the object.
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3. Regression
Once an evidential model has been learned from the available training set, it can be used to provide
robust estimates of the pose of the moving object when new evidence becomes available.
3.1. Dirichlet belief function modeling of soft assignments. When one or more test images are
acquired, new visual features y1, ..., yN are extracted. Such feature values can be mapped by the learnt
universal mappings (115) to a collection of belief functions b1, ..., bN on the set of training poses Q˜.
From Chapter 3, Section 1.4, each bi corresponds to a convex set of probability distributions, whose
width encodes the uncertainty on the pose value due to the uncertainty on the analytical form of the true,
unknown feature-pose map ρ∗i .
In addition, belief functions allow us to take into account the scarcity of the training samples, by
introducing uncertainty on the soft assignment (114) itself. This can be done by assigning some mass
m(Θi) to the whole approximate feature space, prior to applying the refining ρi. This encods the fact that
there are other samples out there which, if available, would alter the shape of the MoG approximation of
Yi in unpredictable ways.
Namely, we map the soft assignment (114) to a Dirichlet belief function [637], with basic probability
assignment:
(116) mi : 2Θi → [0, 1], mi(Yji ) =
Γji (yi)∑
k
Γki (yi)
(
1−mi(Θi)
)
.
The b.p.a. (116) ‘discounts’ [638, 639] the probability distribution obtained by simply normalizing the
likelihoods (114) by assigning some mass mi(Θi) to the entire FOD Θi.
As we need to discount the limited accuracy achieved by using as coordinates in Yi those derived by
the MoG representation Θi, a plausible choice is
mi(Θi) =
1
ni
.
Indeed, when ni →∞ the discount factor tends to zero, and the approximate feature space converges (in
theory) to the real thing. In addition, as ni cannot be greater than the number of training pairs T , such a
discounting factor also takes into account the limited number of training samples.
3.2. Cue integration. If we assume that the belief functions induced by test feature values are gen-
erated by ‘independent’ sources of information they can be combined by means of Dempster’s rule of
combination (Definition 6 or [541]), or its TBM variant the conjunctive rule of combination [173].
DEFINITION 54. The conjunctive combination of two belief functions b1, b2 : 2Θ → [0, 1] is a new
belief function b1 ∩©b2 on the same FOD whose focal elements are all the possible intersections of focal
elements of b1 and b2 respectively, and whose b.p.a. is given by:
(117) mb1 ∩©b2(A) =
∑
B∩C=A
mb1(B) mb2(C).
Definition 54, just like Dempster’s rule, can be extended to the combination of an arbitrary number of
belief functions.
While it is axiomatically justifiable as the only combination rule which meets a number of sensible
requirements such as least commitment, specialization, associativity and commutativity [640], the con-
junctive combination also amounts to assuming that the sources of evidence to merge are both reliable
and independent. The current consensus is that different combination rules [585, 641] are to be employed
under different assumptions [640].
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FIGURE 3. Evidential model. The EM clustering of each feature set collected in the
training stage yields an approximate feature space Θi = {Yji , j = 1, ..., ni}. Refining
maps ρi between each approximate feature space and Q˜ = {q1, ..., qT} (the training ap-
proximation of the unknown pose space Q) are learned, allowing at test time the fusion
on Q˜ of the evidence gathered on Θ1, ...,ΘN .
It is rather difficult, however, to decide in which situations the sources of information can indeed be con-
sidered independent: this is the case for features extracted from one or more views of the same object.
An alternative point of view, supported by Shenoy, maintains instead that rather than employing a bat-
tery of combination rules whose applicability to a given problem is difficult to establish, we should adopt
models which do meet the independence of sources assumption, as it happens in probability theory. We
support this view here, and will test the adequacy of the assumption empirically in Section 5.
3.3. Belief estimate. The measurement belief functions{
bi : 2
Θi → [0, 1], i = 1, ..., N}
inferred from the test feature values y1, ..., yN via (116) are then mapped to belief functions{
b′i : 2
Q˜ → [0, 1], i = 1, ..., N}
on the approximate pose space Q˜ by vacuous extension (recall Chapter 2, Definition 20): ∀A ⊂ Q˜
(118) m′i(A) =
{
mi(Ai) ∃Ai ⊂ Θi s.t. A = ρi(Ai);
0 otherwise.
The resulting b.f.s on Q˜ are combined by conjunctive combination (117). The result is a belief function
bˆ = b′1 ∩©· · · ∩©b′N on Q˜ which is right to call the belief estimate of the object pose.
3.3.1. Example. It is important to understand how sophisticated a description of the object’s pose a
belief function is, as opposed to any estimate in the form of a ‘precise’ probability distribution (including
complex multi-modal or particle-based descriptions based on Monte-Carlo methods). A belief estimate bˆ
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of the pose represents indeed an entire convex collection of probabilities (credal set) on the approximate
pose space (see Chapter 3, Section 1.4).
Suppose that the approximate pose space contains just three samples: Q˜ = {q1, q2, q3}. Suppose also
that the evidence combination process delivers a belief estimate bˆ with b.p.a.:
(119) mˆ({q1, q2}) = 1/3, mˆ({q3}) = 1/6, mˆ({q1, q2, q3}) = 1/2.
By (25), the vertices of P [bˆ] are those probabilities generated by reassigning the mass of each focal
FIGURE 4. The convex set of probability distributions P [bˆ] (in red) associated with the
belief function bˆ (119) on the approximate parameter space Q˜ = {q1, q2, q3}, displayed
on the triangle of all probability distributions on Q˜. The pignistic approximation BetP [bˆ]
(the center of mass of P [b], in blue) is also shown.
element to any one of its singletons. There are
∏
k |Ak| such possible choices, where {Ak} is the list of
focal elements of bˆ. As our belief estimate (119) has 3 focal events of size 1, 2 and 3, the corresponding
credal set P [bˆ] will be the convex closure of 1 · 2 · 3 = 6 probability distributions, namely:
p1 = [
5
6
0 1
6
], p2 = [
1
2
1
3
1
6
], p3 = [
1
3
1
2
1
6
], p4 = [0
5
6
1
6
], p5 = [0
1
3
2
3
], p6 = [
1
3
0 2
3
].
Figure 4 shows the credal set (a polygon) associated with the belief estimate (119) in the simplex of all
probability distributions on Q˜ (a triangle in this case). Here each probability distribution is represented
as a point of R3. The larger the polygon, the greater the uncertainty of the estimate. In the figure P [bˆ]
covers almost all the probability simplex, displaying a large degree of imprecision of the estimate due to
lack of evidence.
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3.4. Computing expected pose estimates. Point-wise information on the object’s pose can be ex-
tracted from bˆ in two different ways.
3.4.1. Extracting a set of extremal point-wise estimates. Each of the vertices (25) of the credal set
associated with the belief estimate bˆ is a probability distribution on the approximate pose space Q˜. We
can then compute the associated expected pose as:
(120) qˆ =
T∑
k=1
p(qk)qk.
The set of such ‘extremal’ estimates describes therefore an entire polytope of expected pose values in
the object’s pose space Q. In the example, the expected poses for the vertices p1, p4, p5, p6 of P [b] are:
qˆ[p1] =
5
6
q1 +
1
6
q3, qˆ[p4] =
5
6
q2 +
1
6
q3, qˆ[p5] =
1
3
q2 +
2
3
q3, qˆ[p1] =
1
3
q1 +
2
3
q3.
3.4.2. Extracting a point-wise estimate. An alternative way to extract a single pose estimate qˆ from
the belief estimate consists in approximating bˆ with a probability pˆ on Q˜, and then computing its mean
value as above. The problem has been indeed extensively studied. In particular, Smets’ pignistic function
[267] (see Chapter 3, Equation (28)):
(121) BetP [b](x) =
∑
A⊇x
mb(A)
|A| ∀x ∈ Θ
has been proposed within the framework of the Transferable Belief Model ([267], Chapter 3 Section 2.1)
as the unique transformation which meets a number sensible of rationality principles. Geometrically,
BetP is nothing but the barycenter of the convex set of probabilities P [b] associated with b (see Figure
4). As such, it is quite consistent with the interpretation of belief functions as credal sets of probabilities.
Although other transforms such as the ‘relative plausibility of singletons’ [328, 331, 642] and the ‘in-
tersection probability’ [341] have been proposed (compare Chapter 3, Section 6.3), the performances of
the different pointwise transformations in the human pose tests presented here have been proven to be
empirically comparable.
In the following, therefore, we will simply adopt the pignistic transform.
3.5. Handling of conflict. The mass the conjunctive combination (117) assigns to the empty set
measures the extent to which the pieces of evidence to combine are in conflict. In the case of the
evidential model, this mass is assigned by the input b.f.s (learned from the available feature values) to
contradictory (disjoint) focal elements.
In our pose estimation scenario, conflict can arise when combining feature evidence via b′1 ∩©· · · ∩©b′N
for basically two reasons:
(1) the object is localized in an imprecise way (due to limitations of the trained detector), so that
background features conflicting with the foreground information are also extracted;
(2) occlusions are present, generating conflict for similar reasons.
A critical case is that in which all the focal elements of a particular measurement belief function have
empty intersection with those of the other b.f.s to combine – all the mass is assigned to ∅, and no
estimation is possible.
When modeling the scarcity of training pairs via Dirichlet belief functions (Section 3.1), however,
this extreme scenario never materializes, as each individual b.f. always has Θi as a focal element. In
case of disagreement, then, some mass is always assigned to the focal elements of the remaining belief
functions. As we argue in Section 6.3, combining Dirichlet belief functions amounts to assume that all
the partial combinations of feature evidence should be given some credit. Maybe, the reasoning goes,
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only a subset of features is telling the truth [469]. Under the assumption that most features come from
the foreground, this brings robustness to localization errors and presence of occlusions.
In the following, therefore, we do not employ any explicit conflict resolution mechanism.
3.6. Pose estimation algorithm. Let us summarize the whole pose estimation procedure. Given an
evidential model of the moving body with N feature spaces, and given at time t one or more test images,
possibly coming from different cameras:
(1) the object detector learned during training is applied to the test image(s), returning for each of
them a bounding box roughly containing the object of interest;
(2) N feature values are extracted from the resulting bounding boxes, as during training;
(3) the likelihoods {Γji (yi(t)), j = 1, ..., ni} of each feature value yi(t) with respect to the appro-
priate learned Mixture of Gaussian distribution on Yi are computed (114);
(4) for each feature i = 1, ..., N , a separate belief function
bi(t) : 2
Θi → [0, 1]
on the appropriate feature space Θi is built from the set of likelihoods {Γji (yi(t)), j = 1, ..., ni}
as in Section 3.1;
(5) all the resulting b.f.s {bi(t) : 2Θi → [0, 1], i = 1, ..., N} are projected onto Q˜ by vacuous
extension (118), yielding a set of belief functions on Q˜:{
b′i : 2
Q˜ → [0, 1], i = 1, ..., N}
(6) their conjunctive combination bˆ(t) .= b′1(t) ∩©· · · ∩©b′N(t) is computed via (117);
(7) either:
(a) the pignistic transform (121) is applied to bˆ(t), yielding a distribution on Q˜ from which an
expected pose estimate qˆ(t) is obtained by (120), or:
(b) the vertices (25) of the convex set of probabilities P [bˆ(t)] associated with the current belief
estimate bˆ(t) are computed, and a mean pose estimate (120) obtained for each one of them.
3.7. Computational cost.
3.7.1. Learning. EM’s computational cost is easy to assess, as the algorithm usually takes a constant
number of steps to converge, c ∼ 5− 10, while at each step the whole observation sequence of length T
is processed, yielding O(cNnT ) (where again N is the number of features, n the average number of EM
clusters, T the number of samples collected in the training stage). This is quite acceptable for real-world
applications, since this has to be done just once in the training session.
In the experiments of Section 5 the whole learning procedure in Matlab required some 17.5 seconds for
each execution of EM on a rather old Athlon 2.2 GHz processor with N = 5 features, ni = n = 5 states
for each feature space, and T = 1726.
3.7.2. Estimation. Although the conjunctive combination (117) is exponential in complexity if naively
implemented, fast implementations of ∩© exist, under additional constraints [319]. Numerous approxi-
mation schemes have been proposed, based on Monte-Carlo techniques [308]. Furthermore, the particu-
lar form of the belief functions we use in the estimation process needs to be taken into account. Dirichlet
b.f.s (116) have ni + 1 non-zero focal elements, reducing the computational complexity of their pairwise
combination from O(22n) (associated with the mass multiplication of all possible 2n focal elements of
the first b.f. and all the focal elements of the second b.f.) to O(n2). The computational cost of the other
steps of the algorithm is negligible when compared to that of belief combination.
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4. Assessing evidential models
A number of aspects of the evidential model architecture are strictly related to fundamental questions
of the example-based pose estimation problem:
(1) whether the model is self-consistent, i.e., whether it produces the correct ground truth pose
values when presented with the training feature data;
(2) what resolutions {ni, i = 1, ..., N} of the features’ MoG representations are adequate to guar-
antee a sufficient accuracy of the learned feature-pose mapping, and through the latter of the
estimation process itself;
(3) whether the training set of poses Q˜ is a proper approximation of the unknown parameter space
Q (see Figure 3).
As it turns out, those issues are related to discussing, respectively: 1) whether Q˜ is the minimal
refinement (Theorem 1) of the approximate feature spaces Θi; 2) whether the selected features space are
independent, in a way which we will precise in the following; 3) whether a flag can be derived to indicate
the need to update the evidential model by adding more training poses.
4.1. Model consistency and Q˜ as minimal refinement. In order for the model to return the correct
ground truth pose when presented with a set of training feature values {yi(k), i = 1, ..., N} it is necessary
that each sample in the training set Q˜ be characterized by a distinct set of feature MoG components.
Namely, no two training poses q1, q2 are allowed to be associated with feature components falling in the
same cluster for each approximate feature space:
6 ∃q1, q2 s.t. yi(q1), yi(q2) ∈ Yjii ∀i
for the same j1, ..., jN .
Imagine that the N feature vector components y1, ..., yN generated by a test image are such that:
y1 ∈ Yj11 , · · · , yN ∈ YjNN . Each piece of evidence yi ∈ Yjii implies that the object’s pose lies within the
subset ρi(Yjii ) of the training set Q˜. The estimated pose must then fall inside the set:
(122) ρ1(Yj11 ) ∩ · · · ∩ ρN(YjNN ) ⊂ Q˜.
Sample object poses in the same intersection of the above form are indistinguishable under the given
evidential model. The collection of all the non-empty intersections of the form (122) is nothing but the
minimal refinement Θ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ΘN of the FODs Θ1, ...,ΘN (recall Theorem 1).
It follows that:
THEOREM 41. Any two poses of the training set can be distinguished under the evidential model iff
Q˜ is the minimal refinement of Θ1, ...,ΘN .
PROOF. ⇒: if any two sample poses can be distinguished under the model, i.e., for all k, k′
(123) qk′ 6∈ ρ1(Yj11 ) ∩ · · · ∩ ρN(YjNN ) 3 qk,
it follows that each intersection of the form (122) cannot contain more than one sample pose, other-
wise there would exist a pair violating (123) (note that the intersection can instead be empty). Further-
more, each sample pose qk falls within such an intersection, the one associated with the visual words
Yj11 , · · · ,YjNN s.t. y1(qk) ∈ Yj11 , ..., yN(qk) ∈ YjN1 . Hence, the minimal refinement of Θ1,...,ΘN has as
elements (122) all and only the individual sample poses (elements of Q˜): therefore, Q˜ = Θ1⊗· · ·⊗ΘN .
⇐: if Q˜ is the minimal refinement of Θ1,...,ΘN then for all qk ∈ Q˜ we have that {qk} = ρ1(Yj11 ) ∩
· · · ∩ ρN(YjNN ) holds for some unique selection of feature components Yj11 , · · · ,YjNN , distinct for each
training pose. Any two different sample poses belong therefore to different intersections of the form
(122), i.e., they can be distinguished under the model. 
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The ‘self-consistency’ of the model can then be measured by the ratio between the cardinality of the
minimal refinement of Θ1, ...,ΘN , and that of the actual approximate parameter space Q˜:
1
T
≤ |
⊗
i Θi|
|Q˜| ≤ 1.
It is hence desirable, in the training stage, to select a collection of features which brings the minimal
refinement Θ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ΘN as close as possible to Q˜: sometimes the addition of new features will be
desirable in order to resolve any ambiguities.
4.2. Complementarity of features and model quantization. When the approximate feature spaces
Θi are independent (Definition 15), for each combination of feature clusters Yj11 , · · · ,YjNN there exists a
unique sample pose qk characterized by feature values in those clusters:
(124) {qk} = ρ1(Yj11 ) ∩ · · · ∩ ρN(YjNN ).
In this case different cues carry complementary pieces of information about the object’s pose – to resolve
an individual sample pose qk you need to measure all its feature values.
When the approximate feature spaces are not independent, on the other hand, two situations may mate-
rialize: while in some cases fewer than N feature values may be enough to resolve some training poses,
in general each combination of feature values will yield a whole set of training poses.
If the model is self-consistent (|Q˜| = |⊗iΘi|, Section 4.1) and the chosen features are complementary
(i.e., they are such that | ⊗i Θi| =
∏
i |Θi|), we have that T = |Q˜| ∼ n1 × ... × nN : assuming ni =
const = n this yields n ∼ N√T . Given a realistic sampling of the parameter space with T = 20000, the
use of N = 9 complementary features allows us to require no more than 9
√
20000 ∼ 3 MoG components
for each feature space in order to ensure a decent accuracy of the estimate.
This shows the clear advantage of encoding feature-pose maps separately: as long as the chosen
features are uncorrelated, a relatively coarse MoG representation for each feature space allows us to
achieve a reasonable resolution in terms of pose estimates2.
4.3. On conflict and the relation between approximate and actual pose space. Ideally, the set
Q˜ of training poses, as an approximation of the actual pose space Q, should be somehow ‘dense’ in Q:
∀q ∈ Q there should be a sample qk such that ‖q − qk‖ <  for some  small enough. Clearly, such a
condition is hard to impose.
The distribution of the training poses within Q has nevertheless a number of consequences on the esti-
mation process:
1) as the true pose space Q is typically non-linear, while the pose estimate is a linear combination
of sample poses (see Section 3.3), the pointwise estimate can be non-admissible (fall outside Q). This
can be fixed by trying to make the feature spaces independent, as in that case every sample pose qk is
characterized by a different combination (124) of feature clusters.
Under this assumption, any set of test feature values y1 ∈ Yj11 , ..., yN ∈ YjNN generates a belief estimate
in which a single sample pose qk is dominant. As a consequence, its credal set (Section 3.4.1) is of
limited extension around a single sample pose, and the risk of non-admissibility is reduced.
2) there can exist regions of Q characterized by combinations of feature clusters which are not in the
model:
∃q ∈ Q : ∀Yj11 ∈ Θ1, ...,YjNN ∈ ΘN q 6∈ ρ1(Yj11 ) ∩ · · · ∩ ρN(YjNN ).
This generates high level of conflict m(∅) in the conjunctive combination (117) (although combination
is always guaranteed for Dirichlet belief functions, see above), a flag of the inadequacy of the current
2In analogy to what proposed in [620] or [630], where trees of classifiers are used for face pose estimation.
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version of the evidential model. This calls, whenever new ground truth information can be provided, for
an update of the model by incorporating the sample poses causing the problem.
5. Results on human pose estimation
We tested our Belief Modeling Regression technique in a rather challenging setup, involving the pose
estimation of human arms and legs from two well separated views. While the bottom line of the eviden-
tial approach is doing the best we can with the available examples, regardless the dimensionality of the
pose space, and without having at our disposal prior information on the object at hand, we ran test on
articulated objects (one arm and a pair of legs) with a reasonably limited number of degrees of freedom
to show what can be achieved in such a case. We demonstrate how the BMR technique outperforms
competitors such as Relevant Vector Machines and GPR.
5.1. Setup: two human pose estimation experiments. To collect the necessary ground truth we
used a marker-based motion capture system [636, 643] built by E-motion, a Milan firm. The number
of markers used was 3 for the arm (yielding a pose space Q ⊂ R9, using as pose components the
3D coordinates of the marker), and 6 for the pair of legs (Q ⊂ R18). The person was filmed by two
uncalibrated DV cameras (Figure 5).
In the training stage of the first experiment we asked the subject to make his arm follow a trajectory
(approximately) covering the pose space of the arm itself, keeping his wrist locked and standing on a
fixed spot on the floor to limit the intrinsic dimensionality of the pose space (resulting in 2 d.o.f.s for the
shoulder and 3 for the elbow).
In the second experiment we tracked the subject’s legs, assuming that the person was walking normally
on the floor, and collected a training set by sampling a random walk on a small rectangular section of the
floor. This is similar to what is done in other works, where the set of examples are taken for a particular
family of motions/trajectories, normally associated with action categories such as the walking gait.
The length of the training sequences was 1726 frames for the arm and 1952 frames for the legs.
While the number of degrees of freedom was limited by constraining the articulated object (person)
to performing motions of a specific class (walking versus brandishing an arm), the tests are sufficiently
complex to allow us to illustrate the traits of the BMR approach to pose estimation. In addition, in
both experiments the background was highly non-static, with people coming in and out the scene and
flickering monitors. The object of interest would also occlude itself a number of times on at least one of
the two views (e.g. sometimes one leg would occlude the other when seen from the left camera), making
the experimental setup quite realistic.
5.2. Automatic annotation of training images. Under the assumptions listed in Section 1 in the
training stage the images ought to be annotated via a bounding box, providing a rough localization of the
unknown object.
To simulate this annotation process, and isolate the performance of the proposed example based esti-
mation approach from that of the object detector employed, in these tests we used color-based segmen-
tation to separate the object of interest from the non-static background, implemented via a colorimetric
analysis of the body of interest (Figure 6). Pixels were clustered in the RGB space; the cluster associated
with the yellow sweater (in the arm experiment) or the black pants (legs one) was detected, and pixels
belonging to that cluster assigned to the foreground. Finally, the minimal bounding box containing the
silhouette of the segmented foreground pixels was detected.
Note that this is just a way of automatically generate, rather than manually construct, the bounding
box annotation required in the assumptions of the initial scenario: the notion that no a-priori information
on the object of interest needs to be employed still holds.
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FIGURE 5. Two human body-part pose estimation experiments. Left: training images
of a person standing still and moving his right arm. Right: training images of the person
walking inside a rectangle on the floor.
5.3. Feature extraction and modeling. For these tests we decided to build an extremely simple
feature vector for each image directly from the bounding box, as the collection max(row), min(row),
max(col), min(col) of the row and column indexes defining the box (Figure 6). As two views were
FIGURE 6. Feature extraction process. Left: a training image Ik in the arm experiment.
Middle: the object of interest is color segmented and the bounding box containing the
foreground is detected to simulate localization annotation. Right: the row and column
indices of the vertices of the bounding box are collected in a feature vector ~yk.
available at all times, at each time instant two feature vectors of dimension 4 were computed from the
two views.
In the arm experiment we built three different evidential models from these vectors: one using N = 2
features (max(row) and max(col)) from the left view only, and a Mixture of Gaussians with ni = n = 5
components for both feature spaces; a second model for the right view only, with N = 3 feature spaces
(associated with the components max(row), min(col) and max(col)) and ni = n = 5 MoG components
for each feature space; an overall model in which both the 2 features from the left view and the 3 features
from the right one were considered, yielding a model with N = 5 feature spaces with the same MoG
representation.
In the leg experiment, instead, we built two models with N = 6 feature spaces (the max(row),
min(col) and max(col) feature components from both views), but characterized by a different number
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of Gaussian components (n = 4 or n = 5, respectively) to test the influence of the quantization level on
the quality of the mapping (and therefore of the estimates).
5.4. Performance. To measure the accuracy of the estimates produced by the different evidential
models, we acquired a testing sequence for each of the two experiments and compared the results with
the ground truth provided by the motion capture equipment.
FIGURE 7. Top left: pose estimates of component 9 of the pose vector (Y coordinate
of the hand marker) produced by the left (red) and right (magenta) model compared to
the ground truth (blue), plotted against time. Top right: the sequence of pose estimates
yielded by the overall model (which uses features computed in both left and right images)
is plotted in (solid) red against the ground truth in (dashed) blue. Bottom: performance of
the overall model on components 1 (left) and 6 (right) of the pose vector, for the first 400
frames of the test sequence. The pignistic function is here used to compute the pointwise
estimates.
5.4.1. Arm experiment. In the arm experiment the test sequence was 1000 frames long. Pointwise
pose estimates were extracted from belief estimates via pignistic transform (121). As the anecdotal
evidence of Figure 7-top left indicates, the estimates of the single-view models were of rather poor
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quality. Indeed, recalling the discussion of Section 4.1, the minimal refinements
⊗
Θi for the left-
view and the right-view models were of size 22 and 80 respectively, signalling a poor model resolution.
In opposition, the estimates obtained by exploiting image evidence from both views (Figure 7-top right)
were clearly better than a simple selection of the best partial estimate at each instant. This was confirmed
by a minimal refinement
⊗
Θi for the overall model with cardinality equal to 372 (the N = 5 features
encoded by a MoG with n = 5 components were enough to resolve 372 of the 1700+ sample poses),
with 139 sample poses individually resolved by some particular combination of the N = 5 feature
values. Figure 7-bottom illustrates similar results for components 1 and 6 of the pose vector, in the same
experiment.
We also measured the Euclidean distance between real and expected 3D locations of each marker
over the whole testing sequence. For the arm experiment, the average estimation errors were 17.3, 7.95,
13.03, and 2.7 centimeters for the markers ‘hand’, ‘wrist’, ‘elbow’ and ‘shoulder’, respectively. As
during testing the features were extracted from the estimated foreground, and no significant occlusions
were present, the conflict between the different feature components was negligible throughout the test
sequence.
5.4.2. Lower and upper estimates associated with the credal estimate. As each belief estimate bˆ
amounts to a convex set P [bˆ] of probability distributions on Q˜, an expected pose estimate can be com-
puted for each of its vertices (25). The BMR approach can therefore provide a robust pose estimate, for
instance by computing for each instant t the maximal and minimal expected value (over the vertices of
P [bˆ]) of each component of the pose vector.
Figure 8 plots these upper and lower bounds to the expected pose values in the arm experiment, for
three different components of the pose vector, over three distinct subsequences of the test sequence.
As it can be clearly observed, even for the rather poor (feature-wise) evidential model built here, most
of the time the true pose falls within the provided interval of expected pose estimates. Quantitatively,
the percentage of test frames in which this happens for the twelve pose components is 49.25%, 44.92%,
49.33%, 50.50%, 48.50%, 48.33%, 49.17%, 54.42%, 49.67%, 51.50%, 39.33% and 43.50%, respec-
tively. We can also measure the average Euclidean distance between the true pose estimate and the
boundary of the interval of expected poses, for the four markers and along the entire test sequence: we
obtain average 3D distances of 7.84cm, 3.85cm, 5.78cm and 2.07cm for the four markers, respectively.
These give a better indication of the robustness of the BMR approach than errors measured with respect
to a central expected pose estimate (see Figure 13-right for a comparison).
Note that in these tests the pose estimate interval was computed using just a subset of the true vertices
of the belief estimate, for mere computational reasons. The true interval is indeed wider, and therefore
associated with even lower average estimation errors.
5.4.3. Comparison with GP and RVM regression. It is interesting to compare BMR’s performance
with that of two well established regression approaches: Gaussian Process Regression [644, 645] and
Relevant Vector Machines (RVMs) [646]. The latter are used to build feature-pose maps in, for instance,
[609] and [626]. Figure 9 shows the estimates produced by a RVM on the same test sequences and
components of Figure 7. It is clear from a visual comparison of Figures 9 and 7 that our approach sig-
nificantly outperforms a standard RVM implementation. Quantitatively, the average Euclidean distances
between real and estimated 3D location of each marker over the whole arm testing sequence were, in the
RVM tests, 31.2, 13.6, 23.0, and 4.5 centimeters for the markers ‘hand’, ‘wrist’, ‘elbow’ and ‘shoulder’,
respectively.
Figure 10 shows instead the estimates produced by Gaussian Process Regression for the same exper-
imental setting of Figures 9 and 7. A visual inspection of Figures 10 and 7 shows a rather comparable
performance with that of the BMR approach, although the partial models obtained from left and right
view features only seem to perform relatively poorly.
Quantitatively, however, the average Euclidean distances between real and estimated 3D location of each
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FIGURE 8. Plots of lower and upper expected pose estimates ((120), in dashed red)
generated by the credal sets associated with the sequence of belief estimates bˆ(k), versus
the pignistic estimate (solid red) and the ground truth (in blue). Top: component 1 of the
pose vector, test sequence from k = 300 to k = 399. Middle: component 6, test frames
from k = 400 to k = 499. Bottom: component 9, test frames from k = 1 to k = 100.
marker over the whole arm testing sequence were, in the GPR tests, 25.0, 10.6, 18.6, and 7.0 centimeters
for the markers ‘hand’, ‘wrist’, ‘elbow’ and ‘shoulder’, respectively, showing how our belief-theoretical
approach clearly outperforms this competitor as well.
Figure 11 plots the confidence intervals of the estimates produced by Gaussian Process Regression
for the same test sequences of Figure 8. A confidence level of 95% (corresponding to an interval of two
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FIGURE 9. Top left: pose estimates of component 9 of the pose vector (Y coordinate
of the hand) produced by an RVM using only the left (red) and right (magenta) features,
compared to the ground truth (blue), plotted against time. Top right: pose estimates
yielded by a RVM regression model which uses features computed in both left and right
images plotted in (solid) red against the ground truth in (dashed) blue. Bottom: perfor-
mance of the overall model on components 1 (left) and 6 (right) of the pose vector, for
the first 400 frames of the test sequence.
standard deviations) is used.
We want to stress, however, the difference between the confidence band (shown in Figure 11) associated
with a single Gaussian distribution on the outputs (poses) (such as the prediction function p(q|y, Q˜, y˜)
of a GPR) which is characterized by a single mean estimate and a (co)-variance, and the interval of
expected (mean) poses associated with a belief estimate (which amounts to entire family of probability
distributions) shown in Figure 8.
This is a consequence of the second-order uncertainty encoded by belief functions, as opposed to single
classical probability distributions. Indeed, for each vertex of the credal estimate produced by BMR
we could also compute (besides an expectation) a covariance and a confidence band: the cumulated
confidence bands for all Probability Distribution Functions (PDFs) in the credal estimate would be a
fairer comparison for the single confidence band depicted in Figure 11, and would better illustrate the
approach’s robustness.
5.4.4. Testing models of different resolutions in the legs experiment. Figure 12 shows BMR’s per-
formance in the leg experiment, for a 200-frame-long test sequence. Again, the pignistic transform was
adopted to extract a pointwise pose estimate at each time instant. The estimates generated by two models
with the same number of feature spaces (N = 6) but different number of MoG components per feature
space (n = 5, red; n = 4, magenta) are shown, to analyze the effect of quantization on the model.
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FIGURE 10. GPR pose estimates in the same experimental setting of Figures 7 and 9.
The results were a bit less impressive (but still good), mainly due to the difficulty of automatically
segmenting a pair of black pants against a dark background (see Figure 5-right). Again, this cannot be
considered an issue of the BMR approach, as annotation is supposed to be given in the training stage. A
quantitative assessment returned average estimation errors (for the pignistic expected pose estimate and
the model with n = 5) of 25.41, 19.29, 21.84, 19.88, 23.00, and 22.71 centimeters, respectively, for the
six markers (located on thigh, knee and toe for each leg). Consider that the cameras were located at a
distance of about three meters. No significant differences in accuracy could be observed when reducing
the number of MoG components to 4. As in the arm experiment, no significant conflict was reported.
In this sense these tests did not allow us to illustrate the ability of the evidential approach to detect
foreground features in the case of occlusions or imprecise localization: more challenging tests will need
to be run in the near future.
5.4.5. When ground truth is not available: visual estimates. When ground truth is not available in
the training stage, the pignistic probability pˆ on Q˜ extracted from the belief estimate bˆ can be used to
render, given a test image, a visual estimate in terms of the weighted sum of sample images:
(125) Iˆ =
∑
k=1,...,T
pˆ(qk) · I(k).
Figure 13 compares the results of this visual estimate with the corresponding, real, test image. The
accuracy of this visual reconstruction can be easily appreciated. Some fuzzyness is present, due to the
fact that the visual estimate is the extrapolation of possibly many sample images, and expresses the
degree to which the estimate is inaccurate.
5.4.6. Conjunctive combination versus vectorization. Finally, it is interesting to assess the advantage
of combining a number of separate belief functions for each component of the feature vector, rather than
piling up all the features in a single observation vector. As a term of comparison, therefore, we applied
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FIGURE 11. The confidence intervals (at two standard deviations) associated with GPR
estimates (in red) are plotted here against the ground truth (in blue) for the same test
sequences of Figure 8.
the same estimation scheme to a single feature space, composed by whole feature vectors, rather than the
collection of spaces associated with individual feature components. We applied EM to the set of training
feature vectors, with a varying number n of MoG clusters.
Figure 13-right plots the different average estimation errors for the four markers in the arm experiment
along the whole testing sequence of length 1000, as produced by the two-view, multiple feature space
evidential model versus a single feature space one generated by applying EM to whole feature vectors.
The pignistic function was again used here to compute the point-wise expected estimate. The solid red
line represents the performance of the multiple feature space model, versus a number of black lines
associated with single feature space models with a number of MoG clusters n equal to 3, 5, 7, 10, 20 and
30, respectively.
In a way, these tests compare the efficacy of the conjunctive combination of belief functions to that
of vectorization as a data fusion mechanism. Not only the former proves to be superior, but the plot
suggests that, after a certain threshold, increasing the number of MoG components does not improve
estimation performance anymore. Figure 14 visually compares the quality of the estimates for two
components (2 and 4) of the pose vector on a 100-frame long sub-sequence of the testing sequence.
Even though (in principle) there is no reason why quantizing a single, vectorial feature space should
yield poor performances, in practice it is impossible to learn the parameters of a Mixture of Gaussians
with a number of states comparable to the product n1 · ... ·nN of the number of clusters of the N separate
feature spaces. The EM algorithm is unable to converge: the best we can get to is a few dozen states, a
number insufficient to guarantee an adequate estimation accuracy.
154 8. BELIEF MODELING REGRESSION
FIGURE 12. Performance of two versions of the two-view evidential model with N = 6
feature spaces, in the leg experiment, on a test sequence of length 200. The pignistic
expected pose is computed for a number of MoG components equal to ni = n = 5 for
each feature space (red), and a model with ni = n = 4 (magenta), and plotted versus the
ground truth (blue). The estimates for components 4, 7, 9 and 12 of the 18-dimensional
pose vector (the 3D coordinates of each of the 6 markers) are shown.
6. Discussion
We wish to conclude by discussing the methodological justification of the proposed regression frame-
work, in the light of the problem to solve and in comparison with similar approaches, in particular
Gaussian Process regression.
6.1. Justification. In the scenario depicted in Section 1, any regression method we design needs to
represent the feature-to-pose mapping y 7→ q, which is unknown.
Consider first the case of a single feature function.
6.1.1. Naive interpolation. The training data {Q˜, Y˜} already provides us with a first, rough approxi-
mation of the unknown mapping. A naive regression approach may, for instance, apply to any test feature
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FIGURE 13. Left: visual comparison between a real test image of the arm experiment
(top) and the corresponding visual reconstruction (bottom) (125). Right: mean estimation
errors for each of the four markers throughout the test sequence of the arm experiment.
The errors delivered by the multiple feature space model are compared to those produced
by a number of single (vectorial) feature space model. When each scalar feature com-
ponent is considered separately and combined by conjunctive rule (solid red), rather than
being piled up in a single observation vector, the performance is significantly superior.
The dashed black line corresponds to a single feature space with n = 30 Gaussian com-
ponents. Solid black lines are associated with a quantization level of n = 20, 10, 7, 5 and
3, respectively. In magenta the average 3D distance from the interval of expected poses
(Section 5.4.2) delivered by the evidential model of Figure 7 is plotted.
value y a simple linear interpolator
y 7→
∑
k
wkqk
with coefficients wk depending on some distance d(y, yk) between y and each training feature yk. We
obtain a one-to-one, piecewise linear map (see Figure 15-left) which, when the training samples are
dense in the unknown pose space Q, deliver a decent approximation of the (also unknown) feature-to-
pose mapping.
Such a naive interpolator, however, does not allow us to express any uncertainty due to lack of training
information. Also, although the source of ground truth provides a single pose value qk for each sample
feature value yk, (self-)occlusions and projection ambiguities mean that each observed feature value y
(including the sample feature values yk) can be generated by a continuum Q(y) of admissible poses. In
particular, this is true for the extremely simple bounding box features implemented in Section 5.3.
When presented with a training feature value yk during testing, our naive interpolator associates it with
the corresponding training pose qk, which is in fact only one of a continuous set of poses Q(yk) that
could have generated that particular feature value.
156 8. BELIEF MODELING REGRESSION
FIGURE 14. Visual comparison between the estimates yielded by the belief combination
of scalar features (solid red line) and those produced by a single (vectorial) feature space
with n = 20 (dotted black) and n = 30 (dashed black) Gaussian components, versus the
provided ground truth (solid blue), in the arm experiment. A 100-frame long interval of
the testing sequence is considered. Results for components 2 and 4 of the pose vector are
shown.
6.1.2. Intervals of pose estimates in the cluster-refining framework. The most interesting and real-
istic situation is that in which the training samples are sparse in Q. Even assuming that the sought map
is one-to-one (which is not), any regressor will be uncertain about the value of the pose far from the
available samples. What we need, is to be able to: 1- express the uncertainty on the value of the map far
from the samples, but also 2- express the fact that to any y may correspond an entire set Q(y) of poses.
The evidential modeling framework of Section 2.1 addresses, to some extent, both these questions, as:
i) it provides an interval of (rather than pointwise) estimates in the regions of Q covered by samples
(clusters); ii) it describes the uncertainty on the value of the pose far from the samples. Let us see how.
In the regions covered by samples the interval of possible poses is estimated on the basis of the interval
[qmin, qmax] of sample pose values in the cluster Q˜k, where:
qmin = minqk∈Q˜k qk, qmax = maxqk∈Q˜k qk.
The rationale is that if close feature values yk yield different poses qks, this may signal what we called
‘inherent’ ambiguity (in that region of Q× Y each feature value y may be generated by a wide interval
Q(y) of admissible poses): see zone 1 in Figure 15-left.
Far from the clusters (zone 2 of Figure 15-left) this interval uncertainty is propagated via Equation
(114), by assigning a total weight
∑
k wk = Γ
j(y)/Z to the ensemble of samples of each cluster (equiv-
alently, by defining a belief function on the collection Q˜ of sample poses).
Given an interpolator function I : Y → Q:
(126) qˆ = I({pk, qk}, y)
mapping a feature value y to a pose vector qˆ (given a certain probability distribution {pk} on the training
poses {qk}), this translates into an interval of admissible poses for each test feature y.
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FIGURE 15. Left: lower and upper bounds to the pose estimate generated by a single-
feature evidential model. We picked component c = 2 of the sample poses q1, q2 and
q4 of the training sequence of the arm experiment of Section 5, and built a single-feature
evidential model using as training feature values y1 = 23, y2 = 38 and y4 = 86 and
n = 2 EM clusters (corresponding to {q1, q2} and to {q4}). A simple linear interpola-
tor (in green) yields a 1-1, piecewise feature-to-pose map which does a decent job when
the samples are dense in Q. Using Bayesian belief functions to encode feature values,
the uncertainty on the feature value in each cluster is smoothly propagated to the entire
range of feature values, obtaining the solid blue lower and upper bounds. Using Dirichlet
belief functions delivers wider, more cautious bounds (dashed blue). Right: the conjunc-
tive combination (117) of multiple features generates a framework with much expressive
power in terms of the family of mappings modeled. Here the complex, but still smooth,
shape of the lower and upper bounds generated by an evidential model with two feature
spaces in the same toy experiment is shown.
The overall effect of the cluster-refining framework which is the building block of our evidential model
is a ‘robustification’ of the estimates produced by the chosen interpolator function I (observe Figure 15,
zone 2 for the case of the expectation interpolator of Equation (120)). Still, isolated values which form
clusters on their own are taken at face value (zone 3, as in GPR): this is an undesirable but unlikely result
of EM clustering, which takes place whenever the number of clusters n is much smaller than the number
of training poses T .
6.1.3. Expressive power in terms of a family of mapping. In a single-feature evidential model, then,
the learned refining does not constitute an approximation of the true feature-pose map under the model,
but determines a constraint on the latter associated with a whole family of feature-pose mappings com-
patible with the given training observations. Such admissible maps are those and only those which
would generate the learned refinings given the same training data. They form an∞-dimensional family,
bounded by an upper and a lower admissible feature-to-pose functions. We can prove that these lower
and upper mappings are smooth, due to the smoothness of the Gaussian likelihoods Γ.
For sake of simplicity we consider here a single feature model, and set to zero the mass m(Θ) = 0 of
the approximate feature space Θ (compare Section (3.1)).
THEOREM 42. Suppose the interpolator function (120) is used to infer a pose estimate qˆ(y) from a
feature value y, given a probability distribution {pk, k = 1, ..., T} on the set of training poses Q˜ =
158 8. BELIEF MODELING REGRESSION
{qk, k = 1, ..., T}. Then, for each component qc of the pose vector q, both the upper bound sup qˆc(y)
and the lower bound inf qˆc(y) to the admissible pose estimates under a single-feature evidential model
for all possible test feature values y ∈ Y are smooth functions of y.
PROOF. We only prove the statement for the upper bound. A dual proof can be easily derived for the
lower bound. The former quantity reads as:
sup
p∈P[bˆ(y)]
T∑
k=1
pk(y)q
c
k,
where bˆ(y) is the belief estimate generated by a test feature value y, and P [bˆ(y)] is the corresponding
credal set. Since we consider a single feature model withm(Θ) = 0, bˆ(y) has n focal elements Q˜1, ..., Q˜n
with mass m(Q˜j) = Γj(y)/Z, with Z a normalization factor. Each is the image of a EM cluster in the
feature space. Together they form a disjoint partition of Q˜, so that:∑
qk∈Q˜j
pk(y) = m(Q˜j) = Γ
j(y)
Z
.
Therefore, we can decompose the upper bound as:
sup qˆc(y) = sup
∑
qk∈Q˜
pk(y)q
c
k = sup
( n∑
j=1
∑
qk∈Q˜j
pk(y)q
c
k
)
=
n∑
j=1
sup
( ∑
qk∈Q˜j
pk(y)q
c
k
)
.
But
sup
( ∑
qk∈Q˜j
pk(y)q
c
k
)
=
Γj(y)
Z
sup
qk∈Q˜j
qck,
for the sup is obtained by assigning all mass Γ
j(y)
Z
to the sample qk with the largest pose component
value. The quantity supqk∈Q˜j q
c
k does not depend on the test feature value y, but is a function of the
samples in the considered cluster j. Therefore
sup qˆc(y) =
1
Z
n∑
j=1
Γj(y) sup
qk∈Q˜j
qck
is a smooth function, the linear combination of the smooth functions Γj(y) with coefficients supqk∈Q˜j q
c
k.

These lower and upper bounds are depicted as solid blue lines in the example of Figure 15-left. Within
those smooth bounds, any one-to-many mapping is admissible, even discontinuous ones: a quite realistic
situation, for the actual pose space Q can have holes composed by non-admissible poses, generating
discontinuities in the feature-pose map.
The width of this family of mappings is a function of the number n of EM clusters:
sup qˆ(y)− inf qˆ(y) = 1
Z
n∑
j=1
Γj(y)
(
sup
qk∈Q˜j
qk − inf
qk∈Q˜j
qk
)
.
A low n amounts to a cautious approach in which training feature values are not ‘trusted’, and the
inherent ambiguity (number of training samples in Q(y)) is higher. Many clusters (n → |Q˜|) indicate
that we much trust the one-to-one mapping provided by the interpolator over the samples.
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6.1.4. Effect of mi(Θi) and sparsity of samples. An additional element in our regression framework
is constituted by the mass mi(Θi) assigned to the whole approximate feature space Θi (Section 3.1). Its
effect on the family of admissible maps is to further expand the band of estimates, depending on the
number of available training samples (as mi(Θi) = 1/T ). In Figure 15-left the expanded upper and
lower bounds due to the use of Dirichlet belief functions are depicted as dashed blue lines. It can be
appreciated how these are still smooth functions of y.
6.1.5. Choice of an interpolation operator. The shape of the family of mappings represented by a
single-feature evidential model (i.e., of its lower and upper bounds) is also determined by the choice of
the interpolation operator qˆ = I({pk, qk}, y). In Section 3 the interpolator function was the expectation
operator qˆ =
∑
k pkqk, but other choices are of course possible.
Different interpolators generate different families of feature-pose mappings.
6.1.6. Fusion of individual features. An additional layer of sophistication is introduced by the com-
bination of distinct features via the conjunctive combination of the associated belief functions. This
produces a rather complex families of compatible feature-to-pose mappings. Figure 15-right illustrates
the shape of the lower and upper bounds generated by an evidential model with N = 2 feature spaces. It
can be noted that, despite their more complex shape, these bounds are still smooth.
6.2. Differences and similarities with Gaussian Process Regression. It can be interesting to com-
pare the behavior of BMR with that of the classical Gaussian Process Regression (GPR) [628]. The latter
assumes that any finite set of observations are drawn from a multivariate Gaussian distribution. Accord-
ing to [628], a Gaussian process is defined as ‘a collection of random variables, any finite number of
which have (consistent) joint Gaussian distribution’. It is then completely specified by a mean m(s) and
a covariance k(s, s′) function over the samples’ (observations) domain, and it can be seen as a distribu-
tion over functions:
(127) ζ(s) ∼ GPj(m(s), k(s, s′)),
where m(s) = E[ζ(s)], and
(128) k(s, s′) = E[(ζ(s)−m(s))(ζ(s′)−m(s′))].
If the covariance function (128) depends on a set of hyperparameters, given a training set of noisy
observations {(sk = yk, ζk = qk)}K=1,...,T , and assuming the prediction noise to be Gaussian, we can
find the optimal hyperparameters of the Gaussian Process GP which best fits the data by maximizing the
log marginal likelihood (see [628] for more details).
With the optimal hyperparameters, we obtain a Gaussian prediction distribution in the space of targets
(poses):
(129) N (k(s∗, s)T [K + σ2noiseI]−1Ψ ′, k(s∗, s∗) + σ2noise − k(s∗, s)T [K + σ2noiseI]−1k(s∗, s)),
where K is the covariance matrix calculated from the training image features s and σnoise is the covari-
ance of the Gaussian noise. This is equivalent to having an entire family of regression models, all of
which agree with the sample observations.
Both GP and BM Regression model a family of feature-to-pose mappings, albeit of a rather different
nature. In Gaussian Process Regression, mappings are one-to-one, and a Gaussian Process amounts to a
probability distribution over the set of mappings. The form of the family of mappings actually modeled
is determined by the choice of a covariance function, which also determines a number of characteristics
of the mappings such as periodicity, continuity, etcetera. After conditioning a Gaussian Process by the
training data, we obtain a prediction function (Equation (129)) on Q which follows a Gaussian distribu-
tion (given a test observation and the trained model parameters). The predicted mean and variance vary
according to the test observations. In particular the training samples are assumed correct and trustworthy:
as a result, the posterior GP has zero uncertainty there.
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In opposition, Belief Modeling Regression produces a random set, an entire convex set of discrete
but arbitrary PDFs, but on the set of sample poses Q˜, rather than on Q. As we have seen, given an
interpolation function this random set corresponds to a constrained family of mappings, rather than a
distribution over the possible maps as in GPR. The resulting mappings are arbitrary and interval-like, as
long as they meet the upper and lower constraints, or, equivalently, as long as they generate the learned
refinings under the training data. The shape of the family of mappings does depend on the chosen
interpolation operator, while its width is a function of the number of clusters n and the mass of the whole
feature space Θ. A feature of BMR is that uncertainty is present even in correspondence of sample
feature values (see above).
Different is the treatment of the uncertainty induced by the scarcity of samples (i.e., far from the
samples). In GPR the standard deviation of the prediction function is influenced by both the type of prior
GP selected and the distance from the samples. In BMR the width of the interval of pose estimates is
influenced by both the number ni of EM feature clusters, and the mass m(Θi) Dirichlet belief functions
assign to the whole (approximate) feature space.
6.3. Different inference mechanisms. Dirichlet belief functions are not the only possible way of
inferring a belief function from a set of likelihoods. Another option is to normalize the likelihoods (111)
generated by the MoG, obtaining a probability (or Bayesian b.f.) on Θi = {Y1i , · · · ,Ynii }:
(130) mi(Yji ) = Γji (yi)
/∑
k
Γki (yi).
Alternatively, the likelihood values can be used to build a consonant belief function (see Chapter 2,
Definition 25), i.e., a b.f. whose focal elements A1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ Am are nested, as in [52]:
(131) bi(A) = 1− max
j:Yji ∈Ac
Γji (yi)
/
max
j
Γji (yi).
The three different Bayesian (130), consonant (131), and Dirichlet (116) inference algorithms seem to
produce comparable results in terms of pointwise estimates, at least under the experimental setting of
Section 5, characterized by low conflict. Significant differences emerge, however, if we investigate the
nature of the belief estimate the different inference techniques generate.
In the Bayesian case, as the belief functions on the individual feature spaces Θi have disjoint (single-
ton) focal elements, their projection onto Q˜ also has disjoint focal elements. The conjunctive combina-
tion of all such b.f.s yields again a belief estimate bˆ whose focal elements are disjoint (Figure 16-left).
This means that a region of the pose space is supported by bˆ only to the extent by which it is supported
by all the individual features.
If the belief functions built on the available feature spaces are Dirichlet, their projections onto Q˜ all
have the whole Q˜ as a focal element. Therefore, their conjunctive combination (117) will have as f.e.s not
only all the intersections of the form ρ1(A1) ∩ · · · ∩ ρN(AN) for all possible selections of a single focal
element Ai for each measurement function bi, but also all the intersections ρi1(Ai1) ∩ · · · ∩ ρim(Aim)
(where i1, ..., im index any subset of features), and the whole approximate pose space Q˜ (Figure 16-
middle). This is equivalent to say that all partial combinations of feature evidence are given some credit,
for maybe only a subset of features is telling the truth. When conflict among different feature models
is present, this amounts to a cautious approach in which the most consensual group of features is given
support. The more so whenever the remaining features are highly discounted as less reliable (mi(Θi) is
high).
Finally, in the consonant case the conjunctive combination of single-feature belief functions yields a
belief estimate bˆ whose focal elements also form chains of nested sets of poses: one can say that the
resulting belief estimate is ‘multi-modal’, with a focus on a few regions of the (approximate) pose space
(Figure 16-right).
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FIGURE 16. Left: when using Bayesian belief functions to encode feature values all the
focal elements of the belief estimate bˆ on Q˜ are disjoint, namely intersections ρ1(A1) ∩
· · · ∩ ρN(AN) of one focal element per feature. Focal elements are depicted as ellipses,
while edges between them indicate inclusion ⊂. Middle: in the Dirichlet case all the
intersections ρi1(Ai1) ∩ · · · ∩ ρim(Aim) generated by groups of m features are also focal
elements of bˆ with nonzero mass. Right: in the consonant case a number of chains of
nested f.e.s describe a multi-modal support for different regions of the pose space.
It is interesting to compare these three approaches by looking at the associated credal sets as well. The
size of the credal set represented by a belief estimate is a function of two distinct sources of uncertainty:
that associated with the belief function bi we build on each approximate feature space Θi, and the multi-
valued mapping from features to poses. Even when the former is a probability (Bayesian case), the
multi-valued mapping still induces a belief function on Q˜.
Consider a restricted, toy model obtained from just the first four training poses q1, q2, q3 and q4 in
the arm experiment. This way Q˜ has size 4, and the probability simplex there (see Figure 4 again) is
3-dimensional and can be visualized. Figure 17 depicts the credal sets generated by the three inference
mechanisms (under the above toy model) in correspondence of frame 13 of the test feature sequence of
the arm experiment. One can note how the credal set in the Bayesian case is the narrower (in fact in this
example it reduces to a single point, although not in general), while it is the widest in the Dirichlet case.
The latter amounts therefore to a more cautious approach to estimation allowing a wider uncertainty band
around the central expected value (which is the one we adopt in the tests, Figure 8). In the Bayesian case,
instead, all the uncertainty in the belief estimate comes from the multi-valued nature of refining maps.
While the size and shape of the credal set varies, the pignistic probability (magenta star) is pretty close
in the Bayesian and Dirichlet cases. Empirical evidence seems therefore to suggest that, when conflict is
limited, pointwise estimates in the three cases are fairly close (while differing in the attached degree of
uncertainty).
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FIGURE 17. Left: belief estimate, represented by a credal set in the simplex of all prob-
ability distributions on Q˜, generated by using Bayesian measurement belief functions for
frame k = 13 of the arm experiment, for a model learned from the first 4 sample poses
only. Middle: belief estimate for the same frame, generated using consonant measure-
ment functions. Right: belief estimate produced via Dirichlet measurement functions.
7. Towards evidential tracking
To conclude, we outline feasible options for extending the proposed belief-theoretical approach to
fully fledged tracking, in which the temporal information provided by a time series of feature values is
exploited to help pose estimation. Suppose you have a belief estimate bˆ(t) of the pose at time t, and
a fresh set of features at time t + 1. The simplest way of ensuring the temporal consistence of the
estimated pose is to combine the current estimate bˆ(t) with the evidence provided by the new feature
values. Namely, the latter will induce a belief estimate bˆ(t+ 1) via the algorithm of Section 3.6; this has
then to be combined with the old estimate by conjunctive combination, yielding an overall, ‘smoothed’
version of the estimate: bˆ(t) ∩©bˆ(t+ 1).
This approach, however, can easily lead to a drifting of the estimates, as no motion model whatsoever is
employed. In addition, it can be argued that in this way features at time t condition the estimates at time
t+ 1 just as feature at time t+ 1 do, which is wrong as a matter of principle.
The use of a motion model encoding the dynamics of the object to track is more sensible: however,
if this model were to be a-priori we would violate the assumptions of the example-based scenario of
Section 1. The way to go is learning a motion model from the training set, in the same way as we learn
feature-pose maps from it. Assuming that the temporal dependency satisfies a Markovian-like condition,
7. TOWARDS EVIDENTIAL TRACKING 163
FIGURE 18. Diagram of the proposed evidential tracking process.
i.e., that the pose at time t + 1 only depends on the pose at time t, the following framework can be
formulated.
7.1. Learning a motion model from the training set. Consider a frame of discernment ˜˙Q = Q˜×Q˜
whose elements (qk, qk′) can be interpreted as transitions qk 7→ qk′ from sample pose qk to sample pose
qk′ . This frame is trivially partitioned into T disjoint subsets
˜˙Q = Q˜1 ∪ · · · ∪ Q˜T , each of them Q˜k
associated with a sample pose qk, and collecting all possible qk 7→ qk′ transitions originating from qk.
We can then mine the information carried by the training set, and infer for each element of this partition
a belief function mk : 2Q˜k → [0, 1] with the following b.p.a.:
mk(qk 7→ qk′) = (1− ) · #transitions from qk to qk′
#times qk appears in Q˜
, mk(Q˜k) = .
The discounting factor  is a measure of how well the motion model learned from the training set ap-
proximates the true, unknown model of the object’s dynamics: in the ideal case mk(Q˜k) = 0. As this
is achieved only by collecting an infinite number of samples,  = 1
#times qk appears in Q˜ is a reasonable
albeit imperfect choice for such a factor. The training set also provides a-priori information on the sam-
ple poses themselves (i.e., on the elements Q˜k of the considered disjoint partition of ˜˙Q), which can be
encoded as a probability distribution on the partition itself:
m0(Q˜k) = #times qk appears in Q˜
T
.
7.2. Tracking process. Given the above belief functions with b.p.a.s m1, ..., mT defined on the
individual elements Q˜1, ..., Q˜T of the partition, and the a-priori distribution m0 on the latter, we need to
derive a single belief function on the transition frame ˜˙Q. This amount to solving the total belief theorem
[553], formulated in Chapter 7, Theorem 39.
Once such a total belief function on ˜˙Q representing the learned motion model is obtained, it can be
combined with the current belief pose estimate bˆ(t) (which is defined on Q˜) on the joint estimation space
˜˙Q×Q˜, the Cartesian product of the two (Figure 18). The resulting belief function can later be projected
back onto the approximate pose space Q˜, where it represents the predicted pose given the pose at time t
and the learned motion model.
Finally, the latter is combined with the belief functions inferred from the available feature measurements
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at time t + 1, yielding a belief estimate of the pose qˆ(t + 1) which incorporates both the current feature
evidence and the predictions based on the motion model learned in the training stage.
8. Conclusive comments
In this conclusing Chapter we have illustrated a novel approach to example-based pose estimation,
in which the available evidence comes in the form of a training set of images containing sample poses
of an unspecified object, whose location within those images is provided. Ground truth is available in
the training stage in the form of the configurations of these sample poses. An evidential model of the
object is learned from the training data, under weak likelihood models built separately for each feature,
and is exploited to estimate the pose of the object in any test image. Framing the problem within belief
calculus is natural as feature-pose maps induce belief functions in the pose space, and it allows to exploit
the available, limited evidence without additional assumptions, with the goal of producing the most
sensible possible estimate with an attached degree of reliability.
The approach has been tested in a fairly challenging human pose recovery setup and shown to outper-
form popular competitors, demonstrating its potential even in the presence of poor feature representa-
tions. These results open a number of interesting directions: a proper empirical testing of object local-
ization algorithms in conjunction with the proposed Belief Modeling Regression approach; an efficient
conflict resolution mechanism able to discriminate as much as possible foreground from background
features; the testing of the framework on higher-dimensional pose spaces; the full development of the
outlined evidential tracking approach.
Part 4
Conclusions

CHAPTER 9
Conclusions
The aim of this Book was not to prove that the generalization of probability theory due to the work
of Dempster and Shafer in the first place, but also of Smets, Shenoy, Denoeux, Kohlas and others, is the
right way to cope with uncertainty in all practical situations arising in computer vision and other fields
of applied science. As we have largely shown in our extensive review of Chapter 3, the debate on the
philosophical foundations of uncertainty theory is still raging. To date, however, the most widespread
view supports the notion that no one formalism can be seen as superior to all others – the choice, in fact,
should depend on the specific application at hand [384, 647]. Partecipating in this debate, at any rate, is
beyond the scope of this Book.
We hope instead to have at least succeeded in giving a flavor of the richness of the mathematical formal-
ism of the theory of evidence, in terms of both its applicability to many important problems (in particular
within computer vision), and of the variety of sophisticated theoretical issues generated by the greater
mathematical complexity and ‘internal structure’ belief functions possess when compared to classical
probabilities. Once again we would like to stress that all the theoretical advances presented here are di-
rect consequences of the formulation of evidential solutions to the vision applications of Part III, which
have been illustrated in detail later in the volume only for pedagogical reasons.
The number of facts and properties yet to be understood remains daunting, and only a brief mentioning
of some of them is possible here. The geometric analysis of Chapter 4 is only at its initial stage, even
though interesting results have already been achieved. We now have a picture of the behavior of belief
functions as geometrical objects, but the questions which initially motivated this approach are still to
be addressed. General expressions for the natural consonant and probabilistic transformations belief
functions based on the principle of ‘external’, Dempster-based behavior proposed in Section 6.3 are to
be found. The geometric ‘language’ we introduced, made possible by the commutativity of Dempster’s
rule and convex closure, appears promising – especially for what concerns the canonical decomposition
of a generic separable support function. Some steps in this direction have been recently taken in [648].
A fascinating consequence of our algebraic study of families of compatible frames, given their strong
connection to the very definition of support function, could be a new interpretation of the notion of fam-
ilies of compatible support functions – an issue closely related to the future potential solution of the
conflict problem via the formulation of a pseudo Gram-Schmidt algorithm we suggested in Chapter 6.
The canonical decomposition problem itself could be approached from a different angle by integrating
geometrical and algebraic tools to study the geometric interplays of belief spaces associated with differ-
ent compatible frames. The notion of lattice of convex hulls [70] could prove very useful in the pursue
of this line of research.
The notion of series of random variables or ‘random process’ is widely used in a variety of engineering
applications, including control engineering and computer vision – think of the Kalman filter formalism.
The geometric form of conditional subspaces derived in Chapter 4 could be employed to understand the
properties and features of what it is natural to call series of belief functions, namely objects of the form:
lim
n→∞
(b1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ bn).
A study of their asymptotic properties would kickstart the formulation of the evidential analogous of a
random process.
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The generalization of the total probability theorem illustrated in Chapter 7 is, in our view, a good
first step towards a satisfactory description of the combination of conditional functions in the evidential
framework. Our analysis of the restricted case provides important hints on the general treatment of the
total belief theorem, in terms of the multiplicity, structure and relationships of the solutions. In the future
we intend to investigate in more detail several alternative views of the total belief problem, an analysis
which could enrich our understanding of the theory of belief functions and its connections with appar-
ently unrelated fields of mathematics.
Homology theory, for instance, provides a natural framework in which to pose the graph-theoretical
problems which arise from the search of candidate total functions. Indeed, the collection of linear sys-
tems associated with candidate solutions form a simplicial complex (a structured collection of simplices,
see [70]). The transformations (107) associated with the edges of a solution graph resemble the formal
sum of a ‘chain’:
ck =
∑
i
giσi,
where σi is a k-dimensional simplex of the complex and gi ∈ G is an arbitrary element of a group of
transformations G.
Conditional subspaces constitute a bridge between the operations of conditioning with respect to func-
tions and conditioning with respect to events. It suffices to recall that:
〈b〉 = Cl(b⊕ bA, A ⊂ Cb),
where b ⊕ bA = b|A is the belief function b conditioned by the event A. Via this fact, the total belief
theorem can be formulated as a geometric problem as well.
Finally, control engineers could easily spot a different interpretation of candidate total solutions in
term of positive linear systems. The link is apparent whenever one compares the graph-theoretical layout
of candidate solutions with the ‘influence graphs’ of linear systems with all positive coefficients, or
rearranges their A matrices into matrices with binary 0/1 entries. Potentially elegant theoretical results
could then be achieved by expressing problems concerning conditional generalized probabilities in terms
of well-known system-theoretical issues such as, for instance, controllability.
The regression framework proposed in Chapter 8 to solve the example-based pose estimation problem
is just an example of the potential the application of evidential reasoning to difficult, real-world problems
can express. Researchers in the theory of evidence tend (at times) to form a small clique of insiders,
focussing on theoretical questions of little interest to the outside world. Attempts to generate impact on
problems relevant to larger academic communities are limited, as attested by the diminishing numbers of
belief functions papers published at UAI, IJACAI or ECAI. The Belief Modeling Regression framework
shows that belief functions can compete with and outperform popular machine learning apparata such as
GPs and RVMs to tackle problems of widespread interest.
We hope this will encourange others to rise up to the challenge and compete with more established
formalisms on their own ground.
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